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Abstract  
 
This thesis will inquire into the practicable strategies that Thomas Hobbes described in 
his major works of political philosophy, on the one hand, to allow his sovereign to ensure civil 
peace, and on the other, to enable his sovereign to defend the commonwealth.  In terms of civil 
peace, the exercise of Hobbes’s sovereign’s ‘absolute’ authority is tempered by, and 
contingent on, its practical efficacy for securing and maintaining a peaceful commonwealth.  
To that end, I will argue that Hobbes’s sovereign is obliged to rule according to the natural 
laws, and entailed in this obligation are coinciding liberties which Hobbes believed that 
subjects must perceive themselves to possess, and which sovereigns must respect, in order for 
peace to be realised.  However, rather than situating the purpose of Hobbes’s project in terms 
of civil peace alone—as the vast majority of his interpreters have—I consider alongside the 
purpose of civil peace, and contrast it with, the purpose of defence.  Evident from this 
comparison is that the means by which Hobbes’s sovereign must ensure the capability of the 
commonwealth to defend itself from foreign nations simultaneously undermines and 
counteracts his otherwise proto-liberal system. Distinct from other prominent interpretations, I 
will argue that this ambivalence is not a result of an imbalance between subjects’ rights contra 
sovereign’s rights, nor yet of an unsupervised agonistic counter-balance between the two.  
Instead, the affirmation of subjects’ inalienable rights are depicted by Hobbes as a practically 
ineffective means by which to ensure defence.  There exists a necessary ambivalence within 
Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty itself and is to be managed solely according to the sovereign’s 
ideally prudent and practicable judgment.  Ultimately, I will characterize Hobbes as arguing 
that the unfortunate necessity of preparedness for foreign defensive wars is best mitigated by 
the sovereign’s prudent and minimal exercise of the commonwealth’s power in carrying out 
this intended purpose.   
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Introduction 
 
 
 
I know not how the world will receive it, nor how it may reflect on those that 
shall seem to favour it.  For in a way beset with those that contend, on one side 
for too great liberty, and on the other side for too much authority, ‘tis hard to 
pass between the points of both unwounded (Hobbes’s Epistle Dedicatory of 
Leviathan). 
 
Interpreters of Hobbes have largely viewed and judged Hobbes’s project through this 
same perspective, which he himself clearly expected.  Broadly speaking, modern Hobbes 
scholars have been preoccupied with judging the extent and degree of Hobbes’s proto-
liberalism or absolutism.  However, what may at first appear to be a prosaic observation, yet 
which turns out to be anything but, is that this preoccupation has been paired with an 
interpretative concentration on Hobbes’s chief concern: civil peace.  It is no exaggeration to 
state that Hobbes is collectively viewed as being a theorist of civil peace; what is 
predominantly contested is where on the liberal-absolutist spectrum Hobbes ought to be 
positioned in his endeavour to theorise it.   
While I do not deny that Hobbes’s chief concern was civil peace, I do not believe it 
sufficiently attentive or reasonable to exclude from thorough investigation Hobbes’s other 
unequivocally expressed concern: the defence of his commonwealth from foreign nations.  
It is useless for men to keep peace amongst themselves, if they cannot protect 
themselves against outsiders; and it is impossible to defend themselves if their 
strength is not united.  It is therefore necessary to the preservation of 
individuals that there be some one Assembly or one man who has the right to 
arm, muster and unite, on each occasion of danger or opportunity, as many 
citizens as the common defence shall require ... Both swords, therefore, the 
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Sword of war and the Sword of justice are inherent in sovereign power, 
essentially and from the very nature of a commonwealth (De Cive, 78-9). 
The role of defence in Hobbes’s works is, as I see it, far more prominent and 
consequential than others have allowed.  It is, to put it simply, understudied.  A study of it 
would therefore not only beneficially redress this neglect, but would also bring a novel 
perspective on Hobbes to the plurality of connective and jostling interpretations.  It would 
indeed be yet another—to borrow Noel Malcolm’s phrase—aspect of Hobbes; it would also 
be, however, a significant and heretofore largely overlooked aspect.  
This is precisely what I propose to undertake in this thesis.  In examining the role of 
defence in Hobbes’s political thought, I hope to add a valuable and novel perspective, 
specifically addressing the ‘Hobbes as proto-liberal or absolutist’ debate.  Rather than 
situating the purpose of Hobbes’s project in terms of civil peace alone, I add alongside the 
purpose of peace, and contrast it with, the purpose of defence.  
I will generally argue that the ‘proto-liberal vs. absolutist’ tension apparent in 
Hobbes’s system is, in large part, attributable to the opposing means by which to ensure the 
dual purposes of sovereignty.  The implications I will draw from this are that: (i) there exists 
an inherent ambivalence in Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty, created by the two distinct 
purposes of civil peace and defence; (ii) the means by which Hobbes’s sovereign must ensure 
the capability of the commonwealth to defend itself counteracts his otherwise liberal-absolutist 
system; (iii) this is so because the means by which Hobbes conceived that these two different 
ends would be achieved are incompatible or in tension in important respects. 
I will ask, therefore, what the role of defence is within Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty 
and inquire into the effect it has on the extent and degree to which his system is proto-liberal 
or absolutist.  I will broadly answer that the ambivalence between proto-liberalism and 
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absolutism in Hobbes’s system—dominating his texts and reflected and amplified in the 
literature—is not attributable simply to the endeavour for civil peace; it exists also because of 
the sovereign’s mandate to defend the commonwealth from foreign nations. 
Hobbes, I will argue, limits the sovereign’s authority in various ways for the sake of 
civil peace; for Hobbes, absolutism is not an end in and of itself; rather civil peace is, and to 
that end, the exercise of the sovereign’s ‘absolute’ authority is tempered by, and contingent 
on, its practical efficacy for securing and maintaining a peaceful commonwealth.  Hobbes’s 
system is, in other words, a liberal-absolutist hybrid.  I will also contend, however, that the 
means by which Hobbes’s sovereign must ensure the capability of the commonwealth to 
defend itself undermines and counteracts his otherwise liberal-absolutist system. 
 
Distinguishing features  
Hobbes, civil peace, and the ‘sword of justice’ 
Many modern interpreters of Hobbes share my claim that the authority of Hobbes’s 
sovereign is limited; the number and variety of arguments is considerable.  What distinguishes 
my interpretation in this thesis from others is a coinciding focus on (i) the religious aspects of 
Hobbes (as opposed to predominately secular readings), (ii) the practical and strategic aspects 
of Hobbes’s theory (as opposed to analytical or philosophical readings) and (iii) an emphasis 
on how Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty is itself limiting (rather than focusing on how 
Hobbes’s sovereign is ultimately limited by the rights of its subjects—as contra to, agonistic 
with, or isolated from, his theory of sovereignty). 
As for the first distinguishing feature, what Hobbes believed to be the chief cause of 
civil strife determines to a large extent how and why the sovereign is limited; I, unlike many 
others, assert that he held the Christianity of his time to be the chief cause of civil strife in 
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England, and accordingly, that this provides the rationale for a distinctly political-theological 
concept of sovereign authority, as well as for the limits to it. I will argue that the authority of 
Hobbes’s sovereign is largely justified in respect to its ability to resolve the “Christian 
problem”, and some of the most significant limitations on the sovereign’s authority are due to, 
and contingent on, this political-theological problem. 
Any description of the way in which Hobbes sought to attain peace, I believe, requires 
that one take notice of both the secular and religious aspects of Leviathan.  It is important to 
note, however, that many contemporary Hobbes scholars do not concentrate on the religious 
aspects of Hobbes’s thought, and they must be distinguished from those who do take into 
serious account the emphasis which Hobbes places on religious matters.  It is the focus of 
these two groups that differs.  The one group, who may be identified as secularists, ignore, 
marginalise or quickly explain away the religious aspects of Hobbes’s writings; while the 
other group, in contrast, take these aspects seriously into consideration1.  A. P. Martinich 
writes on behalf of all those who lay stress on Leviathan’s religious dimensions when he faults 
the secularists for presenting 
. . . a bowdlerized version of [Hobbes’] philosophy from which all the religious 
elements have been expurgated.  After mentioning that the last two of 
Leviathan’s four parts explicitly deal with religion, contemporary scholars 
typically claim that these parts are not important for understanding his 
philosophy and thus ignore them.  When religious topics or theological terms 
are introduced in the first two parts, these are typically passed over without 
mention or with a perfunctory and dismissive discussion, most notably in 
Hobbes’s discussion of the laws of nature.  One of the most popular editions of 
Leviathan excises parts III and IV completely.  When his religious views are 
                                                
 
1 There has been, however, a marked increase in the interest shown in Leviathan’s religious content.  As attested 
to by Paul D. Cooke, in Hobbes and Christianity: Reassessing the Bible in Leviathan (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1996), p. 17, Christianity has “now become one of the major areas of contemporary Hobbes studies: 
the role of religion in his political thought, and, more specifically, the meaning of the entire second half of 
Leviathan, which deals exclusively with the Bible”. 
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discussed, only a select few are quoted.2   
 
When Leviathan’s religious content is taken into fuller account, I will argue, it is 
evident that Hobbes believed that Christianity—as his contemporaries understood it and 
practised it—posed a significant problem to the peaceful maintenance of a commonwealth.  
Hobbes’s understanding of this problem revolves mainly around his firm belief that men 
cannot obey two masters, which in a Christian commonwealth characterises the competing 
roles of God and the sovereign.  Hobbes may have privately held doubts about the truth of 
Christianity, but in Leviathan, it is evident that he did not seriously believe that the elimination 
of God is a viable option for eliminating the problem that Christianity poses for political 
authority.  Hobbes does not, in other words, present as an option the elimination of God as a 
source of authority.  He does not intend to eliminate the role of God as a master who warrants 
obedience.  Despite his belief that men cannot obey two masters, he presents a system in 
which men can, in principle, obey two masters: men may obey both God and their sovereign, 
without conflict occurring.    
Hobbes writes that it is “... in no man’s power to suppress the power of religion” 
(Behemoth, 82). Moreover, he believes religions “can never be so abolished out of human 
nature, but that new religions will spring from them, if suitable cultivators exist” (L, 71). 
According to these convictions, Hobbes does not intend to entirely suppress the power of 
religion; he believes this to be a fool’s errand.  Rather, Hobbes’s sovereign is one who may 
benefit from his subjects’ Christian beliefs; he may use their beliefs to support his own 
authority.  However, Hobbes’s sovereign is also cognisant of the dangers that these Christian 
                                                
 
2 A. P. Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan:  Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992, p. 14. 
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beliefs present to his authority.  
Hobbes’s sovereign must, therefore, also be mindful that “The power of the mighty 
hath no foundation but in the opinion and belief of the people” (Behemoth, 16).  For peace to 
reign in a Christian commonwealth, the sovereign must manage, argues Hobbes, the religious 
and political dispositions of his subjects.    
To ensure this, Hobbes goes to great lengths to make the management of these 
dispositions an obligation of any potential sovereign.  In addition, entailed in this obligation 
are coinciding liberties which Hobbes believes subjects must perceive themselves to possess, 
and which sovereigns must respect, in order for peace to be achieved.  The religious liberty 
belonging to subjects which is most crucial to the sovereign’s management of his subjects’ 
dispositions is the freedom of thought and belief.  Hobbes even goes one step further, I will 
argue, provisionally restricting the authority of the sovereign to be intolerant of religious 
expression so that subjects possess a limited freedom of religious expression.  
One of my chief aims, therefore, is to demonstrate that, in Leviathan, Hobbes sought to 
resolve the problem presented by Christian beliefs to the peaceful maintenance of a 
commonwealth.  Hobbes identifies the problem as fundamentally involving a perceived 
conflict, within each person, between obedience to God and obedience to man.  Hobbes, I will 
argue, attempts to eliminate this perception, and obligates his sovereign to manage this 
perception appropriately.  Entailed in this management is tolerance: the sovereign must 
tolerate all inner religious beliefs, and Hobbes extends this tolerance to include, in certain 
circumstances, religious expression.   
Notice my emphasis on how Hobbes’s resolution to the problem revolves around, and 
is incumbent upon, the sovereign’s management of it, which relates directly to the second and 
third distinguishing features of my interpretation.  I, unlike many others, assert that Hobbes 
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was more concerned with the causes of just conduct, with the strategic means to procure 
peace, than he was with discovering or creating a universal deontology3. 
This focus constitutes the second distinguishing feature of my interpretation.  In this 
crucial regard, I have been influenced by Charles D. Tarlton’s observation that:  
Hobbes studies have for a long time focused on questions relating to the 
grounds of political obligation, the anomalies of absolute sovereignty, the 
moral bases of authority (its derivation from natural law or consent) … and, 
generally, the logical and architectonic features of Hobbes’s treatment of 
political matters.  Much of this literature is, of course, highly valuable for 
understanding aspects of Hobbes’s thought.  Yet it is also very misleading 
since it has created the impression that in dealing with Hobbes a philosophical 
outlook is, by itself, sufficient.  Interpretation and criticism have portrayed 
Hobbes as a systematic philosopher, part of and concerned about the tradition 
of philosophical discourse—abstract, detached, and timeless.  But in so doing 
they have left whole categories of his political theory unaccounted (or merely 
formally accounted) for”4. 
The ‘practical aspects’ that I think have largely been neglected in Hobbes’s thought 
                                                
 
3 Amongst the most influential early such accounts are: H. Caton, “On the Basis of Hobbes’s Political 
Philosophy”, Political Studies 22 (1964); S. P. Lamprecht, “Hobbes and Hobbism”, American Political Science 
Review 34 (1940); C. B Macpherson, Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1962); P.  Riley, “Will and Political Legitimacy in the Philosophy of Hobbes”, Political Studies 21 (1973); A. E. 
Taylor, “The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes”, Philosophy 13 (1938), reprinted in K. C. Brown (ed.), Hobbes Studies 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1965); H. Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957); J. W. N. Watkins, Hobbes’s System of Ideas: a Study in the Political 
Significance of Philosophical Theories (London: Hutchinson, 1965). 
4 Charles D. Tarlton, “The creation and maintenance of government: a neglected dimension of Hobbes’s 
Leviathan”, Political Studies (1978) Vol. 26, No. 3, p. 307.  Very little has been written on such practical aspects, 
however.  One notable book length study of the ‘practical’ aspects of Hobbes is Geoffrey M. Vaughan, Hobbes 
Teaches Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and Political Education (Lexington Books, 2002).  While I agree with the 
importance of political education in Hobbes’s thought—and I will implicitly agree in Chapter 2 on this point—I 
will focus far more than he on the religious aspects.  Furthermore, I find his emphasis on political education to be 
missing an important component—the role of sovereign power in maintaining civil peace—which demonstrates 
that G. M. Vaughan’s concern was more with political education than with the practical concerns of effecting 
civil peace per se. See also Peter J Steinberger, The Idea of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004) in particular, chapter 1.  Quite recently, there has been an attempt find a kinship between what I will later 
call ‘governance’ with Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’ as best expressed in Michel Foucault, Security, 
Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977-1978, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham 
Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); attempts which may be of interest to scholars of Foucault, but 
which provide too little context or reference to Hobbes himself and Hobbes scholarship in general to be of much 
help for my purposes; see Leonie Ansems De Vries and Jorg Spieker, “Hobbes, War, Movement,” Global Society 
(2009) vol 23:4, pp. 453-474; and Ryan Walter, “Hobbes, Liberalism, and Political Technique,” The European 
Legacy (2011) vol 16:1 pp. 53-69.  
  
8 
must be defined clearly. By ‘practical aspects’, I very specifically mean those features of 
Hobbes’s thought that recommend prudent and pragmatic measures which Hobbes believed 
would be practically effective in the sovereign’s endeavour towards fulfilling one of two 
purposes: either to maintain a stable and secure political order, or to defend the 
commonwealth from foreign nations.   
I will discuss what I believe occasions this interpretative focus more fully in Chapter 3, 
which goes beyond more than merely noticing—it is hard not to—that such prescriptive 
aspects are present in Hobbes’s thought.  Moreover, it is important to note that my intent is not 
to study Hobbes’s period-specific advice or the rhetorical means Hobbes may have employed 
to make that advice more persuasive to his contemporaries.5 
I intend to exploit this interpretative opportunity to valuable effect, and these two 
distinguishing features—focusing simultaneously on the religious aspects and on the practical, 
strategic aspects—occasion the third, in which I view Hobbes as being primarily concerned 
with the problems posed to civil peace by religion and makes the management of those 
problems incumbent on the sovereign.   
That is, I will focus on the practical and strategic means afforded to the sovereign to 
effect civil peace, and in so doing I will demonstrate that (i) the exercise of sovereign authority 
                                                
 
5 This topic has been shown quite a lot of interest.  See, for example, J. Barnouw, “Persuasion in Hobbes’s 
Levaithan,” Hobbes Studies 1 (1988), pp. 3-25; David Johnston, The Rhetoric of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and 
the Politics of Cultural Transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); William Mathie, “Reason 
and Rhetoric in Hobbes’s Leviathan,” Interpretation 14 (1986), pp. 281-98; Philip Petit, Made with Words: 
Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008); Raia Prokhovnik, 
Rhetoric and Philosophy in Hobbes’s Leviathan ((London: Garland, 1991); Gary Remer, “Hobbes, the Rhetorical 
Tradition, and Toleration,” Review of Politics 54 (1992), pp. 5-33; William Sacksteder, “Hobbes: Teaching 
Philosophy to Speak English,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 16 (1978), pp. 33-45; Quentin Skinner, 
“Thomas Hobbes: Rhetoric and the Construction of Morality,” Proceedings of the British Academy 76 (1990), pp. 
1-61; Q. Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996); and Tom Sorell, “Hobbes’s UnAristotelian Rhetoric,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 23 (1990), pp. 96-
108. 
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is contingent on its efficacy for maintaining civil peace, and (ii) the sovereign is obliged to 
rule according to the practical, strategic prescriptions of the natural laws.  This is a notable 
departure from various other interpretations of Hobbes which focus on secular arguments for 
limited authority.  Moreover, it is also a departure from many of these same interpretations 
that present limits to the sovereign’s authority as being exclusively or mainly due to the 
contravening rights of subjects rather than as limits inherent or necessary in Hobbes’s theory 
of sovereignty itself.6  Rather than focusing on the limits to the exercise of sovereign authority 
as being primarily due to the sovereign’s and subjects’ respective, agonistic rights, I view such 
limits primarily as a consequence of Hobbes’s sovereign’s obligation to rule prudently in order 
to effect civil peace.   
 
Hobbes, defence, and the ‘sword of war’ 
 After making the above case, my attention will turn to Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty 
as one intended to ensure not only the effective maintenance of civil peace, but also the ability 
of the sovereign to defend the commonwealth.  With very few exceptions, nearly all of the 
                                                
 
6 Describing in full every interpreter who argues that Hobbes’ sovereign has limited authority, and does so based 
on either a secular rationale or a rights-based account, would be an unruly task. Unlike such accounts in general, I 
will argue that Hobbes’ sovereign is primarily limited because of the political-theological system he designs to 
remedy what he perceives to be the chief cause of civil strife: a confusion regarding to whom—God or man—
obedience is ultimately owed.  Amongst the most influential secularist and/or rights-based accounts of the 
sovereign’s limits which my interpretation contends against are: Deborah Baumgold, Hobbes’s Political Theory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Richard Flathman, Thomas Hobbes: Skepticism, Individuality, 
and Chastened Politics (Newbury Park, 1993); David Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan: The Moral and Political 
Theory of Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969); M. M. Goldsmith, Hobbes’s Science of Politics 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1966); Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Lucien Jaume, “Hobbes and the Philsophical Sources of 
Liberalism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’s Levithan, ed. Patricia Springborg (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007);Gregory Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1986); Susanne Sreedhar, Hobbes on Resistance: Defying the Leviathan (Cambridge University 
Press, 2010); and Quentin P. Taylor, “Leviathan Bound; or the Re-education of Thomas Hobbes,” Hobbes 
Studies 22 (2009), pp. 123-43; and J. W. N. Watkins, Hobbes’s System of Ideas: A Study in the Political 
Significance of Philosophical Theories (London: Hutchinson, 1973). 
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interpreters of Hobbes that I will discuss focus almost exclusively on Hobbes’ system as one 
designed to ensure civil peace. Very few interpreters, however, have problematised or 
discussed at any length the sovereign’s other purpose: defence. I wish to contend that the 
debate in the literature regarding the extent of Hobbes’s absolutism is incomplete, and is so 
because of a general and pervasive under-emphasis of defence as a crucial aspect of 
sovereignty’s mandate to ensure salus populi.  By overemphasising civil peace, so much so 
that it is, for most intents and purposes, portrayed as being the sole purpose of sovereignty, 
both sides of the general debate—both Hobbes-as-absolutists and Hobbes-as-liberal-
absolutists—seek to determine which one general strategy of the two (absolutism or liberal-
absolutism) Hobbes prescribed in order to procure the sole end, i.e. civil peace.  However, 
there are two necessary ends inherent in Hobbes’ understanding of salus populi, and it has yet 
to be fully considered how the requirements of defence interact, and counteract, with the 
requirements of civil peace. 
This focus must be distinguished from the numerous and multiplying studies on 
Hobbes which take interest in his international political thought.7  To put it briefly, my study is 
                                                
 
7 There are two broad conceptions (and one emerging conception) of Hobbes within international 
political thought (IPT).  The first may be classified as a ‘realist’ reading, and is concerned with describing how a 
Hobbesian commonwealth would or ought to act vis-à-vis others in an anarchic state of nature.  Key proponents 
of this view are: Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1979); Stanley Hoffman, The State of War: The Theory and Practice of International Relations (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965); Raino Malnes, The Hobbesian Theory of International Conflict (Oslo: 
Scandinavian University Press, 1993); Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: the struggle for power and 
peace, eds. Kenneth Thompson and David Clinton, (Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2005); Glen 
Newey, “Leviathan and Liberal Moralism in International Theory” in International Political Theory after Hobbes 
ed. Raia Prokhovnik and Gabriella Slomp (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011);  Haig Patapan, “The Glorious Sovereign: 
Thomas Hobbes on Leadership and International Relations” in ed. Ian Hall and Lisa Hill, British International 
Thinkers from Hobbes to Namier (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Michael Smith, Realist Thought from 
Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986); Kenneth Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral 
Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 2000).   
The second broad conception of Hobbes in IPT may be classified as a ‘rationalist’ or ‘English school’ 
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not concerned with how Hobbes’s commonwealth would or ought to act vis-à-vis other 
commonwealths.  My interpretation instead simply takes for granted that Hobbes’s 
commonwealth resides in a system of other commonwealths and must be prepared to defend 
its subjects from foreign nations. Questions concerning the nature of that international system, 
or concerning how it would or should relate to others in that system, are beyond the scope of 
this study.  I most certainly do not mean to imply that this literature is not producing some 
fascinating insights, nor that it is not relevant to my own study, however, my concern is 
specifically focused on the sovereign’s mandate to defend the commonwealth, and even more 
specifically, with how the practical necessity to be prepared to do so interacts and counteracts 
the sovereign’s endeavour to maintain domestic, civil peace.   
Continuing, then, with my focus on the practical, strategic aspects of Hobbes’s thought 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
reading, and is concerned with normative, evaluative questions of how Hobbes conceived his sovereign ought to 
act vis-à-vis other sovereigns in an international society.    Key proponents of this view are: Hedley Bull, The 
Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Hedley 
Bull, “Hobbes and the International Anarchy”, Social Research 48 (1981) pp. 717-38; Camilla Boisen and David 
Boucher, “Hobbes and the Subjection of International Relations to Law and Morality” in International Political 
Theory after Hobbes (2011); David Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to 
the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Charles Covell, Hobbes, Realism and the Tradition of 
International Law (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Murray Forsyth, “Thomas Hobbes and the external 
relations of states”, British Journal of International Studies 5 (1979) pp. 196-209); Noel Malcolm, “Hobbes’s 
Theory of International Relations”, in Aspects of Hobbes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002); Richard Tuck, The 
Rights of War and Peace (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999); John Vincent, “The Hobbesian Tradition in 
Twentieth-Century International Thought”, Millenium 10 (1981) pp. 81-101. 
There is a third conception emerging as well, which views Hobbes as a ‘constructivist’ which notably 
include: Beate Jahn, Classical Theory in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006); Michael C Williams, “Hobbes’s Theory of International Relations: A Reconsideration”, International 
Organization 50 (1996) pp. 213-36; and Michael C Williams, The Hobbesian Theory of International Relations: 
Three Traditions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
Where I differ from—in the main—nearly all of these IPT approaches to Hobbes is that I focus on the 
internal and practical aspects of Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty. First, although I focus on the sovereign’s 
mandate to defend the commonwealth, it is more specific than that: I focus on how the practical necessity to be 
prepared to do so interacts and counteracts the sovereign’s endeavour to maintain domestic, civil peace. 
Secondly, in this study I am limiting my concern to the ambivalence within his system, between that which is 
required for civil peace and that which is required for defence, and whether there are any limits imposed—by the 
sovereign’s obligation to endeavour for civil, domestic peace—on the sovereign’s intended exercise of sovereign 
instrumental power.  
 
  
12 
alongside my emphasis on the sovereign’s mandate to rule accordingly, I will study the 
purpose of defence in Hobbes’ major works of political philosophy.   
I will first concentrate on Hobbes’s conception of sovereign power, not in the usual, 
juridical sense (although this certainly is one way in which Hobbes conceives of ‘power’) but 
in another: as “The power of a man (to take it universally) is his present means to obtain some 
future apparent good … (L, 50)”. 
In this ’universal’ sense of the term, I will argue that Hobbes conceives of sovereign 
power in two distinct ways for two different purposes: natural power, intended to be exercised 
to effect civil peace, and instrumental power, to be exercised primarily to effectively defend 
the commonwealth.   
I will further argue that this creates an ambivalence in Hobbes’s system between that 
which is required for civil peace, and that which is required for defence. The ambivalence is 
most apparent on a moral-psychological level: the effect of natural power (submission) and the 
effect of instrumental power (governance), I will argue, counteract one another. 
I will also suggest that Hobbes’s description of the purpose of the sovereign’s exercise 
of instrumental power is not defence alone; it has a secondary purpose, which is to prevent the 
potential civil disorder which the defence of the commonwealth may cause if it is not 
coordinated.  This is very significant, I think, for it represents an acknowledgment by Hobbes 
that both generating and exercising instrumental power may be disruptive of the conditions of 
civil peace.  
I will discuss in more detail and in particular how Hobbes perceived that the generation 
and exercise of instrumental power may upset civil peace, and will present an argument that 
the limits to the authorised exercise of sovereign instrumental power are a result of the 
sovereign’s obligation to maintain civil peace, and not primarily, as others have argued, as a 
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result of subjects’ rights to refuse their contribution.   
Overall, and broadly speaking, I will characterize Hobbes as arguing that the 
unfortunate necessity of preparedness for foreign defensive wars is best mitigated by the 
sovereign’s prudent and minimal exercise of the commonwealth’s power in carrying out this 
intended purpose. 
 
Interpretative approach 
Hobbes scholarship has been, of course, a virtual battleground upon which 
interpretative and hermeneutical approaches to the history of political thought have fought it 
out, and I wish to only briefly sketch out the general interpretative approach of this thesis 
which, I think it fair to say, is well-tread and not without significant precedent.  In general, 
two camps have emerged: textualists8 and contextualists9, and I think Deborah Baumgold 
captures their distinct approaches well: “Textualism and contextualism are often represented 
as rival approaches to interpretation.  In the one, texts are to be considered without regard to 
external data while the other model equates textual meaning with understanding a work’s 
contextual significance”10.  
Again, to follow Baumgold’s lead here, she writes:  
                                                
 
8 An early and influential interpreter of Hobbes who may be identified as a ‘textualist’ is Leo Strauss, who writes, 
“an adequate interpretation is such an interpretation as understands the thought  of a philosopher  exactly  as  he  
understood it  himself.”  See Leo Strauss, “Political Philosophy and History,” Journal of the History of Ideas 10 
(1949), 39.  A fine example of a ‘textualist’ defence of interpreting Hobbes in like manner is articulately provided 
by Michael Oakeshott, “Introduction to Levitathan”, in Hobbes on Civil Association (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1975) pp. 3-8. 
9 According to Quentin Skinner, who at least in terms of Hobbes scholarship is the leading and most influential 
‘contextualist’, the “only history to be written is thus a history of the various statements made with  the  given  
expression,”  Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and Theory, Vol. 8, 
No. 1 (1969), p. 39. 
10 Baumgold, Hobbes’s Political Theory, p. 16.  See also her excellent discussion of the benefits and hazards of a 
textualist approach to Hobbes in Baumgold, “The Difficulties of Hobbes Interpretation”, Political Theory 36 
(2008) pp. 827-55. 
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It is by now also familiar to have pointed out the inadequacies of both models 
in pure form.  The danger of proleptic interpretation, that is, attributing to an 
author ideas that no one in the period held or even would have understood, 
attends a purely textualist approach.  Contextualist readings are subject to the 
contrary—of depicting masterpieces such as Leviathan as no more than 
examples of ordinary political discourse in their period.11   
 
The interpretative approach I think best suited to answer the questions I pose of 
Hobbes in this thesis falls quite squarely in the ‘textualism’ camp. I’m ultimately concerned 
with the practical and prescriptive measures Hobbes affords his sovereign to effect both civil 
peace and defence—which while they have contextual manifestations, such as the Christianity 
of Hobbes’s time, or the particular form of a seventeenth-century English militia—Hobbes’s 
understanding of such instances of cause and effect transcend the particular.  As Connolly has 
put it:  
There are many ways to set the background of a thinker of the stature of 
Hobbes.  We could concentrate on the religious controversies, civil wars and 
struggles between parliament and monarchy, show how these events entered 
into Hobbes’s concerns with peace and sovereignty and how they encouraged 
him to subordinate civil and religious bodies to the authority of the sovereign.  
That would situate Hobbes historically.  But it would not explain his response 
to those circumstances.  Numerous contemporaries of his living in the same 
circumstances reached quite different conclusions … For thought can be 
inspired, influenced, restrained by its circumstances, but not determined by 
them.  There are too many ways which a thinker, especially a thinker of the 
stature of Hobbes, can stretch the horizon of his times or creatively deploy the 
ambivalences in his life or redefine the constraints of contemporary debates”12. 
 
Or, as David Boucher has put it in reference to ‘traditional’ hermeneutics, while I “…. 
certainly recognize that there are vast differences between cultures and between the past and 
present,” I also, like Dilthey, think it entirely appropriate to “emphasize a common humanity 
which enables human beings, through their ability to empathize, to understand the expressions 
                                                
 
11 Baumgold, Hobbes’s Political Theory, p. 16. 
12 William E. Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 16-17 . 
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of life which have been left behind”13.  Similarly, I agree with Baumgold that “Whatever 
significance an argument may otherwise have, the least speculative statement of its purpose is 
the textual statement of the problem on which it bears”14.   
Or as Hobbes himself put it, and who deserves the final word on the matter:  
He that is to govern a whole nation must read in himself, not this or that 
particular man, but mankind, which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn 
any language or science, yet when I shall have set down my own reading 
orderly and perspicuously, the pains left another will be only to consider if he 
also find not the same in himself.  For this kind of doctrine admitteth no other 
demonstration (L, 5). 
 
Structure 
Finally, the thesis is structured in a way so as to emphasize and contrast these two 
purposes in the thought of Hobbes; Chapters One to Four are concerned with determining the 
extent and degree of the limits on sovereignty for the sake of civil peace, while Chapters Five 
to Seven are concerned with determining the extent and degree of the limits on sovereignty for 
the sake of defence, and how the respective means by which to ensure civil peace on the one 
hand, and defence on the other, interact and counteract. 
The intention of Chapter One is to present the absolutist view of Hobbes’s theory of 
sovereignty as understood by particular interpreters who argue this case in the narrow sense of 
being a practical and strategic solution to civil disorder.  While in subsequent chapters I will 
largely contest their absolutist view of Hobbes insofar as they tie it exclusively to the 
endeavour for civil peace, I will do so on largely the same interpretative terms: that the extent 
                                                
 
13 David Boucher, Texts in Context: Revisionist Methods for Studying the History of Ideas (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1985), p. 21. 
 
14 Baumgold, Hobbes’s Political Theory, p. 17. 
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to which Hobbes’s sovereign is absolute is determined by what Hobbes ultimately considered 
to be inimical to civil peace. 
In Chapter Two, I will first discuss in detail Hobbes’s presentation of the Christian 
problem.  This will be accompanied by a review of the literature dealing with Hobbes’s 
religious beliefs and his intent in relation to Christianity.  The chapter will conclude with my 
suggestion that the main body of literature has largely overlooked a crucial perspective, 
presented by Hobbes, on the sovereign’s role in the management of the Christian problem. 
While the natural laws are indeed presented by Hobbes as the foundation for the generation of 
a commonwealth and the sovereign’s authority, as the main body of literature has perceived 
them to be, they are also presented as rules to be followed for the maintenance of peace upon 
establishment of a commonwealth—a role which the aforementioned debate largely ignores.  
Rather than focusing on whether or not God is the source of the sovereign’s authority, I assert 
a simple interpretative fact: there exist two concurrent—but incompatible—accounts by 
Hobbes.  After acknowledging this, I turn away from finding an adequate or ultimate account 
of sovereign authorisation, and instead pursue the likely implication of the inclusion of two 
opposed accounts: Hobbes intentionally provided two accounts.  To suggest he did so opens 
up the possibility that Hobbes was more concerned that his readers should trust an account, 
either account, rather than irrefutably demonstrate one ultimate source of authority.  Hobbes 
is, as I accordingly understand him, entirely opportunistic about the reasons why certain 
behaviour ought to be considered just; his opportunism suggests he is more concerned with 
causing conduct presumed to be just.  The idea of God, I will argue, may in Hobbes’ view be 
used by the sovereign to eliminate the perceived choice between obedience to God or man, 
quite apart from—and practically far more important than—determining whether or not God is 
intended by Hobbes to be the actual source of the sovereign’s authority.   
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Moreover, this Hobbesian opportunism regarding the source of sovereign authority 
does not suggest that because there is no intended ultimate source of authority save for the 
sovereign’s will, the sovereign’s exercise of authority is essentially arbitrary.  Rather, I will 
argue that the inclusion of two sources of authority, one theistic and one secular, demonstrates 
Hobbes’s commitment to, and preoccupation with, effecting just conduct (i.e. peaceable 
conduct) over a concern for the reasons for calling that conduct just.  Hobbes’s opportunism is 
not to be interpreted as an attempt to undermine or confuse the source of higher authority—to 
which his sovereign would otherwise be subject—and hence to justify his sovereign’s 
absolute, unlimited and arbitrary authority.  Rather, its intention is to afford the sovereign two 
effective means by which to manage subjects’ disposition to obey, and to that end, the 
sovereign’s exercise of authority is contingent on its ability and obligation to maintain a 
peaceful disposition amongst subjects. 
I will discuss this role of the sovereign in Chapter Three by examining Hobbes’s 
theory of obligation in general, and I will ultimately focus on his theory of sovereign 
obligation.  Again, rather than focusing on the natural laws from the perspective of being 
either theistic or secular foundational principles—as much of the literature has done—I will 
argue from the perspective that the natural laws are obligatory guidelines for the maintenance 
of a commonwealth, once established.  I will demonstrate that the sovereign is accordingly 
obliged to do a number of things, all of which are necessary for the maintenance of peace in a 
commonwealth.  I will conclude the chapter by detailing precisely how Hobbes’s sovereign is 
expected to manage the Christian problem, and how this management is an important facet of 
the sovereign’s obligation.   
In Chapter Four, I will discuss how the sovereign’s obligation results in limits on the 
sovereign’s exercise of authority.  Hobbes, I will argue, intends these limits to serve his chief 
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concern, peace.  In particular, there are certain restraints on the sovereign’s exercise of 
authority which pertain specifically to the sovereign of a Christian commonwealth, and these 
restraints require the sovereign’s tolerance of religious beliefs and, in certain instances, 
religious expression.   
I will conclude that for peace to be achieved in a Christian commonwealth, Hobbes 
thought it necessary to oblige the sovereign to rule according to certain dictates. Hobbes 
identifies liberal, pragmatic tactics that must, he believes, be used by any sovereign who hopes 
to secure peace in a Christian commonwealth.  Absolutism is not an end in and of itself; rather 
civil peace is, and to that end, the endeavour for ever-increasing authority is not only counter-
productive, but in order to maintain subjects’ peaceful disposition and behaviour, limits on the 
exercise of authority are required. 
In Chapter Five, I will turn my attention to the means of defence, and argue that the 
essential difference between the requirements for civil peace and defence lies in Hobbes’ 
understanding of power’s respective role in practically effecting each.  This becomes clear 
when it is noticed—which it has not adequately been before—that Hobbes describes two types 
of power: natural power and instrumental power.  When exercised by the sovereign, natural 
power is that by which submission is ensured and civil peace maintained, and instrumental 
power is that by which the sovereign governs or uses his subjects in the defence of the 
commonwealth.   
I will argue that the natural power exercised by the sovereign is intended to prevent 
actions on the part of subjects that would otherwise be inimical to civil peace. On the other 
hand, that which is prescribed for the defence of the commonwealth drives and promotes 
subjects’ actions.  Instrumental power determines the conduct of subjects in a performative 
sense; that is, subjects must contribute to and perform actions for defence to be effective.  
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Defence is, moreover, an end which is corporate and runs counter to certain limits on 
sovereign commands, limits which Hobbes otherwise maintains are consistent and necessary 
with the endeavour for civil peace.   
In Chapter Six I will discuss the means by which Hobbes envisioned that his sovereign 
can generate and maintain the moral psychology necessary for subjects to submit, and 
alternatively, to be governed.  The two types of power to which subjects are subjected have 
moral-psychological consequences imposed upon them: one causes them to refrain from 
acting and to become, essentially, passionless; the other causes them to be used by the 
sovereign, being made to act on behalf of the commonwealth in its defence, and depends upon 
commandeering subjects’ power and necessarily generating their passions.  The two, I will 
argue, counteract each other, and are the basis for a moral-psychological ambivalence in 
Hobbes’ system, between that which is required for civil peace, and that which is required for 
defence.  Nevertheless, in bringing attention to and magnifying the means of defence in 
Hobbes’ system, I defend Hobbes against the highly influential suggestion that the 
interpretations of Leo Strauss, Carl Schmitt, Michael Oakeshott, and Richard Tuck make or 
infer: that his commonwealth is unable or ill-equipped to defend itself. 
In Chapter Seven, the question that I scrutinised in Chapters Two to Four—whether 
there are limits to the exercise of sovereign authority for the sake of civil peace—will be 
scrutinised again, here in the context of defence.  For the sake of civil peace, I will have 
determined that the sovereign is obliged to refrain from issuing commands which would be 
likely to undermine the authority or the beliefs upon which authority depends.  Hobbes’ 
sovereign is consequently limited in its exercise of authority, which includes being obliged to 
refrain from making commands to perform actions that would destabilise the otherwise 
peaceable disposition of subjects. 
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The question I will pose in Chapter Seven, however, is: are there exercises of 
sovereign authority, intended for the sake of defence, which will undermine the recognition of 
the sovereign’s authority?  While the sovereign has the right to freely exercise its authority for 
the sake of defence, are there instances or commands which will undermine the recognition of 
its authority, thereby threatening civil peace?   
Recall that I will have argued that the exercise of authority is contingent on its efficacy 
for civil peace. In Chapter Seven I will argue that this extends to the sovereign’s exercise of 
authority for the sake of defence.   
Crucially, I will engage with influential recent interpreters, most notably Deborah 
Baumgold and Susan Sreedhar, who also acknowledge that the sovereign is limited in terms of 
defence.  Both argue that the limits imposed upon the sovereign’s use of subjects in defence of 
the commonwealth are derived from the rights of subjects; their arguments are derived from 
the perspective of Hobbesian subjects.  Sreedhar argues that Hobbesian subjects possess the 
right to resist being used by the sovereign for the sake of defence15; Baumgold argues that 
ordinary subjects—with the notable exception of soldiers—do not have an obligation during 
peacetime to contribute to the commonwealth’s defence16. 
While I will generally agree with these two interpreters that there are moral and legal 
limits to the use of ordinary subjects, rather than looking primarily at the ways in which 
subjects might be entitled to refrain from contributing, I think it more fitting to understand the 
issue according to Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty, and will examine the ways in which 
generating their contribution may counteract and contradict the conditions of civil peace.  
                                                
 
15 Sreedhar, Hobbes on Resistance (2010). 
16 Baumgold, Hobbes’s Political Theory (1988). 
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There are, I will argue, commands that the sovereign may make that are judged by him to be 
necessary for defence, yet those same commands would undermine his authority.  In other 
words, I will argue that an important limit to the sovereign’s right to defend the 
commonwealth results from the sovereign’s obligation to maintain civil peace, and not 
ultimately nor primarily, as others have argued, as a result of subjects’ right to resist and 
refuse their contribution. 
Importantly, this implies that the ambivalence between that which is required for civil 
peace and that which is required for defence was intended by Hobbes to be neither a 
resolvable tension nor an unsupervised agonistic balancing act between subjects’ and 
sovereign’s rights.  Rather, the balancing act is an obligation of the sovereign alone, and the 
ambivalence is a necessary one contained within Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty itself: the 
balancing act is between the sovereign’s rights and the sovereign’s obligations.  It is, Hobbes 
concedes, a potentially dangerous ambivalence, yet it is to be managed solely according to the 
sovereign’s judgement. 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: 
Hobbesian absolutism 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The fundamental question regarding the extent and form of Hobbesian absolutism is 
whether or not the sovereign’s authority is limited.  While there have been many debates 
generated by this question, three in particular have become central.  The first two interpret 
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absolutism in a juridical sense, and are captured well by Susan Sreedhar:  
In summary, there are two ways in which the authority of a Hobbesian 
sovereign could be said to be ‘absolute’ or ‘unlimited’.  According to the first, 
the sovereign’s authority is unlimited if there is no power above him to judge 
and punish his actions.  According to the second, the sovereign is unlimited if 
there is no limit to the scope of his power, specifically his power to issue 
commands that bind subjects.17   
Hobbesian absolutism perceived from a juridical perspective, then, is concerned with 
either (i) sovereignty as an institution which, if it is admitted to be the sole source of positive 
law, is unlimited in what it can legislate and command18; or (ii) sovereignty as an institution 
which may be limited by its accountability to subjects and/or the resistance rights of its 
subjects19.   
The third prominent debate can be categorized as regarding deontological absolutism; 
the concern of those engaged in this debate is whether or not Hobbes’s sovereign is morally 
restrained or morally obliged by the laws of nature and, regardless of juridical absolutism, 
whether or not the sovereign is accountable to God.20 
 I will, of course, engage with key elements of these three debates throughout this 
thesis. However, in keeping with my interpretative focus and aims as outlined in the 
Introduction, I eventually intend to highlight the practical limits imposed by Hobbes’s theory 
                                                
 
17 Sreedhar, Hobbes on Resistance, p. 98. 
18 In terms of this first juridical debate, I will agree that yes, Hobbes’s sovereign can be characterized as absolute.  
I will do so with reference to Deborah Baumgold’s argument later in this chapter, yet add to it in Chapter Two 
what she largely neglects: the religious implications of this institutional absolutism. 
19 In terms of this second juridical debate, I will argue in Chapters Three and Four that Hobbes’s sovereign is not 
absolute. However, I will emphasize that the sovereign’s exercise of authority is limited because of its obligation 
to the natural laws and not ultimately because the sovereign is accountable to subjects or because of the agonistic 
rights of subjects.  
20 I will discuss this deontological debate at some length in Chapter Two, and what I perceive to be its intentional 
irresolvability will occasion a switch in interpretative focus.  More specifically, rather than attempting to 
determine whether or not God is the author of the natural laws, I will argue that the inclusion of both a theistic 
and a secular source of authority was intended by Hobbes to afford the sovereign with two different rationales to 
influence subjects’ dispositions to obey.  
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of sovereignty itself.  To that end, in this current chapter I intend to highlight an alternative 
and largely over-shadowed perspective on Hobbesian absolutism.  
Each interpreter whom I will discuss in this chapter describes the type and extent of 
Hobbesian absolutism as being his prescription to his particular understanding of the causes of 
civil strife.  Their shared interpretative assumption is that the extent to which Hobbes’s 
sovereign is absolute is determined by what Hobbes ultimately considered to be inimical to 
civil peace.  Hobbes’s sovereign, each ultimately argues, is unlimited because limits—to 
various degrees and forms—allow and cause civil conflict.   Limits are therefore understood to 
both disable the sovereign from effectively fulfilling its purpose and to counter the very reason 
why the sovereign’s possession and exercise of authority is necessary.   
The ultimate intention of this chapter, then, is to present the absolutist view of 
Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty as understood by particular interpreters who argue this case in 
the narrower sense of being a practical and strategic solution to civil disorder.  While in 
subsequent chapters I will largely contest their absolutist view of Hobbes insofar as they tie it 
exclusively to the endeavour for civil peace, I will do so on largely the same interpretive 
terms.21 
 
1.2 Historical context and critical reception 
 
A good starting point is to ask whether or not Hobbes was an absolutist in terms of his 
                                                
 
21 I will, in Chapters Two-Four, argue that the exercise of sovereign authority is contingent on its efficacy for 
maintaining civil peace, and yet, and this is where I will differ, that the sovereign is obliged to rule according to 
the practical, strategic prescriptions of the natural laws. Consequently, this imposes limits on the sovereign’s 
exercise of authority.  
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own historical context; in order to place him within it, however, it is necessary to first 
determine what the term ‘absolutism’ meant in that context; a difficult, if not impossible, task.  
Indeed, the manner in which Hobbes’s contemporaries reacted to him in general is a matter of 
dispute and has generated a very substantial amount of literature.22  A fine attempt to 
understand how the term ‘absolutism’ was used in seventeenth-century England is undertaken 
by James Daly, who in chiding modern historians’ overly broad understanding of its historical 
meaning, stresses just how ambiguous a term it really was:   
When one comes across the notion in a contemporary source, what does the 
user mean?  In what part of the century is he speaking?  What party, or faction 
within a party, does he belong to?  Does he mean that a monarchy is a model 
of its kind?  That the king has no superior?  Or is not elected?  Or cannot be 
resisted?  Does ‘absolute’ refer to the king’s right to occupy the throne, or to 
the extent of the power which the throne gives him?  Does it refer to a 
particular legal right, or to the form of government?  Does it denote a 
monarch’s right to raise taxes and make law without consent?  Or does it only 
mean that he is trying to enforce a legal right against opposition?  Or that he is 
trying to stretch such a right to questionable lengths? … Terms like absolutism 
and absolute monarchy often mean little more than this, that the historian who 
uses them is thinking of a regime where the king has or would have more 
power than twentieth-century scholars think a seventeenth-century king ought 
to have had.  That is not a very careful terminology.  It risks reading an 
essentially modern opinion back into historical evidence, a rash form of 
historical retrospection.  To avoid such traps, historians must strive for sharper 
understanding of a term ‘which is indeed a point rather controverted, than 
clearly decided by the author, that I have yet met withal.’23  
                                                
 
22 A selection of the best of this literature: John Bowle, Hobbes and his Critics, (New York, 1952); Mark Goldie, 
“The Reception of Hobbes”, in The Cambridge History of Political Thought, ed. J.H. Burns (Cambridge, 1991), 
pp. 589-615; Samuel Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan (Cambridge, 1962); G.A.J. Rogers, “Hobbes’s Hidden 
Influence”, in Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes, ed. G.A.J. Rogers and Alan Ryan (Oxford, 1988); and Basil 
Willey, English Moralists (London, 1965).  Quentin Skinner is the intellectual historian par excellence of 
Hobbes’ reception, and amongst his influential early contributions to this subject are: Q. Skinner, “History and 
Ideology in the English Revolution”, Historical Journal, 8 (1965), pp. 151-78; Q. Skinner, “The Ideological 
Context of Hobbes’s Political Thought”, Historical Journal, 9 (1966), pp. 286-317; and Q. Skinner, “Conquest 
and Consent: Thomas Hobbes and the Engagement Controversy”, in The Interregnum: The Quest for Settlement, 
1646-1660, ed. G.E. Aylmer (London, 1972), pp. 79-98. 
23 James Daly, “The Idea of Absolute Monarchy in Seventeenth Century England”, The Historical Journal 21 
(1978), pp. 249-50.  
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Although he only briefly discusses Hobbes, Daly’s assessment of his use of the term 
‘absolutism’ is revealing; it is, he argues, similar in content to the pejorative use of it by the 
Levellers: that “it meant unlimited, beyond accounting, irresistible, unchallengeable”24.  Of 
course, Hobbes did not use it in a pejorative sense at all; according to Daly, “Hobbes’s 
sovereign had far more power than most people had understood by the term ‘absolute’, but he 
was willing to describe it in that term”25.  By ‘absolute’, Daly interprets Hobbes’s system 
specifically as having no notion of limitation26.  Although he acknowledges that Hobbesian 
subjects have a continuing right to resist the sovereign, “the general impact of his theory was 
in the direction of an awesome state authority, and he did not reject the label of ‘absolute’ 
…”27. 
 Hobbes’s use of the term also, quite remarkably, influenced his contemporaries’ use of 
it.  According to Daly, they had a rather “grim reputation of Hobbes”, which was in part 
earned by their association of his theory with “a terrifying sovereignty”28.   He notes that 
“Hobbes chided the king’s advisers for denying that the government was absolute, and scoffed 
at their fear that, if the king won the war, ‘his power would be what he pleased, and theirs as 
little as he pleased, which they counted tyranny’”29.  Certain royalist writers amongst 
Hobbes’s contemporaries were indeed “at pains to claim that the king’s power was legally 
limited”30.  After Hobbes’s use of the term and the connotations he gave to it, many royalists 
were left not to debate the actual powers of the king, but to determine whether the term 
                                                
 
24 Ibid., p. 237. 
25 Ibid., p. 238. 
26 Ibid., p. 238. 
27 Ibid., p. 238. 
28 Ibid., p. 238. 
29 Daly, p. 239. 
30 Ibid., p. 239. 
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‘absolute’ ought to be used to describe those powers at all31. 
 Contributing to this view of Hobbes in particular, and undoubtedly also to the effect 
this had on the meaning of absolutism in general, were his contemporary critics.  Amongst the 
numerous modern commentators on the general reactions of Hobbes’s contemporaries to his 
work, one in particular, John Bowle, has focused on the reasons why and the extent to which 
Hobbes’s contemporaries viewed him as being an absolutist.  Bowle’s treatment is unique in 
the priority he gives to the attempt to endorse the view that, amongst Hobbes’s 
contemporaries, there were those who set a precedent for judging Hobbes as an absolutist, 
while simultaneously emphasising and criticising its practicability.   
Bowle emphasises that they were generally fearful and condemning of Hobbes’s 
absolutism, to the extent that they perceived it to license arbitrary power.  Hobbes’s 
contemporaries attempted to undermine this by questioning whether Hobbes’s state of 
nature—which they saw as being his primary justification for arbitrary power—was 
unrealistic.32  The assumption they made is obvious: Hobbes’s argument for what they 
perceived to be an absolute sovereign in possession of arbitrary power rested on the premise 
that the state of nature is an actual condition that can only be remedied by such power.   
 According to Bowle, they also generally agreed that what they perceived to be 
Hobbes’s support of arbitrary power would be “precarious and inefficient”; that the arbitrary 
power of Hobbes’s sovereign would defeat the purpose for which such power was granted to it 
                                                
 
31 Ibid., p. 239. 
32 Bowle, Hobbes and his Critics p. 201.  He notes that of the many who questioned the reality of Hobbes’ state 
of nature, Eachard and Clarendon gave it the most emphasis and denied the reality of it, both as a fact and as a 
hypothesis.   
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in the first place: the self-preservation of subjects33. Notable amongst these contemporaries 
were Bramhall, Whitehall and Clarendon, all of whom shared the general opinion of Rosse, 
who chided Hobbes through Aristotle:  “… no commonwealth can be happy or continue long, 
but where the Prince is as well subject to the law as the people”34. In the same spirit, Gough 
eloquently scorned Hobbes for thinking “that men are so foolish that they take care to avoid 
what mischief may be done them by polecats or foxes, but are content, nay think it safety, to 
be devoured by Lions”35.   
 The general tenor of the attacks of Hobbes’s contemporaries on him, presented here 
only broadly and very briefly, give us a clear indication of what Hobbes’s contemporaries 
largely perceived Hobbesian absolutism to represent: arbitrary power.  While few denied to 
Hobbes the virtue or necessity of his intended end, civil peace, they derided what they 
perceived to be his means, absolutism, both as over-compensatory or even as ineffective, 
assuming that no liberal-minded person would subject themselves to such power.   
A few observations can, therefore, be drawn from the contemporary reception of 
Hobbes, the most important of which are similarly common amongst the selected modern 
critics of Hobbes’s absolutism whom I will discuss later in this chapter.  First, the term 
‘absolutist’ is an extremely difficult one to define in the context of the 17th century, and 
Hobbes’s explicit use of it is simply one example amongst many of what it could mean and 
could be perceived to mean.  Second, he was undoubtedly perceived to be an absolutist, and in 
a pejorative way, whatever precise meaning and content was ascribed to the term in the 17th 
century. Third, there were amongst his critics those that focused on the practicability of 
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Hobbes’s strategy: they granted that Hobbes sought civil peace through absolutism, but 
thought that (i) he exaggerated the problem, (ii) that his solution was over-compensatory, or 
(iii) that his system itself would be an ineffective solution to the problem. Finally, the best 
indication of what they perceived Hobbes’s absolutism to imply is what they explicitly feared: 
the arbitrary exercise of authority.    
 
1.3 Late 20th century characterisations of Hobbes-as-absolutist 
 
1.3.1 Absolute dominion or institutional possession of authority  
Hobbes clearly advocates dominion—the possession of authority—as a resolution to 
two distinct problems.  First, Hobbes considers the chief cause of civil war to be when more 
than one person or institution is recognised to possess authority; “man cannot serve two 
masters (L, 392)”.  Second, the foremost obstacle to defending one’s commonwealth is a lack 
of concord, or “the concurrence of many men’s wills to one action” (Elements, 19, 5).  For 
these two rather straightforward reasons, Hobbes argues, the sovereign must be recognised to 
be the sole possessor of authority. 
That Hobbes advocated absolute possession of authority, or in other words, that he 
depicts the sovereign as the sole institution in possession of authority, is largely 
uncontroversial.  Nor is the claim that civil peace is the intention behind it. However, 
remarkably little has been made explicit in terms of how absolutism was intended by Hobbes 
to practically effect civil peace, or in other words, the strategy of it; the three central debates 
described above are generally more concerned with the legal, deontological and hypothetical 
problems presented by Hobbes’s arguments. 
There should be little doubt that Leviathan was intended by Hobbes to be a 
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prescription for peace; it is a systematic detailing of what is inimical and necessary for the 
maintenance of a peaceful commonwealth.  Central to this broad objective in Leviathan is the 
relationship between authority and obedience.   It is evident that Hobbes considered this 
relationship to be of crucial importance for the maintenance of a peaceful commonwealth; he 
believed that the proper conceptualisation and implementation of this relationship would lead 
to peace, whereas an improper understanding and institutionalisation of the relationship would 
inevitably lead to the condition of war.   
Problems arise in this relationship, Hobbes argues, whenever humans are forced to 
obey one authority rather than another, or are conflicted over the question of to which 
authority their duty to obey is ultimately owed.  Problems arise, therefore, when two or more 
institutions exist, each claiming to possess authority, and each claiming that obedience is owed 
to them.   
Hobbes’s general solution to this untenable situation is fairly straightforward: he 
proposes an absolute sovereign who is the sole legitimate possessor of authority, and the sole 
person to whom, or institution to which, all subjects owe their obedience.  Put simply, 
Hobbes’s solution proposes the creation of a sole master. 
 Of the recent literature focusing on Hobbes as an absolutist from a strategic 
standpoint—understood in terms of institutional absolutism—Deborah Baumgold is highly 
notable for her excellent discussion of Hobbes which ultimately seeks to show that the extent 
and character of Hobbes’s absolutism must be understood in terms of what he perceived to be 
the chief threat to civil peace: “Conceiving politics to be a struggle among elites for power, his 
arguments for absolutism are directed … at the dual problems of strengthening the sovereign 
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and discouraging the designs of ambitious rivals”36.   His absolutism takes the form of unified 
sovereignty, and it serves a practical and specific purpose: “his defence of the principle of 
unified sovereignty consists in a series of related discussions of the political desirability of 
central control of major state powers”37, because of his assertion that “… the purposes of the 
state require unified sovereignty”38 and “divided sovereignty produces impotent 
government”39.   
 Significantly, Baumgold lays emphasis on the nature of this absolutism and, calling on 
Kant via Alan Ryan, she describes it as “prescriptive” rather than ‘analytic’.  Chief among 
those whom she identifies as interpreting Hobbesian absolutism as ‘analytic’ is M. M. 
Goldsmith, who wrote the following:   
Hobbes was not trying to show that it was practically better not to divide 
sovereignty.  When he uses that type of empirical argument he signals it. … 
Hobbes’s argument for the indivisibility of sovereign powers is couched in no 
such empirical terms.  The rights of sovereignty are ‘incommunicable and 
inseparable.’  … Thus the concept of sovereignty is used in an all or nothing 
                                                
 
36 Baumgold, Hobbes’s Political Theory, p. 60.   
37 Ibid, p. 65. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Baumgold, Hobbes’s Political Theory, p. 66.  One cannot avoid the ‘Hobbes-as-monarchist” debate here, from 
which I think Baumgold’s is beneficially distinct.  Generally speaking, this debate has revolved around either (i) 
documenting his preference as a historical or biographical fact; or (ii) pointing out that Hobbes clearly states his 
preference for monarchy in his own texts. For a good overview of those engaged in either of these discussions, 
see Peter J Steinberger, The Idea of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) pp.42-44.  As for 
explaining—rather than just asserting—his support for monarchy, I agree with Steinberger (p. 43) “that Sabine’s 
account has long been the standard view, namely, that those writings were intended ‘to exert influence upon the 
side of the king.  They were designed to support absolute government and in Hobbes’s intention this meant 
absolute monarchy; all his personal interests attached him to the royalist part” citing George Sabine, A History of 
Political Theory (Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1973). See also, however, Samuel L. Mintz, The Hunting of 
Leviathan: Seventeenth0Centruy Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962).  Mintz contends that although Hobbes’s sovereign is absolute, 
Hobbes “expressed no particular bias in favour of monarchy (p. 13)”.  Returning to Baumgold, her treatment of 
what can be called ‘institutional absolutism’ is largely unique from others, and for my purposes more useful, 
because her account gives emphasis to the practical and prescriptive rationales behind Hobbes’s preference for 
monarchy and subsumes it to the overarching idea of ‘unified sovereignty’.  Recently agreeing with her is 
Steinberger: “Hobbes’s preference for monarchy is a governmental preference rooted in considerations of 
prudence and good judgment …(p. 43)”. 
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way:  either there is a sovereign possessing all these powers or there is none.40   
This is a definitional understanding of absolute sovereignty as an analytical claim: 
sovereignty is equated with institutional absolutism, independent of purpose, contingency or 
context. While Baumgold concedes that, at a few points, Hobbes does indeed in his earlier 
works refer to unified sovereignty as a definitional truth, i.e. as an analytic statement, she 
argues that in all of Hobbes’s works, and particularly clearly in Leviathan and Behemoth, he 
asserts the opposite: unified sovereignty is an empirical statement to which evidence is 
relevant.  That is, Hobbes’s absolutism does not assert that sovereignty is necessarily and 
logically unified.  Rather, Hobbes’s absolutism is one which asserts that although sovereignty 
may be divided, it is not a desirable state of affairs and unified sovereignty is recommended 
for its practical utility of preventing domestic conflict, the chief obstacle of which is divided 
sovereignty. 
 To demonstrate her case, Baumgold focuses on the critique of divided sovereignty in 
Leviathan. Hobbes, she argues, holds there to be a causal connection between divided 
sovereignty and civil war.  Citing Hobbes:   
And this division is it, whereof it is said a kingdom divided in itself cannot 
stand; for unless this division precede, division into opposite armies can never 
happen.  If there had not first been an opinion received of the greatest part of 
England, that these powers divided between the King, and the Lords, and the 
House of Commons, the people had never been divided and fallen into this 
civil war, first between those that disagreed in politics, and after between the 
dissenters about the liberty of religion … (L, 116).   
 
 Hobbes adds that among those doctrines which weaken a commonwealth, the 
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following belongs: “That the sovereign power may be divided.  For what is it to divide the 
power of a commonwealth, but to dissolve it; for powers divided mutually destroy each other 
(L, 214)”. 
 These passages, Baumgold rightly points out, imply that Hobbes asserts the empirical 
claim that “divided sovereignty is a necessary condition of civil war—absent divided 
sovereignty, civil war will not occur—and therefore the falsifying case would be civil war in 
an absolutist state”41.  This is certainly evident in Hobbes’s rhetorical question, phrased most 
emphatically in the Latin edition of Leviathan: “But I ask … when or where has there been a 
kingdom free of sedition and civil war, where the power was not absolute” (OL, 135). 
  Alternatively, in the following passage Hobbes appears to imply that “divided 
sovereignty is a sufficient condition for the occurrence of civil war, a hypothesis that would be 
falsified by the example of a peaceful society with a mixed constitution”42:  “… to erect two 
sovereigns, and every man to have his person represented by two actors that by opposing one 
another must needs divide that power which (if men will live in peace) is indivisible, and 
thereby reduce the multitude into the condition of war, contrary to the end for which all 
sovereignty is instituted (L, 119).43 
 Baumgold argues from this passage, despite the potential illogic of it, that Hobbes 
nevertheless conceives there to be a causal mechanism: “divided sovereignty fosters elite 
conflict and this in turn tends to spread into civil war as elites mobilize the people to fight on 
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lead to disagreement (and contention) among the holders of the power while division may lead to contention (p. 
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their behalf”44.  More specifically, she argues that Hobbes is not so much arguing that divided 
sovereignty institutionalises elite conflict, a point she thinks banal, but rather is arguing that 
“divided sovereignty lends constitutional legitimacy to bids for power by ambitious elites”45.  
That is, if divided sovereignty was constitutionally legitimate, competing institutions could 
equally lay claim to the “loyalties of ordinary Englishmen”. 
 Yet more evidence of this more specific assertion is found in Hobbes’s Behemoth.  The 
civil war, Hobbes argues, was in large part a result of a constitutional struggle between the 
Parliament and King, in which “the true meaning of the Parliament was, that not the King, but 
they themselves, should have the absolute government (Behemoth, p 68)”.  “‘Ambition can do 
little without hands’ and the support of common people hinges on their believing that those 
ambitious of power have legitimate title to it”46.  Furthermore, “The ideology of a mixed 
constitution … justified Parliament’s claim that it, not the king, should be master … The 
people, in short, were ‘carried into’ rebellion by the arguments of an ‘impudent’ Parliament”47. 
 Hobbes’s absolutism, Baumgold concludes, is, therefore, a prescriptive, practical 
solution to the perceived problem of “institutionalised political ambition”48.  Accordingly, 
Hobbes’s absolutism, to meet its purpose, refers specifically to the possession of authority by a 
single, unified institution that is recognised to be sovereign.  Since “rebellions are the product 
of political ambition provided with an institutional home and hence a claim on the allegiance 
of ordinary people”49, and since unified sovereignty has as its purpose the prevention of 
rebellion, Hobbesian absolute authority, according to Baumgold, refers specifically and 
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limitedly to the possession of authority by a single and unified sovereign institution. 
Two important consequences of her argument are apparent.  First, she emphasises the 
point that Hobbes’s absolutism is prescribed—rather than merely described analytically—for 
the sake of civil peace, and also claims that it is contingent and, therefore, potentially limited 
to that purpose.  Secondly, she claims that Hobbes’s absolutism is not cast in abstract or 
universalistic terms, and “does not take the form of the proposition that individuals in the 
abstract should find it in their interest to consent to absolute government”50.  Rather, since the 
chief cause of civil war is the division of the institution of sovereignty, manifest by elite 
conflict, the extent to which Hobbes’s sovereign can be said to be absolute is contingent on its 
efficacy for preventing it.  Hobbes’s sovereign is absolute, therefore, in the sense of absolute 
dominion, as institutionally autonomous, unanswerable to and supreme over other institutions.  
The sovereign, in this description of it, is not only the sole person in possession of institutional 
authority, but it is the only institution to which obedience is owed.  
We should pause briefly here to consider an important distinction that Hobbes makes, 
and that I have already alluded to, between the possession of authority and the exercise of 
authority.  Note the following passage from Leviathan: “and as the right of possession, is 
called dominion; so the right of doing any action is called AUTHORITY.  So that by 
authority, is always understood a right of doing any act; and done by authority, done by 
commission, or license, from him whose right it is” (L, 102). 
Also, 
And because the end of this institution is the peace and defence of them all, 
and whosoever has right to the end has right to the means, it belongeth of right 
to whatsoever man or assembly that hath the sovereignty, to be judge both of 
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the means of peace and defence, and also of the hindrances and disturbances 
of the same, and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both 
beforehand (for the preserving of peace and security, by prevention of discord 
at home and hostility from abroad) and, when peace and security are lost, for 
the recovery of the same (L, 113). 
 
Hobbes’s phrase “whosoever has right to the end has right to the means” indicates a 
distinction between the right to be in authority, and the right to exercise authority.  A helpful, 
contemporary way of looking at this is presented succinctly in C. W. Cassinelli’s essay 
Political Authority: Its Exercise and Possession:  “When the governor exercises political 
authority he performs an overt act aimed at regulating his governed's behavior. In order to 
perform such an act, he must (as we say) have authority, but his possession is clearly not the 
same thing as his act”51. 
 Applying this distinction to Hobbes, he distinguishes between the possession and the 
exercise of authority, both of which his sovereign has a right to.  The means—the exercise of 
authority or the making of judgments on how to regulate behaviour—has as its end “the peace 
and defence of them all”.  The sovereign is, therefore, said “to be judge both of the means of 
peace and defence”, which would sanction judgements about the regulation of behaviour or 
the performance of actions which are amenable to both peace and defence.   
The question which now arises, then, is: are all of the sovereign’s judgements and 
actions authorised? Or, from another perspective, must subjects obey all of the sovereign’s 
commands?  It is one thing to say that the sovereign is in sole possession of authority and is 
the only one to whom obedience is owed; it is quite another to assert that all of the sovereign’s 
actions and commands are authorised and obedience is always owed.   
                                                
 
51 C. W. Cassinelli, “Political Authority: Its Exercise and Possession,” The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 14, 
No. 3 (Sept. 1961), p. 637.  
  
36 
In other words, what if the rationale for absolutism is not strictly limited to the domain 
or to the unified possession of sovereignty, but also to the exercise of authority?  If civil peace 
is the end for which absolutism is justified, does it follow merely that the sovereign must be in 
sole possession of authority and be solely recognised to be in authority? Or, does it also extend 
to how the sovereign exercises authority?  Does the sovereign have an absolute right to 
exercise authority, i.e. is there no limit to what the sovereign can and may command, and are 
there no limits to what subjects are obliged to obey?  Arguments that assert that the 
sovereign’s right to exercise authority is indeed absolute in this sense, and that simultaneously 
emphasise that this is prescribed by Hobbes as being necessary to effect civil peace, are 
presented by John Plamenatz, Preston King, and Charles D. Tarlton, each of which will now 
be examined. 
 
1.3.2 Absolute exercise of authority 
Beginning with Plamenatz, he, like Baumgold, understands Hobbes’s argument that 
authority must be absolute to mean that it is never in people’s interest that “supreme 
governmental authority should be divided”, since “if there is more than one maker and 
enforcer of law, there cannot be real security”52.  He adds, however, and unlike Baumgold, 
that it is also never in people’s interest “that there should be rules or conventions limiting their 
obedience to government”53.  While the sovereign “must never have more than one centre of 
supreme authority”, nor must the sovereign be obeyed “only on condition that he governs 
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according to such and such principles”54.   
 Plamenatz’s interpretation is elegantly simple:  if subjects obey conditionally, then 
particular sovereign commands will be subject to disputes about whether those commands 
infringe upon the conditions. For “If the sovereign is the final judge in such disputes, 
conditions might as well not be laid down, for he will interpret them to suit himself.  If another 
authority is set up to decide the dispute, there is danger of civil strife.  If the people generally 
set themselves up for judges, there must be anarchy”55. 
Therefore, according to Plamenatz, Hobbes’s sovereign is absolute in the sense that it 
possesses the unlimited right to arbitrate for the sake of civil peace:   
Hobbes seems to have believed that all agreement about principles or rules to 
limit authority is at bottom illusory, lasting only as long as the rules are not 
applied.  As soon as the need is felt to apply them, they are variously 
interpreted.  Unless it is agreed whose interpretation is final, there is always 
danger to peace … Hobbes’s argument for absolute government therefore rests 
on the assumption that, unless supreme authority is undivided, there cannot be 
a final and generally accepted arbiter in all cases, including disputes about the 
limits of authority.56 
 
Simply put, and like Baumgold argues, the sovereign is the sole possessor of authority.  
However, Plamenatz adds that the sovereign is free to exercise his authority without limit, and 
effectively arbitrarily, since any limit on the exercise of the sovereign’s authority would 
suggest that the sovereign is not the sole possessor of authority.  Peace, therefore, requires not 
only that there be a sole possessor of authority; to be the sole possessor of authority also 
requires that the exercise of it be unlimited.  In other words, to ensure that a sole possessor of 
authority is obeyed, the possessor’s right to exercise authority must be unlimited. 
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 A similar but rather more complex argument—which also interprets Hobbes’s 
absolutism to extend to the exercise of authority—is presented by Preston King.57  Ultimately, 
King argues, Hobbes presents “an ideal model of obedience to which he supposes we should 
aspire”58, and the way in which Hobbes does so is absolutist in the sense that Hobbes makes a 
universal recommendation for the concentration of power.  Key to this is King’s emphasis of a 
distinction between the description of absolutism and the norm of absolutism.  Hobbes, he 
explains in the following passage (and along with Bodin), is remarkable for his support of the 
latter:  
To advance the norm allows us to recommend the movement.  Merely to 
advance the description, by contrast, allows us to condemn the movement, or 
to remain neutral about it, or (which is very important) to assume an 
appearance of neutrality while covertly recommending it.  A writer who 
describes the character of centralised power is not necessarily to be regarded 
as an absolutist: he may oppose it.  One who recommends centralised power in 
some particular context is not necessarily to be regarded as an absolutist 
either; he may think the broader claim harmful or unnecessary or impossible.  
To the extent that Bodin and Hobbes are regarded as describing the movement 
towards greater centralisation as ‘objectively’ necessary, inevitable and 
illimitable, they may be regarded as covert absolutists (i.e. they accept morally 
what they may be supposed—merely factually—to describe).  More 
obviously, to the extent that Bodin and Hobbes directly recommend greater 
centralisation, in some universal and illimitable manner, they must be regarded 
as overt absolutists.  Their absolutism cannot be reduced to the mere fact that 
they recommend that power be more highly concentrated at a given centre.  
They become absolutist, or approximate to becoming absolutists, where or in 
the degree that they recommend (overtly or covertly) the concentration of 
power in an a priori, which is to say illimitable, fashion.59 
 
To what extent, then, does Hobbes recommend the concentration of power in an 
illimitable and a priori fashion?  The starting point for King is, as one has come to expect, 
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Hobbes’s analysis of the causes of conflict.  King reduces them to two:  The first he, like 
Baumgold and Plamenatz, believes is “the desire of several bodies to share sovereign power”. 
The second is “the desire by individuals and sects for free expression of religious and political 
opinion”60.     
 While the general purpose of the possession of unified sovereignty is to eliminate the 
conflict brought about by divided sovereignty, the essential function of sovereignty, or the 
purpose of the exercise of authority “was to state what opinions were or were not seditious, 
what rules were or were not lawful, and to possess a monopoly of force sufficient to ensure 
that inadmissible opinions were not disseminated and that rules declared to be law were not 
ignored”61.  
Aside from the possession of authority, therefore, the sovereign must have an absolute 
right to exercise authority, or to make obligatory commands, in order to control opinion in 
favour of civil peace.  However, King adds, ensuring obedience requires not just that the 
commander is authoritative in the sense that there is no other authoritative institution, but also 
that people are  
… convinced that it is right to obey the commands issued them.  Thus, although 
commands are essential to order, what is equally essential, after a point, is the 
belief (on the part of those obeying) that those commands are not unjust … 
Hobbes’ss principal objective is to convince subjects that they ought not to have 
too many qualms about obeying their rulers no matter (virtually) what these 
command them to do.62 
 
Hobbes, according to King, thought that the absolute possession of sovereignty is, 
therefore, insufficient to effect civil order.  The absolute possession of the right to exercise 
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authority is also, however, insufficient.  What is also required over and above this is “that the 
commands of the sovereign, in so far as he remains sovereign, must be read as coterminous 
with the designation of right and wrong”63.   
 If King is correct, and the sovereign is tasked with ensuring that his commands are 
recognised as being coterminous with ‘right’ in a moral sense, the concern then becomes a 
question of how the sovereign can convince his subjects the truth of that. 
On the one hand, it may be possible that Hobbes believed no sovereign could ever 
actually convince his subjects that every exercise of his authority is ‘right’ and, therefore, it is 
futile to try.  If this were the case, this would represent an acknowledgement on the part of 
Hobbes that his sovereign’s authority is limited, and not absolute, to the extent that subjects 
will not acknowledge their obligation to obey every command the sovereign may issue.  In 
other words, absolute authority is not possessed “where the controller requires any degree of 
assent from either co-controllers (actual or potential) or from those controlled”64.     
Were this the case, we could expect Hobbes to address the issue of what particular 
commands ought to be avoided because they would be highly unlikely to be considered by 
one’s subjects as ‘right’ or ‘just’, and thus would undermine the sovereign’s right to exercise 
authority to the extent that it requires a corresponding belief on the part of subjects’ that every 
command of the sovereign be obeyed without qualm. In other words, Hobbes could be 
expected to advise that the content of particular commands ought to be contingent on their 
consistency with effecting civil peace over or alongside the assertion that all commands per se 
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are absolute. 65 
This is not, however, the explanation that King provides.  The answer, according to 
King, refers back to his distinction between descriptive and normative absolutism.  Since 
Hobbes is argued to be an absolutist in the sense that he universally prescribes the 
centralisation of authority as an a priori norm, King argues that Hobbes pushes to ceaselessly 
increase the degree to which the sovereign’s right to command is limitless.  Conversely, 
Hobbes pushes to ceaselessly decrease the degree to which subjects’ obedience is limited.  
Why?  Because if the sovereign’s right to command is to reach as close to absolute as possible, 
and the sovereign’s commands must be viewed by subjects as ‘right’ to approach that degree 
of de facto absolute authority, the limits to subjects’ obedience must increasingly approach nil.  
Now, if Hobbes’s sovereign accepted or was resigned to the reality that his authority will 
always be limited, because there will always be some degree to which his subjects will not 
recognise his commands as ‘right’, this realisation would resign the sovereign to refrain from 
ceaselessly increasing and pushing for constantly greater centralisation; a policy which 
contravenes what the norm of absolutism prescribes.  However, were Hobbes’s sovereign to 
rule according to the norm of absolutism—as King suggests—the sovereign must always try to 
concentrate authority, which requires that the sovereign try to eliminate any and all opinion 
and belief amongst his subjects that would infer or instruct that the sovereign’s right to 
exercise authority, and their corresponding obedience, was somehow limited.  The extreme of 
this—and King argues that Hobbes’s adherence to the norm of absolutism pushes him to this 
extreme—is absolute authority in the sense of arbitrary authority: the sovereign is unrestrained 
in the exercise of its will, and subjects’ obedience is absolute in the sense that they cannot 
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disobey.  This is what, according to King, Hobbes’s sovereign endeavours for: Hobbes’s 
sovereign aims, simply, to be absolute. 
To state it from a different perspective, yet consistent with King’s, for Hobbes civil 
peace requires that the sovereign is acknowledged to be the sole arbiter of right and wrong, 
and the sovereign’s commands must be acknowledged to be ‘right’.  This in turn requires that 
there are no alternative notions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ aside from the will of the sovereign. The 
sovereign must strive to be absolute, then, in the sense that even arbitrary judgments and 
commands be acknowledged to be ‘right’. 
It follows, then, that the sovereign’s essential purpose in exercising his authority is that 
the product of the exercise—a judgment or an act—itself be absolute.  The content and effect 
matters not, since holding either to scrutiny or standard is in itself contrary to civil peace.  The 
purpose of commanding is to create a command which is absolute; the purpose of 
commanding is not, therefore, primarily to command something which is specifically 
conducive to civil peace.  The purpose of exercising authority is to issue commands that are 
recognised to be such on the basis that they are issued by the sole source of authority.  The 
exercise of authority serves to reinforce that there is only one source of authority.  Hobbes’s 
attempt to find the conditions in which the a priori norm of civil peace is achieved results in 
the construction of a political system rigged to constantly strive towards an entirely different a 
priori and ideal norm: absolutism.   
Put more broadly and simply, like Plamenatz, King argues that Hobbes advanced a 
closed system of authorisation: the right to exercise authority is absolute in the sense that all 
exercises of it are authorised by the possessor, for the sole reason that possession of authority 
denotes the right of exercising authority. It follows from King’s argument that the only limit to 
the sovereign’s exercise of authority is the judgement of the sovereign himself on whether or 
  
43 
not a particular exercise of authority is authorised, which of course it would be by definition.  
This is indeed, if accurate, arbitrary.66  
In a more straightforward way, Charles D. Tarlton—the last of the Hobbes-as-
absolutist interpreters I’ll examine and a stimulating interpreter of Hobbes whose work has 
been regretfully overlooked by most contemporary Hobbes scholars67—argues that Hobbes’s 
sovereign is absolute because there are no identifiable limits to the exercise of sovereign 
authority.  Rather than trying to determine whether Hobbes is an absolutist by positively 
ascribing to him absolutist characteristics, Tarlton negatively defines his absolutism by 
identifying what Hobbes’s sovereign is not bound by.  The sovereign, he concludes, is left 
bound only by his own judgement and will, which he possesses the right to freely exercise. 
To make the case, Tarlton takes four Lockean limits and compares their relevance to 
Hobbes’s sovereign, and concludes that none trump the arbitrary will of the sovereign; 
Hobbes’s sovereign “has absolute authority not bounded by consent, law, individual rights 
(especially the right of property), or the public good”68.  
 Taking each of these four in turn, consent could be conceived to be a limit on the 
sovereign’s authority if consent was an actual act of authorisation, with limits the subjects 
preconceived before consenting, or if consent could be withdrawn.  Of course, the act of 
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consent is between subjects—and not between subjects and sovereign—and, therefore, the 
sovereign is not obliged under the terms of the contract since he is not a consenting party. 
Could, however, individual subjects withdraw their consent that obliges them to obey the 
sovereign?   
Tarlton writes: 
  
Not only tacit consent, but even a negative vote, would nevertheless bind one 
totally, and not only a negative vote, but even complete inaction, could oblige, 
because ‘whether he be of the Congregation, or not; and whether his consent 
be asked, or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or be left in the 
condition of warre he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be 
destroyed by any man whatsoever’.69   
In other words, not only tacit consent, but even abstention, are considered to signify 
consent. This prompts the question: “Was one obliged because one had consented, or was one 
presumed to have consented because one was obliged?”70  In either case, consent is always 
presumed to have been given and it cannot, according to Tarlton, be withdrawn and, therefore, 
consent cannot in any meaningful way be understood to potentially limit the sovereign’s 
authority. 
As for the rule of law;  
Law, for Hobbes, was no social agreement manifest in a fixed rule, it was 
nothing more nor less than the sovereign’s command, an act of his will.  
Therefore it followed that the ‘sovereign of a Common-wealth is not subject to 
the Civill Lawes’.  Because he could make laws, he could repeal them; being 
able to repeal them, he was never bound by them to start with … .71 
As for individual rights, Tarlton specifically discusses property, the right to self-
preservation, and the right to private, unexpressed opinions and beliefs. As for property, 
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Hobbes held the following opinion to be seditious:  “That every private man has an absolute 
propriety in his goods; such, as excludeth the right of the sovereign” (L, 213).  “No subject 
possessed property, then, ‘exclusive of the sovereign’s right to the use of the same’, while for 
conquered subjects, the sovereign’s right over their property and lives was boundless.  At his 
own discretion, and in whatever he judged necessary, the sovereign could encroach upon the 
subjects’ property and ‘levy mony upon the subjects’”.72 
Although Hobbes contends it could be considered inequitable, the sovereign could 
nevertheless “invade the property (and all other rights that came in with the establishment of 
commonwealth) of his subjects”73. 
More generally, according to Hobbes, the liberty subjects have is: 
 
… on the one hand, a permission granted by the sovereign, as ‘in all kinds of 
actions, [when] by the laws praetermitted, men have the Liberty, of doing 
what their own reason shall suggest’, or, on the other, in those ‘things, which 
though command by the Soveraign, he may nevertheless, without Injustice, 
refuse to do.74   
So first, any right the subject has to act freely is entirely conditional on the sovereign’s 
permission, which the sovereign is entitled to withhold.  More promisingly, according to 
Tarlton, is the second type of right, a right to refuse or resist the sovereign’s command.  
However, this turns out to be little more than a “‘liberty’ not to kill oneself”75. The only 
command that a subject may disobey, therefore, is:  
If the sovereign command a man (though justly condemned,) to kill, wound, or 
mayme himself; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the 
use of food, air, medicine, or any other thing, without which he cannot live, 
yet hath that man the liberty to disobey (L, 142).   
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Tarlton concludes that ultimately, “There were, on Hobbes’s strict view, no rights, 
freedoms or liberties worth either mentioning or having everyday significance, except those 
that derived from the sovereign’s commands”76.  Accordingly “such liberty is in some places 
more, and in some less; and is some times more, in other times less, according as they that 
have the sovereignty shall think most convenient” (L, 143). 
The last potential limit to the sovereign’s authority considered by Tarlton is the public 
good, which can be summed up by the following passage which seems to burden the 
sovereign’s exercise of authority.  The sovereign is tasked with the … 
… procuration of the safety of the people, to which he is obliged by the law of 
nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the author of that law, and to 
none but him.  But by safety here is not meant a bare preservation, but also all 
other contentments of life, which every man by lawful industry, without 
danger or hurt to the commonwealth, shall acquire to himself (L, 219). 
Tarlton argues, however, that “this undertaking was, then, summed up and completely 
fulfilled when that sovereign merely clung to every possible strand of his absolute power”77.  
“It is the Office of the Sovereign to maintain those rights entire” (L, 219).  Laws made by the 
sovereign, intended for the ‘good of the people’, are incidentally so; Hobbes equates the ‘good 
of the people’ with the ‘good of the sovereign’: “For the good of the sovereign and people 
cannot be separated.  It is a weak sovereign that has weak subjects, and a weak people whose 
sovereign wanteth power to rule them at his will” (L, 229).  
While some of the duties Hobbes lists may seem to limit the sovereign’s authority, 
“beyond the first one (maintaining his absolute power and discretion) none of the rest even 
pretended to be deductions from any necessary aspects of the theory of sovereignty … They 
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were prudential propositions, indicating just where the sovereign might practically best secure 
his power by actions at least seeming to aim at the public good”78. 
Considering each of these four possible limitations—consent, rule of law, rights and 
the public good—which turn out to be anything but limits according to Tarlton, lead him to 
conclude that Hobbes’s sovereign is indeed absolute, and absolute in the sense of arbitrary and 
limitless authority:   
… Hobbes’s underlying conclusion here was that all law and policy, including 
the definition of the sovereign’s own rights and duties, were, technically, 
solely within the purview of the sovereign’s own judgment and desires.  No 
condition attached to the sovereign, and no limits, because ‘every Subject is by 
this Institution Author of all the Actions and Judgements of the Soveraigne 
Instituted [and] it followes, that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any 
of his Subjects’ nor ought he to be by any of them accused of Injustice’.  The 
sovereign, having defined himself, and having been entrusted with the end of 
peace, then ‘has the right to the Means [and] to be Judge both of the meanes to 
Peace and Defence; and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; 
and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done’.79 
1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has been concerned with the extent to which Hobbes’s sovereign’s 
authority may be said to be absolute for the sake of civil peace.  His contemporary critics 
primarily viewed his absolutism through their fear of tyranny and arbitrary power: Hobbes 
was recognised to prescribe his sovereign as a remedy to civil strife, but the authority he 
granted it was seen to be a licence to exercise authority arbitrarily, which would in the end, 
believed his critics, actually threaten civil peace.    
 As for the select few 20th century interpreters who focus on the strategic aspects of 
Hobbesian absolutism, I first focused on Deborah Baumgold, who interprets Hobbes’s 
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absolutism primarily in terms of the possession of authority, and for a clear reason.  Hobbes 
perceived the chief cause of civil strife, according to her, to be elite conflict; a particular, local 
and historical problem.  Hobbes argued that divided sovereignty lends constitutional 
legitimacy to bids for power by ambitious elites, and hence undivided sovereignty. This would 
strip that constitutional legitimacy, thus remedying the problem.  Since the chief cause of civil 
war was the division of the institution of sovereignty, made manifest by elite conflict, the 
extent to which Hobbes’s sovereign can be said to be absolute is contingent on its efficacy for 
preventing it.   Hobbes’s sovereign is absolute, therefore, in the sense of absolute dominion: 
the sovereign, in this description of it, is not only the sole person in possession of institutional 
authority, but it is also the only institution to which obedience is owed.    
  Baumgold’s argument has an important consequence:  if the extent to which the 
sovereign is absolute is limited to dominion, and if Hobbes’s argument for absolute dominion 
is also contingent on its efficacy for procuring and maintaining civil peace, it suggests that the 
sovereign’s exercise of authority is not intended by Hobbes to be arbitrary.   This is indeed 
what Baumgold argues, and although I have focused on arguments for absolute authority in 
this chapter, I will examine her arguments concerning the limits to sovereign authority in 
greater detail in a Chapter seven.   
 While Baumgold limits Hobbes’s absolutism to dominion, there are some that extend 
his absolutism to the exercise of authority. In this chapter I focused on three noteworthy 
interpreters that argue this case; I will in chapters three and four, however, present arguments 
that dissent with these, despite my affinity for their interpretative assumptions and focus.   
 In these subsequent chapters, I will agree with Plamenatz that while the sovereign does 
indeed possess the right to freely exercise its authority, there are exercises of it that Hobbes 
believes will threaten civil peace, and he seeks to oblige the sovereign to refrain from 
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exercising it to that effect in those instances.  The sovereign must indeed be seen as the final 
arbiter, but there are commands, particularly religious commands, which will undermine the 
sovereign being recognised as the final arbiter and must, therefore, be avoided.  While the 
sovereign has the right to freely exercise his authority, the sovereign is also obliged not to 
exercise it in those instances where a command will undermine the subjects’ recognition of 
that right. In other words, Hobbes describes a limit on the exercise of sovereign authority: the 
sovereign may have authority over certain matters, yet Hobbes clearly cites both principles 
and examples which stress that the sovereign should not exercise his authority over these 
matters.  These restrictions, I will argue, are ultimately derived from the natural laws, in 
accord with which the sovereign is obliged to rule.  
 King’s mistake is, my subsequent arguments will suggest, that he exaggerates the 
extent of Hobbes’s adherence to a norm of absolutism. In contrast, I will argue that Hobbes’s 
real adherence was to the norm of peace.  My interpretation in Chapters three and four will 
make apparent that Hobbesian absolutism is not an end in and of itself, rather civil peace is, 
and to that end, the endeavour for ever-increasing authority is counter-productive and cannot, 
therefore, be accurately described as normative absolutism.   
This is evident in Hobbes’s limiting the exercise of sovereign authority in those 
instances where a command may or will threaten civil peace; Hobbes does address the issue of 
which commands ought to be avoided because they would be highly unlikely to ever be 
considered ‘right’ or ‘just’, and thus would undermine the sovereign’s right to exercise 
authority to the extent that it requires a corresponding belief on the part of subjects’ that every 
command of the sovereign be obeyed without qualm.  
This reality is present in a Christian commonwealth, which Hobbes spends a very 
considerable amount of time discussing.  As King well knows, and with which I agree, civil 
  
50 
peace requires the management of subjects’ disposition to obey the sovereign.  King’s 
interpretation is not particularly holistic, however, and his argument that the exercise of 
authority serves to reinforce that there is only one source of authority fails to take into account 
the rationale for authorisation that a sovereign must instil in Christian subjects.  As I will 
argue, when the sovereign’s authority extends over a Christian commonwealth, the subjects’ 
belief in God complicates the sovereign’s management of the disposition of his subjects to 
obey him.  Hobbes attempts, I will argue, to alleviate this complication within the framework 
of his fundamental objective: the creation of a commonwealth in which choices do not arise 
amongst subjects between obedience to God and obedience to man.  A key consequence of 
this, and what is at odds with King’s interpretation, is that Hobbes clearly asserts the 
possibility that certain commands may upset the sovereign’s authority that the otherwise 
submissive and obedient Christian subjects recognise.  Hobbes advises, indeed obliges, the 
sovereign to ensure that the content of particular commands be contingent on their consistency 
with effecting civil peace over, or at least alongside, the assertion that all commands per se are 
absolute.  The exercise of authority, therefore, is not unlimited, nor is it independent of its 
efficacy for civil peace, and most certainly it is not subordinate to a norm of absolutism.    
 In subsequent chapters I will also challenge Tarlton’s interpretation by emphasising the 
sovereign’s obligation to rule according to the natural law, alongside Hobbes’s 
acknowledgement that the de facto authority of the sovereign is dependent on the recognition 
of subjects.  The sovereign, I will argue, must maintain peace, and doing so requires adherence 
to the laws of nature, just as his possession of authority itself is prescribed by the laws of 
nature.  In accordance with this, the sovereign must act as if his authority has been consented 
to, and he is, therefore, in effect demonstrating that his subjects possess a right to self-
governance by recognising that his subjects transferred their right to self-governance to him in 
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order to secure their peace and preservation.  In short, the sovereign’s exercise of authority is 
not unlimited, because to exercise it arbitrarily, or to exercise it as if the sovereign had no 
obligation to rule according to the natural laws, would be to undermine the recognition of his 
authority, which would lead directly to civil discord. 
Moreover, my argument in Chapter Four will question Tarlton by claiming that the 
right to exercise authority is not absolute in the sense that not all exercises of it are authorised: 
(i) the sovereign does not possess authority over everything, there is a particular and important 
domain over which his authority does not extend; (ii) the sovereign is obliged to refrain from 
exercising his authority in a certain way or to a certain effect; and (iii) competing rights exist 
belonging to subjects which do indeed frustrate the sovereign’s exercise of authority.  
Ultimately, Tarlton does not fully appreciate the essential role of the natural laws in Hobbes’s 
thought.  His account fails to adequately address why Hobbes would even bother describing all 
these potential limits—which Tarlton thinks amount to nothing.  As I will argue, however, 
ruling according to and within these limits is a practical and effective means to maintain civil 
peace; which is Hobbes’s ultimate concern.   
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Chapter 2 
Dominion and the authorship of the Natural Laws 
 
 
2.1 Civil peace and the “Christian problem” 
Problems arise, Hobbes argues, when two or more powers exist, each claiming to 
possess authority, and each claiming that obedience is owed to them.  Hobbes expresses his 
belief in Leviathan that the side-by-side existence of competing authorities is untenable for the 
following simple reason: “Men cannot serve two masters” (L, 392).  His general solution to 
this untenable situation is fairly straightforward: he proposes an absolute sovereign who is the 
sole, legitimate possessor of authority, and to whom all subjects ultimately owe their 
obedience.   
However, while this solution may be effectively implemented in a secular 
commonwealth, Hobbes does not believe that this would sufficiently resolve the problem of 
obedience in a Christian commonwealth. In a Christian commonwealth, Hobbes argues, the 
two masters are God and man, and one’s duty to obey God may be perceived as taking 
precedence over one’s duty to obey the sovereign.  Hobbes, in fact, identifies this problem as 
“the most frequent pretext of sedition and civil war” (L, 397). 
Leviathan’s most explicit passage illustrating Hobbes’s emphasis on this topic is worth 
citing:  
The most frequent pretext of sedition and civil war, in Christian 
commonwealths, hath a long time proceeded from a difficulty, not yet 
sufficiently resolved, of obeying at once both God and man, then when their 
commandments are one contrary to the other.  It is manifest enough that when 
a man receiveth two contrary commands, and knows that one of them is 
God’s, he ought to obey that and not the other, though it be the command even 
of his lawful sovereign (whether a monarch or a sovereign assembly) or the 
command of his father (L, 397).   
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The most common form in which this problem manifests itself is the obedience 
demanded by both ecclesiastical and civil powers; ecclesiastics invoke the authority of God, 
which conflicts with the authority of the civil power. From Hobbes’s correspondence we learn 
that insofar as his views regarding the relationship between church and state are concerned,  
There is no doubt that he thought the establishment of the truth on this 
question was of the highest importance in securing peace in England.  In 1641 
he told the Earl of Devonshire that the dispute ‘betweene the spirituall and 
civill power, has of late more than any other thing in the world, bene the cause 
of civill warre’.80   
Hobbes’s assessment does not appear to be far off the mark, and even a cursory glance 
at Leviathan’s contents reflect his careful attention to the matter: 
Events bore out his claim, for disagreements on questions of church 
government played a large part in bringing about civil war in England in 1642, 
and debate on this issue remained heated throughout the 1640s and 1650s.  It 
is no accident that far and away the longest chapter in Leviathan is the forty-
second – ‘Of Power Ecclesiasticall’81. 
If the religious aspects of Leviathan are taken into full account, it becomes evident that 
in order to resolve what Hobbes perceived to be the problem of a body politic pulled upon by 
contending, institutional authorities, he proposes a political-theological system in which the 
two authorities do not come into conflict, and in which both may not lawfully demand 
obedience.  Accordingly, Hobbes, as a preliminary measure, attempts to eliminate the conflict 
by eliminating competing claims to institutional authority—by granting authority to a sole 
power, namely, a Christian sovereign82.   According to Hobbes, Christian sovereigns ought to:  
                                                
 
80 Johann P. Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context (London: The Macmillan Press 
Ltd., 1992), p. 113. 
81 Sommerville, p. 113. 
82 In Chapter three I will argue that Hobbes’s “Christian sovereign” is not necessarily a sovereign who is a 
believing Christian, but rather is meant to describe a sovereign, whether he is a believing Christian or not, of a 
Christian commonwealth. 
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. . . have all manner of power over their subjects that can be given to man for 
the government of men’s external actions, both in policy and religion, and may 
make such laws as themselves shall judge fittest for the government of their 
own subjects, both as they are the commonwealth and as they are the Church; 
for both State and Church are the same men (L, 372).   
If Hobbes’s concern was primarily and simply the division of power, as Baumgold 
suggested it would be, at a glance, conceivable that Hobbes’s problem could have been 
resolved just as well by granting ecclesiastics both spiritual and civil authority.  It is evident, 
however, that Hobbes did not do so due to his scepticism about revelation or supernatural 
inspiration.  The difficulty consists in this: 
. . . that men, when they are commanded in the name of God, know not, in 
divers cases, whether the command be from God, or whether he that 
commandeth do but abuse God’s name for some private ends of his own. [OL:  
Not because there is anyone who does not know that we ought to obey God 
rather than any man whatever, but because sometimes they do not know 
whether what is commanded by man in the name of God is really commanded 
by God, or whether the one who commands abuses the name of God for his 
own benefit.]  For as there were, in the Church of the Jews, many false 
prophets, that sought reputation with the people by feigned dreams and 
visions, so there have been, in all times in the Church of Christ, false teachers, 
that seek reputation with the people by fantastical and false doctrines, and by 
such reputation (as is the nature of ambition) to govern them for their private 
benefit (L, 397). 
 The command of a representative of God or an ecclesiastical authority is subject to 
doubt, for although “God Almighty can speak to a man by dreams, visions, voice, and 
inspiration, yet he obliges no man to believe he hath so done to him that pretends it, who 
(being a man) may err, and (which is more) may lie” (L, 247).   
 Therefore, the problem with revelation, for Hobbes, is not a problem with revelation 
per se, but rather with the legitimacy of its agents; whose version of the revealed will of God 
should be taken as authoritative?  Competing versions are precisely what, according to 
Hobbes, lead to conflicts not only between civil and ecclesiastical authorities but also between 
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disparate ecclesiastical authorities83.   
 To remedy this, Hobbes systematically undermines two of the three traditional sources 
of revelation, that is, prophecy and miracles.84  In their place, he attributes solely to the third, 
Scripture, verifiable and legitimate revelatory content (L, 249).  In order to prevent alternative, 
and thereby potentially contradictory, interpretations of Scripture from gaining legitimacy he 
names the sovereign as the sole authoritative interpreter of Scripture. In addition, since 
revelation is not perceived by Hobbes to be the problem so much as the question of whose 
version of God’s will is authoritative, the sovereign must be considered a true prophet of God.  
Hobbes writes,  
. . . when Christian men take not their Christian sovereign for God’s prophet, 
they must either take their own dreams for the prophecy they mean to be 
governed by, and the tumor of their own hearts for the Spirit of God, or they 
must suffer themselves to be led by some strange prince or by some of their 
fellow subjects that can bewitch them, by slander of the government, into 
rebellion . . ., and by this means destroying all laws, both divine and human, 
reduce all order, government, and society to the first chaos of violence and 
civil war (L, 293). 
In other words, for the sake of civil peace, the sovereign’s interpretation of God’s will 
must be considered authoritative; whether it is true or false, accurate or inaccurate, should be 
of no political consequence.  In any event, it cannot be conclusively known what God’s will is. 
By including what were traditionally thought of as spiritual powers—traditionally held, 
in turn, by ecclesiastical authorities—in the authority of a Christian sovereign, Hobbes 
essentially strips ecclesiastical authorities of their traditional domain.  Hobbes stresses, 
                                                
 
83 Nor did Hobbes believe that the problem of revelation—essentially challenges made to the sovereign’s claim of 
authority—was confined to challenges from established ecclesiastic institutions.  Anyone claiming to have 
special knowledge of God may contend that their knowledge of God’s will conflicts with the sovereign’s law.  If 
God’s authority is perceived to take precedence over the sovereign’s, any claim of supernatural inspiration may, 
therefore, potentially conflict with the sovereign’s authority. 
84 Note Leviathan chap. xxxvi and chap. xxxvii (in particular xxxvii 6).  
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however, that the authority which ecclesiastics claim to possess—spiritual authority—is not 
even a true form of authority: ‘spiritual’ authority ought not to be distinguished from 
‘temporal’ authority.  He then argues that conflicts between ecclesiastical and civil authorities 
competing for sovereign authority cannot be resolved by maintaining the distinction between 
ecclesiastical and civil authority85.   
Michael Oakeshott, for instance, notes that the authority possessed by Hobbes’s 
sovereign is “an authority which is not temporal and spiritual …, but single and supreme.  And 
the association represented in his person is not a state and a church, for a true church . . . is ‘a 
company of men professing Christian Religion, united in the person of one Sovereign’”86.  
Hobbes does not propose a sovereign possessing both civil and ecclesiastical authority, but 
rather a sovereign possessing simply authority.  There is no proper distinction between civil 
and ecclesiastical authority for Hobbes.  If, he argues, the sovereign is considered to possess 
both civil and ecclesiastical authority, or both temporal and spiritual authority, then the 
problem remains unresolved despite the sovereign’s dual authority, since “if it be one 
kingdom, either the civil, which is the power of the commonwealth, must be subordinate to the 
ghostly, and then there is no sovereignty but the ghostly, or the ghostly must be subordinate to 
the temporal, and then there is no supremacy but the temporal” (L, 216).  Rather, the sovereign 
must possess simply authority, the exercise of which is not to be divided between civil and 
                                                
 
85 J. G. A. Pocock, for instance, makes a distinction “between [Hobbes’] philosophical and theological 
justifications for the exercise of ecclesiastical power by the civil sovereign …”, as cited in Springborg, 
“Leviathan, The Christian Commonwealth Incorporated” Political Studies, 24 (1976) p. 137.  Springborg 
criticises Pocock’s position that these two justifications are autonomous, and argues, rather that they 
“interpenetrate” (Springborg, 146).  Both arguments assume that Hobbes meant ecclesiastical authority to signify 
proper authority, which in turn assumes that Hobbes maintained a distinction between ecclesiastical and civil 
authority. 
86 Michael Oakeshott, “Introduction to Leviathan” in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 1991), p. 272. 
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ecclesiastical or temporal and spiritual jurisdictions.   
This is not to say, however, that Hobbes’s sovereign does not possess authority that 
had been traditionally identified or considered to be ecclesiastical or spiritual.  Indeed, 
Hobbes’s sovereign does possess authority over those things that had traditionally been in the 
church’s domain.  For instance, the sovereign decides which books of Scripture are to be 
canonical, and is the sole interpreter of the Scriptures87.  However, Hobbes maintains that 
what had traditionally been considered ecclesiastical authority is no different than civil 
authority, and it was an error to consider the two distinct.   
Ecclesiastical power, Hobbes argues, which is what “was left by our Saviour to the 
apostles” (L, 336), is “only a power to proclaim the kingdom of Christ, and to persuade men to 
submit themselves thereunto” (L, 336).  Persuasion, moreover, is not to be accomplished 
through “coercion and punishing” (L, 337).  Thus, 
. . . the office of Christ’s ministers in this world is to make men believe and 
have faith in Christ; but faith hath no relation to nor dependence at all, upon 
compulsion or commandment, but only upon certainty or probability of 
arguments drawn from reason or from something men believe already.  
Therefore, the ministers of Christ in this world have no power by that title to 
punish any man for not believing or for contradicting what they say (L, 337). 
Notice Hobbes’s emphasis upon the inability of coercion to instil belief.  In the Latin 
edition of Leviathan (1668), Hobbes adds “But no one can be compelled to believe, either by a 
command or by force, but only by reason, and arguments drawn either from reason or from 
something they already believed” (OL, 337).  Hobbes denies political power as a means of 
securing belief not only to the “ministers of Christ”, but also to the sovereign: “As for the 
inward thought and belief of men, which human governors can take no notice of (for God only 
                                                
 
87 The sovereign as canonical legislator and sole interpreter of Scripture is portrayed by Hobbes in Leviathan 
xxxiii (1) and xxxiii (24) respectively. 
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knoweth the heart), they are not voluntary, nor the effect of the laws, but of the unrevealed 
will, and of the power, of God, and consequently fall not under obligation” (L, 318).  
Sovereigns “cannot know whether we believe or not, nor if they knew, change [our belief]” 
(OL, 338).  As such, even should a sovereign “forbid us to believe in Christ … such forbidding 
is of no effect, because belief and unbelief never follow men’s command” (L, 338). 
This implies, therefore, that ecclesiastical authority, as traditionally conceived, is not 
authority proper; this suggests that it is insufficiently binding to be consistent with Hobbes’s 
definition of authority, “the right of doing any action” (L, 102).  Hobbes argues that the aim of 
ecclesiastical action is to “make men believe and have faith in Christ”, yet the tools of 
coercion and compulsion are unavailable to achieve this end.  Only persuasion may be 
effectively employed to this end.  Ecclesiastical authority consists only of a power to employ 
persuasion and, therefore, is not of “a right of doing any action”, but rather is relegated to a 
very limited role88.   
While ecclesiastical authority does not strictly exist for Hobbes, the power possessed 
by the sovereign may be legitimately exercised over that which was traditionally considered to 
be under ecclesiastical authority.  Although Hobbes’s Christian sovereign can no more 
influence his subjects’ beliefs through coercion and compulsion than can the church, the 
sovereign does have authority over the making and enforcement of laws, including religious 
laws89.  While the church has no power “by that title of Christ’s ministers, to punish such; but 
if they have sovereign civil power, by politic institution, then they may indeed lawfully punish 
                                                
 
88 The role Hobbes has in mind for the Church is mainly an instructional, evangelical one: “The work of Christ’s 
ministers is evangelization, that is, a proclamation of Christ and a preparation for his second coming, as the 
evangelization of John [the] Baptist was a preparation to his first coming (xlii, 8). 
89 In Chapter four I will argue that the sovereign’s exercise of authority in the making of religious laws is limited 
by Hobbes. 
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any contradiction to their laws whatsoever” (L, 337).  Authority over religious matters, 
therefore, is neither ecclesiastical nor civil authority, but rather sovereign authority.  Hobbes 
argues, again, that this conception and arrangement is necessary. Otherwise there will “follow 
faction and civil war in the commonwealth: between the Church and State; between 
spiritualists and temporalists; between the sword of justice and the shield of faith; and (which 
is more) in every Christian man’s own breast, between the Christian and the man” (L, 316). 
This prescription substantially changes the dynamics of ecclesiastical and civil 
authority in terms of Hobbes’s aim to eliminate the dual claims of each, and particularly 
claims by ecclesiastics to civil authority, ensuring that the sovereign’s authority over religious 
matters does not conflict with church authorities.  In other words, the initial part of Hobbes’s 
solution to the problem of men being unable to serve two masters is to eliminate the 
institutional authority of one of the masters, the ecclesiastics.  Ecclesiastical authority, 
however, is only one—albeit significant—manifestation of the fundamental problem: 
obedience to God versus obedience to man.  Ecclesiastical authority claims to be derived from 
the authority of God, and Hobbes, as we have seen, denies the legitimacy of obeying those 
who claim to represent God, and denies the legitimacy of trusting another’s version of God’s 
will.  This does not appear to eliminate the authority of God, however. Rather, it severely 
limits one’s ability to obey God; one cannot know God’s will through traditional means, so 
what commands are there to obey, besides those of the gate-keeper (i.e. the Christian 
sovereign) of the only legitimate source of revelation (i.e. Scripture)?  In other words, 
therefore, Hobbes not only strips ecclesiastics of their ability to command obedience, but 
appears to strip Christians of their ability to choose to obey God over man. 
It would appear, then, that to solve what he believed to be the fundamental problem 
facing a Christian commonwealth—obedience to God versus obedience to man—Hobbes 
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affirms that the ability to obey God is severely limited.  This appearance has led critics of 
Hobbes to charge him with stripping his Christian commonwealth of the characteristics which 
make a commonwealth essentially Christian, thereby making its ultimate foundations 
indistinguishable from the foundations of any peaceful commonwealth. 
In all this, Hobbes makes an implicit distinction between that which is inimical and 
necessary for peace in all commonwealths, and that which is peculiar to Christian 
commonwealths.  Whereas all commonwealths need a sovereign, for example, Christian 
commonwealths require a Christian sovereign; whereas all commonwealths are threatened by 
competing authorities, the most acutely dangerous manifestation of this problem is peculiar to 
Christian commonwealths. 
Due to this distinction, a reader of Hobbes is likely to question whether or not 
Hobbes’s Christian commonwealth is Christian in name only; that is to ask if to eliminate the 
peculiar problems facing a Christian commonwealth, Hobbes eliminates the essential 
peculiarities which make the commonwealth Christian? 
Certain critics of Hobbes argue precisely this; that by eliminating the essential 
peculiarities of what makes a commonwealth Christian—for example, by eliminating the 
claims of ecclesiastics to authority, and by eliminating the legitimacy of Christian revelation—
what remains of Hobbes’s Christian commonwealth is not actually Christian.  Rather, they 
argue that Hobbes’s Christian commonwealth is devoid of any meaningful Christian content, 
and has its foundations in secular, non-religious principles, which Hobbes believed should be 
common to all commonwealths: the natural laws and natural rights.  Hobbes, in other words,  
thought that to maintain peace in a commonwealth that is Christian it is necessary to eliminate, 
in effect, the authority of God. In God’s place he founded his commonwealth upon the natural 
laws which function independently of God.  In this way, his critics argue, Hobbes ensured that 
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men would not be forced to choose between two masters.   
Importantly, however, Hobbes does not eliminate in principle the authority of God.   In 
opposition to the above interpretation, there are those that note that Hobbes equated the natural 
laws with God’s laws.  Therefore, while Hobbes may have eliminated some traditional 
attributes of a Christian commonwealth, he ultimately made the foundation of his 
commonwealth God.  God, according to this interpretation, is necessary for the authority of 
both the natural laws and the sovereign; God is ultimately the authorising agent.  It is, 
therefore, argued that Hobbes maintains the authority of both God and man; men can, without 
conflict, serve two masters, when God is considered the ‘true’ master. 
The above debate, therefore, is essentially a debate over whether or not God is 
intended by Hobbes to be the actual author of the natural laws.  By focusing on this aspect of 
Leviathan, the debate correspondingly assumes that the religious problem—obedience to God 
versus obedience to man—is overarching.  That is, the debate focuses almost exclusively upon 
which author—God or man—is ultimately to be obeyed90. Both sides of the debate, however, 
are represented in two discernible arguments present in Leviathan.  Both sides of the debate 
present evidence from Leviathan which indicates either that the natural laws are God’s laws, 
or that they are ultimately based upon secular principles.   
In the following sections of this chapter, I will examine both sides of this debate, 
which focuses on whether or not God is necessarily the author of the natural laws in Hobbes’s 
                                                
 
90 Although generally, the two interpretations are primarily concerned with “the sincerity of 
Hobbes’s often professed belief in Christianity and its status in his overall political-theological 
scheme” (John W. Seaman  “Hobbes and the Liberalization of Christianity.” Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 32 (1999) p. 227), both interpretations carry this atheist/theist debate into an area of 
focus which they perceive to be indicative of their respective positions: whether Hobbes justifies his 
sovereign’s authority ultimately upon secular or religious grounds, and whether or not God is 
ultimately the author of the natural laws. 
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Leviathan.  It will be noted that the two sides of the debate represent two discernible 
arguments in Leviathan, making it extremely difficult to establish Hobbes’s true intent91.  
 
2.2 Authorship of the natural laws 
The debate focuses on whether or not Hobbes ultimately intended God to be the author 
of the natural laws, and similarly focuses on the natural laws as foundational principles.  If the 
natural laws are taken to be foundational principles, then this focus on God’s role in Hobbes’s 
system deserves and warrants due attention:  whether or not the natural laws are God’s laws 
will determine the nature of the ultimate authority—theistic or not—in Hobbes’s system.  
Two general interpretations have offered particular responses to this query. The first 
maintains that Hobbes based the authority of an essentially civil sovereign on strictly secular, 
rational grounds to the exclusion of religious, revelatory grounds.  That is, Hobbes 
subordinated revelation to reason in the justification of his sovereign’s authority.  The second 
position interprets Hobbes as basing the authority of his sovereign ultimately upon God. 
In addition, both interpretations have at their root a more or less explicit 
acknowledgement of the importance and centrality of natural law to Hobbes’s politico-
theological system in Leviathan.  Indeed, any focus on how Hobbes justifies the sovereign’s 
authority must necessarily correspondingly focus on an interpretation of his natural laws.  This 
is so because those natural laws form the basis upon which Hobbes both explains the 
rationality of, and provides the justification for, individuals consenting to lay down their 
alienable rights in pursuit of a commonwealth, thereby becoming subjects of a sovereign 
                                                
 
91 This difficulty will prompt a switch in focus, to be discussed in Chapter Three.  I will, in that chapter, focus on 
the natural laws as practical, ruling principles, which in turn, suggests that Hobbes had a practical, instrumental 
role in mind for the idea of God. 
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power.   
It is, accordingly, acknowledged or assumed by both groups of interpreters that the 
natural laws prescribe the authority of the sovereign.  Hence, the fundamental difference 
between them is not derived from their positions on whether or not the natural laws prescribe 
the authority of the sovereign, but rather from their positions on the question of whether or not 
the natural laws prescribe the authority of the sovereign because they are God’s laws.   
   
2.2.1 Reason and secular authorship 
Taking each interpretation in turn, those that argue that Hobbes ultimately made the 
foundation for his sovereign’s authority rest solely upon reason and natural law make two 
general claims92.  First, it is argued that by making natural law the ultimate foundation for his 
sovereign’s authority, Hobbes excluded any divine or revelatory source of authority.  
Secondly, in order to effectively do so, given the circumstances of his time, Hobbes did this in 
a disingenuous fashion. 
According to Basil Willey, for instance, Hobbes was a deist.  Hobbes meant to do 
away with the superstitious Gentile God, and replace Him with the One God; “first mover and 
designer of the world machine”93.  Simply put, “For him the word God is really little but a 
                                                
 
92 This view, under the umbrella interpretation of characterising Hobbes as an eliminator of Christian authority, 
can be found in Jan H. Blits, “Hobbesian Fear”, in Political Theory 17 (1989); David Johnston, The Rhetoric of 
Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural Transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
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Philosophy? And Other Studies (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976); Basil Willey, The Seventeenth Century 
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93 Willey, p. 118. 
  
64 
symbol of the philosopher’s fatigue”; the necessary first mover of causal theory94.   
Since this view was far from orthodox, however, Willey attributes to Hobbes a 
disingenuous method shared by other radical Protestant contemporaries: by attacking “Popery” 
they could, with every appearance of religiosity, “demolish the very foundations of religion 
itself”95.  While attacking the institutions of the Church was certainly radical—although it 
could be more palatably justified by appealing to the Church’s apparent deviation from God’s 
will—attacking the truth of Scripture was outright heretical, since Scripture was considered 
the Word of God.  Willey writes, “ … the Bible, or rather the contemporary attitude towards it, 
was perhaps the greatest of all the obstacles to the ‘exaltation of Truth’.  As the ‘Word of God’ 
it could neither be denied nor ignored, and there was therefore no alternative but to ‘re-
interpret’ it and to confute the current ‘misinterpretations’”96.  Hobbes was, therefore, forced 
to re-interpret Scripture in order to achieve his goal of eliminating Christian authority.  By 
simply arguing that reason is the “undoubted word of God” and ought never to be renounced, 
Hobbes, according to Willey, reveals his clear preference for reason over other, and what he 
perceived to be less reliable, sources of revelation97.  When revelation, or Scripture, seems to 
conflict with reason, the dictates of reason, given exhalted status by Hobbes, must take 
precedence.  In fact, Willey argues, Hobbes states that Scripture and reason cannot conflict, 
since both are sources of revelation; they may merely appear to conflict.   
Through these means, Willey believes Hobbes successfully undermines the authority 
of Scripture.  Since the sovereign’s authority is justified by reason, any challenges to the 
                                                
 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid., p. 120. 
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sovereign’s will via some other source of revelation must not take precedence over the 
sovereign’s will.  Since reason must be obeyed, the will of the sovereign must be obeyed.  
“The reverence we owe to Scripture ...”, therefore, turns out “... to be yet another aspect of our 
general obligation to obey constituted authority”98. 
Leo Strauss follows Willey quite closely in his understanding of Hobbes’s intentions 
for Christianity.  On religion, Strauss states that Hobbes’s writings were guided by this 
fundamental question:  “On what authority does one believe that Scripture is the word of 
God?”99  He claims Hobbes’s response in Leviathan is:  “On the authority of the teachers 
whose teaching is permitted and organized by the sovereign power, i.e. one confesses 
verbally—for thoughts are free—that Scripture is the word of God, because secular authority 
commands this confession”100.   Like Willey, therefore, Strauss understands Hobbes to 
subordinate the authority of Scripture to the authority of the sovereign; Scripture has full 
authority—political and ecclesiastical—only because of the sovereign’s will.   
Strauss attributes this position to Hobbes’s true religious beliefs and their 
incompatibility with the prevalent beliefs of his time.  Hobbes, under this view, held two 
fundamental attitudes towards religion: one concerned natural religion, and the other 
concerned positive religion.  
According to Strauss, Hobbes in his later life and during the writing of Leviathan 
believed that it was “completely impossible” to have any “natural knowledge of God which is 
more than the knowledge that a First Cause exists”101. Thus, like Willey, Strauss views 
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Hobbes as a deist.  Strauss maintains that this belief had two major implications for Hobbes’s 
religious writings.  First, he “systematically excluded” both revealed and natural theology 
from his philosophy.  Second,  
In order to hide the dangerous nature of this skepticism, to keep up an 
appearance that he attacked only scholastic theology and not the religion of the 
Scripture itself, Hobbes fought his battle against natural theology in the name 
of strict belief in the Scriptures and at the same time undermines that belief by 
his historical and philosophical criticism of the authority of the Scriptures.102  
Alongside this motivation for eliminating the authority of Christianity, Strauss 
attributes to Hobbes another, namely his attitude towards positive religion.  Religion, Hobbes 
says according to this view, “must serve the State and is to be esteemed or despised according 
to the services or disservices rendered to the State”103.  A golden mean was reachable for 
Hobbes, according to Strauss, between atheism on the one hand and superstition on the other, 
only when it “consists in subordination to the religion which is prescribed by the State and 
never comes into conflict with the State”104.   
Strauss’s interpretation, therefore, argues that Hobbes meant to destroy the divine 
authority of Christianity and the Bible, and, while not entirely eliminating the authority of 
Christianity per se, placed the power to authorise Christianity in the hands of the sovereign.  
Strauss’s position on this point is very similar to that of Willey, who also considered Hobbes’s 
re-interpretation of Scripture as an attempt to undermine its authority in favour of sovereign 
authority.  Strauss adds to this view by attributing to Hobbes a dual motive; Hobbes was a 
deist who was sceptical of revelation and, therefore, attempted to eliminate it as a source of 
                                                
 
102 Ibid., p. 76. 
103 Ibid., p. 74. 
104 Ibid, p. 75. Cf. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 198; 
Strauss writes that Hobbes’ scheme “requires for its operation the weakening, or rather, the elimination of the 
fear of invisible powers [emphasis added]”. 
  
67 
authority.  Moreover, because Hobbes believed religion could disserve the state, he believed 
that for practical purposes religion should be subordinate to the state. 
Others agree with Strauss that Hobbes desired to eliminate Christianity’s authority, and 
while they concur with the original motivation that Strauss attributed to Hobbes, have added to 
Strauss’s arguments.  They argue that Hobbes believed the authority of Christian revelation to 
be incompatible with what he really wanted to found his political system upon: natural rights 
and natural law105. 
Cooke, for instance, writes that Hobbes ultimately taught 
... that the formerly highest authorities—the Bible and God—have been 
dethroned and replaced by the sovereignty of man ... that human beings are not 
only free to establish their own moral authorities, they are also alone in the 
universe and have no choice—they must create their own moral order with no 
other guide than their own needs.  Hobbes did not intend to teach a broad 
audience that in the liberation of human beings from all authorities they do not 
themselves create, there is no longer to be any higher support for human lives 
than the foundation called natural rights.  But this is precisely what his 
teaching indicates, once his treatment of the Bible is revealed for what it is.106 
To summarise this position, it is first argued that by making natural law the ultimate 
foundation for his sovereign’s authority, Hobbes excluded any divine or revelatory source of 
authority.  This interpretation not only argues that Hobbes excluded such sources; it maintains 
that Hobbes systematically excluded them, this being indicative of an effort on Hobbes’s part 
to eliminate Christian revelation as a source of political or ecclesiastical authority.  Hobbes did 
so, according to this position, because he realised that reason, natural right, and natural law, 
upon which he truly intended to found his political philosophy, were incompatible with certain 
doctrines that were central to the Christian faith.  His reinterpretation of Christianity and 
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Scripture was, therefore, intended to remedy these incompatibilities, and Hobbes accordingly 
corrupted Christianity to make it compatible with natural right and law.   
Secondly, it is argued that Hobbes did so in a disingenuous fashion.  Those that 
subscribe to this interpretation are sceptical of Hobbes’s claims to be a sincere Christian, and 
make the general assertion that “Hobbes was an atheist who sought to hide his real purpose of 
eliminating the authority of Christian revelation under a veneer of public piety”107.  Parts III 
and IV of Leviathan, for example, deal exclusively with Scriptural interpretation, and while 
this interpretation may be heterodox, Hobbes maintains that Scripture does support his 
political system because the natural laws can be inferred from Scripture.  Hobbes also 
maintains that Scripture is the revealed word of God, and, therefore, both reason and 
revelation lead to knowledge of the natural laws.  To sceptics, however, this is not evidence of 
Hobbes’s sincerity, but rather it is precisely what constitutes Hobbes’s veneer of piety.   
 
2.2.2 God and theistic authorship 
Those who argue, on the other hand, that Christian principles are essential to Hobbes’s 
system take the starting point that while Hobbes does justify the authority of the sovereign by 
appeal to the natural laws, Hobbes equates those natural laws with God’s laws108.  If this is the 
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case, they argue, then if Christianity is a crucial and inextricable aspect of his political 
philosophy, Hobbes could not have intended to eliminate the authority of Christianity.  It is, 
they argue, counterintuitive for a sincere Hobbes to have based his political philosophy on 
Christian principles, while in the meantime eliminating the authority of those Christian 
principles. It is also, however, undeniable that Hobbes did indeed put an extraordinary 
emphasis on natural law and reason in parts I and II of Leviathan. It is also apparent that 
Hobbes bases the authority of his sovereign on them.  The challenge for this interpretation, 
therefore, is to demonstrate that Hobbes did not believe Christianity to be incompatible with 
natural right and natural reason, but that Christian principles, rather than natural right and 
natural reason exclusively, provided the foundation of his political system.   
This position advances two basic premises which mean to establish that Christian 
principles are essential to the justification for the authority of Hobbes’s sovereign.  First, it 
claims that natural law is the command of God in Hobbes’s account.  Insofar as the 
justification for the sovereign’s authority is concerned, the natural laws state that the consent 
of the governed authorises the sovereign’s authority.  Because the natural laws are God’s laws, 
however, while the sovereign’s authority may proximately be a result of his subjects’ 
covenant, the sovereign’s authority ultimately is derived from God.  God’s laws dictate that 
humans covenant to authorise a sovereign power and, therefore, it is not consent that 
authorises the sovereign ultimately but the fact that consent was commanded by God.  
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Secondly, it is argued that Hobbes did not understand revelation to be inconsistent with 
reason or natural law.  Rather, reason is the method by which God reveals His law, part of 
which is natural law.  Compared with the other position on this matter—that the will of God is 
known only through revelation and, therefore, natural law replaces revelation as a source of 
authority—a fundamental difference between these two interpretations arises, which revolves 
around their answer to the question of how Hobbes believes God’s will is revealed.  Those 
who characterise Hobbes as eliminating revelation argue that God’s will, according to Hobbes, 
can only be known through revelation, and since revelation is not conclusive and is often 
contradictory, Hobbes thought it best to replace revelation as a source of authority with natural 
law.  Those who maintain that Hobbes’s system is consistent and reliant upon Christian 
principles argue that Hobbes believed God’s will is revealed through natural reason and law.  
It is conceded that Hobbes wished to deny legitimacy to other sources of revelation.  Since, 
however, natural law is the revealed word of God, there is no conflict between revelation and 
natural law. 
Clearly, whether or not Hobbes ultimately rested the authority of his sovereign upon 
God is closely related to the question of what Hobbes’s religious beliefs were, and what his 
intent in Leviathan was.  This question, Samuel I. Mintz points out, similarly preoccupied 
many of Hobbes’s contemporaries. Offered, at least in part, as a remedy to Hobbes’s secularist 
interpreters is Mintz’s reminder that Hobbes  
. . . was the bête noire of his age.  The principal objection to him, the one to 
which all other criticisms of him can ultimately be reduced, was that he was an 
atheist.  He was the “Monster of Malmesbury”, the arch-atheist, the apostle of 
infidelity, the “bug-bear of the nation”.  His doctrines were cited by 
Parliament as a probable cause of the great Fire of 1666.  His books were 
banned and publicly burnt, and the ideas which Hobbes expressed in them in 
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his lucid and potent style were the object of more or less continuous hostile 
criticism from 1650 to 1700.109 
Although the term ‘atheist’ casts a very wide net, two particular implications of 
Hobbes’s system appear to have sparked this criticism.  The way in which Hobbes justified his 
sovereign’s authority came under attack as supplanting God’s authority and God’s law, and 
the content of the authority which Hobbes granted his sovereign—particularly what they 
believed to be ecclesiastical authority—was viewed by his contemporaries as being Erastian in 
principle and form, which at that time further warranted a charge of atheism.   
Many modern Hobbes scholars have sought to reveal what Hobbes’s belief and intent 
was by comparing Hobbes’s professed belief with what his contemporaries understood to be 
his belief.   I will thereby attempt to answer whether the charges of atheism by Hobbes’s 
contemporaries do indeed prove an insincere profession of Christian belief on the part of 
Hobbes.  Some modern Hobbes scholars argue that the criticisms of Hobbes by his 
contemporaries indicate that Hobbes was far from orthodox, which they believe indicates that 
Hobbes’s profession of Christian belief is doubtful.  If accurate, however, this also has a 
consequence for the validity of any argument maintaining that Hobbes hid his intent behind a 
veneer of piety.  Other modern scholars argue that Hobbes was orthodox, or perhaps 
heterodox, yet remained Christian, and his contemporaries were too quick to label Hobbes an 
atheist.  Both sets of arguments are used to bolster their respective claims about whether or not 
God was a necessary part of Hobbes’s system in Leviathan.  Hence, alongside the 
aforementioned aim of the following section, I will also discuss the ability of the historical 
evidence to support such claims. 
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2.3 Historical context and critical reception 
A good introduction to the mood of Hobbes’s contemporaries is provided by Samuel 
Mintz’s notice of a contemporary anecdote110. In 1668, Daniel Scargill, a Fellow of Corpus 
Christi College, Cambridge, was expelled from the university for having “asserted several 
Impious and Atheistical Tenets to the great dishonour of God, the scandal of the Christian 
Religion and of the University”111.  Some time after Scargill’s expulsion, he was told that 
provided he made a public recantation, he could be restored to the University.  He agreed to do 
so, and in 1669, he recited the following in the University Church of St. Mary the Great: 
   Whereas I Daniel Scargill, late Batchelour of Arts, and Fellow of Corpus 
Christi Colledge, in the University of Cambridge, being through the instigation 
of the Devil possessed with a foolish proud conceit of my own wit and not 
having the fear of God before my eyes:  Have lately vented and publickly 
asserted in the said University divers wicked, blasphemous, and Atheistical 
positions (particularly, that all right of Dominion is founded only in Power:  
That all moral Righteousness is founded only in the positive Law of the Civil 
Magistrate …), professing that I gloried to be an Hobbist and an Atheist; and 
vaunting, that Hobbs should be maintained by Daniel that is by me.  
Agreeably unto which principles and position, I have lived in great 
licentiousness, swearing rashly, drinking intemperately, boasting myself 
insolently, corrupting others by my pernicious principles and examples, to the 
Dishonour of God, the Reproach of the University, the Scandal of Christianity, 
and the just offence of mankind …. 
   Wherefore, I do here in the presence of God, Angels, and men, cast my self 
down in a deep dread of the just judgments and vengeance of God upon the 
accursed Atheism of this age, acknowledging myself to be highly guilty of the 
growth and spreading thereof; having contributed what my profane wit could 
devise, or my foul mouth express, to instill it into others, to confirm them 
therein…. In a deep sense of that wretched part I have acted in the propagating 
thereof, I do now abhor my self in dust and ashes, and from the bottom of my 
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heart, I do disclaim, renounce, detest, and abhor those execrable Positions 
asserted by me or any other:  particularly… that there is a desirable glory in 
being, and being reputed an Atheist: which I implied when I expressly 
affirmed that I gloried to be an Hobbist and an Atheist.112 
It is evident from this that Hobbes had been—if not officially then certainly widely—
deemed an atheist.  So as not to misunderstand the charge, however, atheism was at that time a 
‘hydra-headed term’.   
When [atheism] was not being used as an epithet of abuse having only 
emotional content, it referred in general to the denial of God’s existence; but it 
also meant any arguments which tended in that direction, even if only by 
implication.  Hence it was flexible enough to include a variety of doctrines, 
many of them dissimilar in their premises, but all of them conceived of as 
leading to the same conclusions and as having the same consequences—the 
disavowel of the deity and the undermining of Christian faith.113   
An example of the content of such a charge can be found in the following “Atheists’ 
Catechism”, which was appended to an anti-Hobbist diatribe written by Sir Charles Wolsley 
(1666).  Wolsley lists the most common particulars upon which a case for Hobbes’s 
characterisation as an atheist was largely based:   
Q. Do you believe there is a God? 
A. No: I believe there is none. 
Q. What is the true ground of your belief? 
A. Because I have no mind there should be one. 
Q. What other reason do you give for it? 
A. Because I never saw him. 
Q. If there be no God, how came this world to be? 
A. It made itself by meer chance. 
Q. After what manner was it first pieced together? 
A. By a casual hit of Atoms one against another. 
Q. How came those Atoms so to hit one against another? 
A. As they were eternally dancing about, in an infinite space. 
Q. Whence came the reason of mankind; and all that order and regularity we find in the 
world? 
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A. From the meer accidental conjunction of those Atoms. 
Q. What is it that men call Religion? 
A. A politick cheat put upon the world. 
Q. Who were the first contrivers of this cheat? 
A. Some cunning men that designed to keep the world in subjection and awe. 
Q. What was the first ground of it? 
A. Men were frighted with Tales, that were told them, about invisible nothings. 
Q. When did this fright first seize men? 
A. ‘Tis very long ago: and (for ought we can find) ‘tis as old as the world itself. 
Q. Has this fright upon men been general? 
A. Yes:  The whole world, in all ages of it, have been possessed with a fear of nothing. 
Q. What is the great end that every man is to live to? 
A. To please himself. 
Q. How prove you that? 
A. Because there is nothing above him: and so he is his own Law. 
Q. Are men to make any distinction in their actions? 
A. No further, nor upon no other account, but as they please or displease themselves. 
Q. Is there any such thing as good or evil? 
A. No: ‘tis a distinction the world hath been couzened with. 
Q. When was that distinction first brought into the world? 
A. ‘Tis of the same date with those fables about a Deity; and related wholly to them. 
Q. Is there anything for a man to hope for or stand in fear of, beyond this world? 
A. No, nothing at all. 
Q. What becomes of a man when he dyes? 
A. He returns into his first Atoms. 
Q.  What becomes of those Atoms? 
A.  They still help to carry on the great round of the world.114 
 
A number of strands of conventional theological doctrine can be found in this passage: 
scepticism, naturalism, atomism or Epicureanism and, more generally, blasphemy and 
heresy115.  Because, as was noted earlier, the charge of atheism was quite general, if Hobbes 
could be shown to be in opposition to any one of these particulars, Hobbes could also be 
identified as an atheist, which, of course, he was.   
Of such ‘offences’, perhaps the most predominant, at least judging by what Hobbes’s 
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critics most vehemently and frequently seized upon, was Hobbes’s emphasis on reason above 
revelation in Leviathan.  According to Cooke, while it was not an unpopular view among 
Hobbes’s contemporaries, it was at the very root of the atheist charge116.  Since Hobbes 
challenged the various divine sources of revelation commonly held by the orthodoxy, and 
appears to question the special authority of the Bible, his biblical criticism was viewed as 
destructive.  The widely held position of the time maintained that reason was not the enemy of 
revelation, for reason was considered to be able to operate “within the boundaries of the 
principal tenets of Scripture”117.  Yet Hobbes seemed to place reason outside of those 
boundaries and, therefore, his teachings were seen to undermine the Christian faith. 
Therefore, in at least this one important doctrinal matter, Hobbes’s position appeared 
noticeably to be outside that of orthodox opinion.  Yet to conclude from this that Hobbes was 
an atheist, as did his contemporaries, is problematic:   
The term “Christian orthodoxy” is hard to define and it is therefore difficult to 
say someone is outside of it.  However, although the task of defining it in a 
precise way may be difficult, indicating what it is not is less so.  Anglican 
divines, the Oxford rationalist theologians, Puritan clergymen, and the 
Cambridge Platonists, among others, were each offended by Hobbes’ss 
application of reason to revelation.  Reason, as concerns divine revelation, was 
to operate within certain broad bounds beyond which Christian faith was 
violated; across the spectrum of faith from Catholicism to Anglicanism to 
Puritanism, if nothing else at the time could be so named, this may be termed 
as a kind of limit of orthodoxy and in this important sense Hobbes departed 
from orthodoxy and, indeed, was well outside of it.118 
While Hobbes, therefore, may not have been an orthodox Christian, this does not 
necessarily mean that his critics were correct in assuming Hobbes was an atheist.  The 
question here revolves around whether someone is or is not a Christian, based upon their 
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compliance with orthodox doctrine.  Hobbes frequently denied that he was an atheist, as the 
following response of Hobbes to such charges, made in the context of his reply to Wallis, 
demonstrates:   
. . . What kind of attribute I pray you is immaterial, or incorporeal substance?  
Where do you find it in the Scripture?  Whence came it hither, but from Plato 
and Aristotle, Heathens, who mistook those thin Inhabitants of the Brain they 
see in sleep, for so many incorporeal men; and yet they allow them motion, 
which is proper only to things corporeal.  Do you think it an honour to God to 
be one of these?  And would you learn Christianity from Plato and Aristotle?  
But seeing there is no such word in Scripture, how will you warrant [sic] it 
from natural reason?  Neither Plato nor Aristotle did ever write of, or mention 
an incorporeal Spirit; for they could not conceive how a Spirit, which in their 
language was πνεΰµα (in ours a Wind) could be incorporeal.  Do you 
understand the connection of substance and incorporeal?  If you do, explain it 
in English; for the words are Latine.  It is something, you’l say, that being 
without Body, stands under----! Stands under what?  Will you say, under 
Accidents?  Almost all the Fathers of the Church will be against you; and then 
you are an Atheist.  Is not Mr Hobbs his way of attributing to God, that only 
which the Scripture Attribute to him, or what is never anywhere taken but for 
honour, much better than this bold Undertaking of yours, to consider and 
decypher Gods nature to us?119 
Notice Hobbes’s tongue-in-cheek remark that should Wallis be considered by the 
“Fathers of the Church” to be an atheist, he is, in fact, an atheist.  Moreover, much of 
Hobbes’s criticism of Wallis can be interpreted as an attack on the validity of contemporary 
orthodoxy. In other words, Hobbes defends himself against the charge of atheism by 
suggesting that the standard against which he is being judged is itself misguided.  He makes 
the case against the following argument: it is plausible that someone is an atheist if his 
contemporaries consider him to be one120. Even if Hobbes’s religious views constituted a 
radical departure from orthodoxy, which they likely did, this does not necessarily call into 
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question his theism, but merely his commitment to orthodox theism. 
Hobbes also has his modern day apologists who agree that his contemporaries were 
wrong in assuming that his apparent heterodoxy constituted atheism.  Some have even argued 
that Hobbes was indeed within the boundaries of seventeenth-century Anglican doctrinal 
trends.  Paul J. Johnson, for instance, argues that Hobbes and a few of his acquaintances, most 
notable among them John Hales and William Chillingworth, shared in common “a doctrine of 
salvation and a theory of Christianity which formed the mainstream of Anglican doctrinal 
development in the seventeenth century”121.  Anglican thinkers at this time, Johnson outlines, 
were seeking a middle course between Roman Catholicism and Protestant sects such as the 
Presbyterians and Independents.  To find this course, they concentrated on problems involving 
interpretative infallibility and differences between the essentials of faith as opposed to 
accessories.  Simply put,  
… the Anglicans argued for a simplified Christianity whose essence lay in a 
very few fundamental doctrines which had been so clearly presented in the 
Scriptures as to require no interpretation and no special qualifications to 
understand beyond the simple willingness to read the words without prejudice.  
Salvation required belief in these doctrines alone; other beliefs, whatever they 
might be, were matters of indifference.  Thus the infallibility of men and 
institutions was replaced in Anglican thought with the simpleness and clarity 
of fundamental doctrines.122   
In other words, Anglicans were embarking on a course of doctrinal minimalism, and 
leading this course were Hales and Chillingworth, with whom Johnson claims Hobbes was 
acquainted, and whose lead Hobbes can be seen to have followed quite closely.  Consequently, 
Johnson argues that Hobbes was not as far removed from mainstream theology—although it 
had yet to become orthodox—as many have supposed.  Yet, if this were the case, why would 
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so many of Hobbes’s contemporaries accuse him of atheism?  Johnson answers that Hobbes 
was a-theistic: 
The simplified essentialist Christianity which he held sharply separated faith 
from reason and isolated piety from theology.  Such a view left Hobbes 
completely free to construct a metaphysics, a psychology, and a politics in 
which the idea of God played no functional role and in which the traditional 
religious issues could be subjected to the severest criticism and finally left in 
the hands of the secular ruler.  To his religiously attuned contemporaries, 
Hobbes’ss system would seem to be the product of an atheistic mind.123   
In other words, Hobbes left so little of Christianity as essential that his contemporaries 
thought he had abandoned it.  However, while Johnson’s argument does support a view in 
which Hobbes should not be considered an atheist in relation to his contemporaries, it does not 
adequately demonstrate that Hobbes was either orthodox or mainstream.  The theological 
ideas he subscribed to may have become mainstream or orthodox (although many did not), but 
they were not when he wrote them.  As Mintz has suggested, heterodoxy, however unfairly, 
was believed to warrant a charge of atheism.  However, while Hobbes’s contemporary critics 
may have been overly zealous in their charge of atheism, there is little doubt that Hobbes’s 
thought was indeed heterodox.   
What, then, are we to make of the historical evidence which suggests that the great 
majority of Hobbes’s contemporaries regarded him as an atheist, or at the very least, outside of 
the contemporary bounds of orthodoxy?  Hobbes’s contemporary critics can be viewed either 
as exaggerating Hobbes’s divergence from orthodoxy, and being inflexible on what they 
considered to constitute that orthodoxy, or as having an ulterior motive.  With regard to the 
former, atheism was, as mentioned earlier, a ‘hydra-headed’ term which included nearly 
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anything that deviated from orthodox opinion.  The inflexibility of what was considered 
orthodox and the resulting exaggeration of labelling Hobbes an atheist is an expected 
consequence of this.  Consider Martinich’s appraisal of the term in seventeenth-century 
England:   
In the seventeenth century “atheist” was more readily used as a term of abuse 
than it is these days, and more often attributed to a person whose philosophical 
or religious principles entailed atheism in the opinion of the critic. . . . In 
seventeenth-century England, religious disagreements were more acrimonious 
than they are in the twentieth century.  Religious views were more parochial, 
partisan, and politically charged.  In order to talk informatively about the 
seventeenth century, it is simply not good enough to rely solely on the 
distinction between theist and atheist.  While there is nothing wrong with this 
distinction, more fine-grained distinctions are needed in order to understand 
the disputes between intellectuals in that period.  Most attacks of one person 
against another were highly parochial.  Indeed, these attacks, far from 
indicating that the target of criticism lacked religion, are strong evidence for 
it.124 
The second plausible explanation for why Hobbes was described so frequently as an 
atheist was one offered by Hobbes himself; that his critics were not defenders of the faith, but 
rather feared losing their ecclesiastical and political power125.  Mintz agrees, and I along with 
him, that Hobbes was right in this indictment, but only in a certain sense:   
It is clear that he touched his opponents in the sensitive area of power and 
privilege; and I think it will also be granted that the thirst for power and 
privilege is a compelling if not a fundamental human motive, and that in the 
present controversy the powerful interests of clergy, university and common 
law were heavily engaged and just as vigorously defended.126   
Like Martinich, however, Mintz does not wish to deny the importance of the religious 
climate in seventeenth-century England:  
… any explanation of their motives is incomplete which attempts to 
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rationalize away the intensity and depth of their religious belief, the suasive 
power of religion itself to move them to its defence against what they 
considered to be the dangerous strictures of an atheist.  Again and again the 
critics return to this point: that if the creeds and practices of the Church are 
made to subserve the interests of the state, then not only the Church but 
Christian faith itself will wither away.127 
Therefore, however passionate the criticisms of Hobbes’s contemporaries, they cannot 
be considered reliable, conclusive sources for settling the question of his theistic sincerity. 
While it is clear that Hobbes held heterodox opinions and that most of his contemporaries 
acknowledged this, because heterodox opinions were typically considered to be atheistic, 
Hobbes was charged with being an atheist. As such, either Hobbes was an atheist by virtue of 
being considered one by his contemporaries, or, Hobbes was a heterodox yet sincere Christian 
because he was just Christian enough.  The first argument relies on the dubious assumption 
that “one is what one is charged to be”, whereas the second can only conclude that Hobbes 
wrote heterodox opinions, which appear to be theistic, but cannot state with any certainty 
whether or not he was a sincere Christian. 
As such, the criticisms of Hobbes’s contemporaries can neither demonstrate adequately 
that Hobbes’s professions of Christian belief are insincere, nor that his professions are truthful.  
The historical evidence does, however, have a consequence for the argument that Hobbes hid 
his true religious beliefs behind a veneer of piety, which in turn is used to explain why Hobbes 
may have only seemingly justified the authority of his sovereign by equating the natural laws 
with God’s laws.  Those who maintain that Hobbes’s system does not ‘require’ God or 
Christian principles, and argue, despite his professions of faith, that Hobbes was disingenuous 
in equating the natural laws with God’s laws, commonly provide two explanations as to why 
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Hobbes presumably did so: “(i) he cluttered his works with theistic suggestions and 
pronouncements in order to protect himself from persecution for the atheistic basis of his 
politics and mechanics; and (ii) he sought to support his political views by appeal to the 
religious beliefs of his readers.”128  
These two positions, however, are quite untenable.  For instance, Mintz argues:   
I doubt that Hobbes’ss ‘theism’ was a screen thrown up for his own safety.  It 
is hard to credit such a theory when we remember that Hobbes’ss openly-
avowed opinions on the nature of God were profoundly unorthodox and 
aroused the most intense opposition in their own time.  Hobbes must have 
known that the line between his brand of theism and seventeenth-century 
atheism was a thin one and that for many of his contemporaries this line did 
not exist at all.  If safety and a peaceful life were his object he would have had 
to express his opinions far more circumspectly than Professor Strauss would 
have us believe (44).   
I am fully in agreement with Mintz on this point, and this criticism calls into serious 
question not only Strauss’s argument that Hobbes disguised his true beliefs in order to escape 
harassment, but also his claim that Hobbes wrote with a veneer of piety in order to appeal to 
his contemporary readers.  If that was his true intent, the negative response and the resulting 
near consensus of his contemporaries is evidence that his veneer was so thin as to be virtually 
clear.  Again, Hobbes must have known that rather than appealing to his readers’ religious 
sensibilities, he was more at risk of offending them with Leviathan, and he would have had to 
disguise his opinions much more thoroughly in order to avoid doing so. The interpretative 
difficulties which the Leviathan presents on the matter of whether or not the natural laws are 
ultimately God’s laws, therefore, are not adequately settled by arguments relying on Hobbes’s 
personal religious beliefs.   
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2.4 Conclusion 
I began this chapter by demonstrating that Hobbes was primarily concerned in 
Leviathan with creating a peaceful, stable commonwealth.  This is not possible, he argues, so 
long as there are competing authorities demanding obedience, and so long as authority is 
conceived as being of two types: temporal and spiritual, possessed in turn by civil or 
ecclesiastic institutions.  As a remedy, Hobbes ascribes authority to a sole sovereign power.  
Either Hobbes does so, it is argued, at the expense of true Christianity, or Hobbes’s 
reformulation of Christianity in Leviathan is, if only in its fundamentals, to be properly 
conceived of as Christian.  In consequence, it is argued that the political-theological system 
which Hobbes proposes is either lacking in any authentic Christian content and eliminates any 
functional role of God in political affairs, or is dependent upon fundamentally Christian 
principles and the Christian conception of God. 
In other words, both sides of the debate examined in this chapter assume that the 
natural laws are foundational principles, and then proceed to ask whether or not the natural 
laws are God’s laws.  One interpretation maintains that the natural laws are not ultimately 
intended to be God’s laws, and thus concludes that God is not ultimately the foundation of 
Hobbes’s system.  The other interpretation maintains that the natural laws are ultimately 
intended to be God’s laws, and concludes that God is ultimately the foundation of Hobbes’s 
system.  
In the following chapter I will, however, focus on the natural laws not as foundational 
principles, but rather as practical, ruling principles.  Upon examining the sovereign’s authority 
according to this understanding of the natural laws, I will suggest that Hobbes had a practical, 
instrumental role in mind for the idea of God in the commonwealth, apart from God’s 
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undetermined, and perhaps undeterminable, role as the foundation of Hobbes’s system.  
Recall that Hobbes sought to address the problem faced by those confronted with a 
choice between obedience to God or man.  Hobbes replied that men cannot serve two masters.  
As I will discuss in the next chapter, however, Hobbes presents a system in which “Man can 
serve two masters, after all.  In serving his sovereign he is serving his God; yet at the same 
time the service of his God, requiring as it does no manifestations but this one, cannot impede 
his service to the sovereign”129.  The idea of God, I will argue, may in Hobbes’s view be used 
by the sovereign to eliminate the perceived choice between obedience to God or man, quite 
apart from whether or not God is intended by Hobbes to be the actual author of the sovereign’s 
authority.  
 
  
                                                
 
129 Clifford Orwin, “On the Sovereign Authorization,” Political Theory 3 (1975), p. 38. 
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Chapter 3 
Hobbes’s obliged and prudent sovereign 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the debate surrounding whether or not the natural laws are God’s laws, as discussed 
in Chapter Two, the natural laws are predominantly viewed as the foundation for the 
establishment or generation of a commonwealth.  The natural laws are indeed presented by 
Hobbes in Leviathan as the foundation for the generation of a commonwealth and the 
sovereign’s authority. However, they are also presented as rules to be followed for the 
achievement of peace upon establishment of a commonwealth, enabling the peaceful 
maintenance of the commonwealth—a role which the aforementioned debate largely ignores. 
Hobbes writes that a commonwealth is “made by covenant of every man with every 
man, in such manner as if every man should say to every man I authorize and give up my right 
of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give 
up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner” (L, 109).  This consent is 
dictated by the second natural law, and it is, therefore, readily apparent how the natural law is 
the foundation for the establishment or generation of a commonwealth and sovereign 
authority. 
Alongside this, however, the natural laws can also be viewed as guidelines for the 
preservation of a commonwealth, once established.130  That is, once a commonwealth is 
                                                
 
130 I make this claim without intending to engage in debate over whether or not the instrumentality of the natural 
laws which Hobbes posits is consistent with traditional natural law teachings. See, for instance, Noberto Bobbio, 
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established, the natural laws are no less applicable to it.  For instance, Hobbes writes that the 
natural laws, in contrast to viewing them as “conclusions or theorems concerning what 
conduceth to the conservation and defence of [men]” (L, 100), may also be perceived as 
becoming “proper laws.”  When “a commonwealth is once settled, then are they actually laws” 
(L, 174). 
By focusing on the natural laws from this latter perspective, as guidelines for the 
maintenance of a commonwealth, it becomes clear that Hobbes sought to oblige the sovereign 
to an adherence to the natural laws, as I will discuss in the following sections.  When the 
natural laws are thought of as rules for peace, to be followed after the establishment of a 
commonwealth, it is evident that Hobbes meant to oblige the sovereign to exercise his 
authority according to those rules.  Moreover, it is evident that Hobbes did so using two 
rationales: one in which God is the author of the natural laws, and another in which God need 
not be the author of the natural laws.   
This switch in interpretative perspective is justified and occasioned by the inability to 
persuasively resolve the problem of whether or not the natural laws are intended by Hobbes to 
be authorised by God and, therefore, the question of the source of the authority of Hobbes’s 
sovereign also remains elusive. There is another compelling interpretation, however, offered 
by Michael Oakeshott in his essay The Moral Life in the Writings of Thomas Hobbes. He asks: 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition, trans. Daniela Gobetti (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1993); Johann P. Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1992), pp. 28-56, 74-9; Vickie B. Sullivan, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and the Formation of a Liberal 
Republicanism in England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 83-86; Richard Tuck, Hobbes 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 51-64.   I do, however, generally agree with Bobbio’s statement that 
“What has unleashed the most divergent discussion and has maddened critics, is that Hobbes has called these 
prudential rules ‘natural laws’.  But he has done so only to pay homage to tradition (p. 44)”.  While I do not wish 
to affirm or deny that Hobbes only “pays homage” to the natural law tradition, I certainly do agree that Hobbes’s 
natural laws are prudential rules. 
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“Why did Hobbes, in an enterprise designed to elucidate the ground and character of the 
obligation entailed in living in a civitas, run together two strikingly different (and at some 
points contradictory) accounts of moral obligation?”131.  
Oakeshott is concerned with the two rationales—parallel with those presented in 
Chapter two—provided by Hobbes for moral obligation; one in which the natural laws are 
obligatory due to God’s authorship, and another in which the natural laws are obligatory due 
to some act of human volition.  While Oakeshott uses the following interpretation to determine 
the source of subjects’ moral obligation, it is equally relevant to my concern in this chapter: 
the sovereign’s obligation.   
He characterises the first account as beginning with natural right, focusing on Hobbes’s 
insistence that “‘every man has a right to everything; even to another’s body’, a right to govern 
himself according to his own judgement, ‘to do anything he liketh’, and to preserve himself in 
any manner that he finds expedient”132.  Reason coexists alongside this right, and its proper 
role is “to suggest fit means for achieving desired ends”133.  Reason is not, however, 
obligatory; “… nothing is obligatory on account of it being reasonable”134.  Reason, moreover, 
is unable to establish knowledge of God; Hobbes “… tells us that by reason we can know 
nothing whatever about God as the author of a moral law (or about his rewards and 
punishments in another life), but may know God only as a First Cause”135.  Natural obligation 
is not universal; “the obligation to obey the civil authority applies only to a specific class of 
                                                
 
131 Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, (Oxford:  Basil Blackwell, 1975) p. 114. 
132 Ibid., p. 115. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid. 
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person and rests upon agreement and acknowledgement”136.  The authority of natural law 
“derives from the imprimatur of the civil sovereign” and “the precepts of Scripture are what the 
civil sovereign says they are”.137  That is, both natural law and Scripture are authorised solely 
by the authority of the sovereign; without this authorisation, they are simply not considered to 
have obliging force.   
Moral obligation, under this account, exists only because of, and is dependent upon, 
sovereignty.  Nothing outside of sovereignty and, therefore, nothing independent of human will 
or volition, obliges human beings (including, most importantly, the sovereign) to moral 
conduct.   
The second account is very different.  First, in the state of nature, “every man has a 
‘natural’ obligation to endeavour peace, imposed by a Natural Law which is the command of 
an omnipotent God”138.  It is through the faculty of reason which the laws of nature are 
revealed to us.  Reason also reveals to us that God is the author of those laws of nature.  
Hobbes adds that “… our obligation to civil obedience … is before all civil law”, which clearly 
suggests that an obligation to submit to civil authority exists prior to, and independently of, the 
creation of a civil authority. Moreover, Hobbes “… asserts the independent authority of both 
Natural Law and Scripture, the one based on reason and the other on revelation”139. 
Moral obligation, under this second account, exists prior to, and independently of, 
sovereignty.  Reason reveals both the content of the natural laws and knowledge of the author 
of those laws, God.  This is also revealed in Scripture, the Word of God.  God, therefore, as 
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author of the natural laws, confers authority upon the laws of nature.  The natural laws are 
obligatory due to their nature as the laws of God; God’s commands are obligatory. 
These two accounts of moral obligation are plainly inconsistent; while one maintains 
that obligation depends upon sovereignty and thus human will, the other maintains that 
obligation depends upon God’s authorship.  
Oakeshott—unlike nearly all preceding and most proceeding—interpreters of Hobbes, 
ascribes to neither account of moral obligation in Hobbes.  Instead, Oakeshott acknowledges 
that there exist two concurrent—but incompatible—accounts in Hobbes.  By then questioning 
Hobbes’s intent in providing two opposed accounts, Oakeshott turns away from finding an 
adequate account of obligation, and instead pursues the likely implication of the inclusion of 
two opposed accounts: Hobbes intentionally provided two accounts.  In presuming he did so, 
Oakeshott opens up the possibility that Hobbes was more concerned that his readers should 
trust an account, either account, rather than irrefutably demonstrate one reasonable source of 
obligation.  Hobbes, accordingly, is conceived to be entirely opportunistic about the reasons 
why certain behaviour ought to be considered just; his opportunism suggests he is more 
concerned with causing conduct that is presumed to be just. Oakeshott writes, “Hobbes was 
usually so much more concerned with elucidating adequate motives or ‘causes’ for what is 
alleged to be just conduct than with finding adequate reasons for calling it just …”140.  Hobbes 
was less concerned about why something is obligatory, and more concerned about what should 
be considered obligatory, and what causes and motivates people to obey this ‘what’.   
When the natural laws are not viewed as foundational principles, but as ruling 
principles (or as rules for the exercise of sovereign authority which will cause and maintain 
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obedience), the importance of whether or not God is the author of the natural laws is, 
therefore, lessened considerably. This is because in either instance, as I will demonstrate, the 
sovereign is obliged to rule according to the natural laws.  When the natural laws are viewed 
as ruling principles, however, it is evident that Hobbes’s opportunism regarding the source of 
sovereign authority is for the sake of effecting civil peace, which is contingent upon the 
circumstances in which a sovereign finds himself. Hobbes insisted that Christian subjects, in 
order to believe that they may obey both God and man, must believe that the natural laws are 
God’s laws.  Or, from the sovereign’s perspective, since the sovereign is obliged to rule 
according to the natural laws, his subjects’ perception of whether or not God is the author of 
the natural laws is more important than whether or not God is the author of the natural laws. 
I will argue in this chapter that the sovereign’s obligation to the natural laws logically 
entails the management of his subjects’ disposition to obey him, and that this requires, 
according to Hobbes, that the sovereign of a Christian commonwealth encourage a fear of God 
amongst his subjects alongside a fear of the sovereign.  Moreover, the sovereign of a Christian 
commonwealth is obligated to teach that his authority ultimately rests upon God, and that 
there is a corresponding Christian duty of subjects to obey their sovereign, whether or not their 
sovereign is Christian.  The fear of God, and the idea of God as the agent whose command 
obliges must, therefore, be viewed by the sovereign as instrumental, rule-facilitating devices; 
that is, the sovereign need not necessarily consider God to be the basis of his authority, but 
rather must understand the idea of God to be a practically effective basis for the exercise and 
maintenance of authority in a Christian commonwealth. 
   
3.2 Natural laws as ruling principles 
When such a distinction of perspectives is made, Hobbes’s treatment of obligation 
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becomes much clearer.  If the laws of nature are viewed as “conclusions or theorems 
concerning what conduceth [men] to the conservation and defence of themselves” (L, 100), 
then it can be asked whether obligations to obey the natural laws exist prior to the generation 
of a commonwealth, which is to say in a condition of war.  On the one hand, Hobbes argues 
that the laws of nature “oblige in foro interno, that is to say, they bind to a desire they should 
take place; but in foro externo, that is, to the putting them in act, not always” (L, 99)141.   
Hobbes also writes, however, that the natural laws “are those which have been laws 
from all eternity” (L, 185).  Elsewhere he states that “The laws of God, therefore, are none but 
the laws of nature ... ” (L, 399).  Divine natural laws are laws of nature, “and therefore an 
eternal law of God” (L, 189).  They are, moreover, obligatory because of this fact.  Hobbes 
makes a distinction between natural law and positive law, in which “Natural are those which 
have been laws from all eternity, and are called not only natural but also moral laws” (L, 185), 
while “Positive are those which have not been from eternity, but have been made laws by the 
will of those that have had the sovereign power over others ...” (L, 185).  If the natural laws 
are, therefore, divine, then they are eternal.  Are they, however, eternally binding? 
Hobbes suggests that they are indeed. Divine laws, he argues, are those laws which 
concern “the natural duties of one man to another ...” (L, 237).142  Perhaps the best evidence of 
this—that if the natural laws are God’s laws then the natural laws are obligatory—is Hobbes’s 
discussion of Abraham’s covenant with God.  Although Hobbes’s focus in the following 
passage is on whether or not Abraham was obliged to obey God’s positive law due to the 
covenant, notice the clause in parentheses:  
                                                
 
141 OL: “The laws of nature oblige in foro interno, i.e., their transgression is not properly to be called a crime, but 
a vice.  But they do not always oblige in foro externo” (99).   
142 Emphasis added. 
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This is it which is called the Old Covenant, or Testament, and containeth a 
contract between God and Abraham, by which Abraham obligeth himself and 
his posterity, in a peculiar manner, to be subject to God’s positive law (for to 
the law moral he was obliged before) as by an oath of allegiance (L, 273).   
Recalling that Hobbes equates natural law with moral law, Hobbes here explicitly 
states that, prior to their covenant, Abraham was subject to God’s divine natural law, as would 
any potential sovereign and subject be. 
Thus, when the natural laws are conceived of as existing prior to the establishment of a 
commonwealth, if the natural laws are not God’s laws, then the natural laws may not oblige in 
foro externo, since if they are not God’s laws, there is no authorising agent prior to the 
establishment of a commonwealth.  On the other hand, if the natural laws are God’s laws, the 
natural laws are eternally obliging143. 
Viewed from the alternate perspective—as guidelines for the maintenance of a 
commonwealth—the natural laws are presented by Hobbes as “the command of an agent who 
obliges”144. That is, after the formation of a commonwealth, the natural laws are presented by 
Hobbes as the binding commands of an agent.  Hobbes writes, “These dictates of reason men 
use to call by the name of laws, but improperly; for they are but conclusions or theorems 
concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves, whereas law, 
                                                
 
143 Warrender, noticing this disparity between duties in the condition of war writes “The reason why I can do my 
duty is that I am able ... to see it as a means to my preservation; but the reason why I ought to do my duty is that 
God commands it.  The ground of my obligation is therefore God’s command (1957, 213)”.  Cooke rightly 
criticises Warrender by asking: if he is correct, “one must wonder what becomes the basis of obligation for all 
those who are insecure and unbelieving ... Warrender leaves such persons unable to escape the laws of nature 
unless, of course, they adopt the laws of nature as ... principles of prudence that they are obliged to follow for no 
other reason than self-interest” (Cooke, 59).  However, both arguments assume that Hobbes meant the state of 
nature to be an actual condition, with consent signifying an actual means of exit.  As I will discuss later in this 
chapter, Thomas J. Lewis argues convincingly that Hobbes’s meaning of consent does not imply an act of 
consent, but rather signifies tacit, hypothetical consent.   
144 Cooke, p. 53, characterising Warrender’s premise that “The law imposes obligations because it is the 
command of an agent entitled to obedience (1957, 231)”. 
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properly, is the word of him that by right hath command over others” (L, 100). 
“Him that by right hath command over others”, or the agent who commands, is either 
God or the sovereign. Alongside this, duties in a commonwealth can belong to both subjects 
and sovereign. Focusing on the duties of subjects (in contrast to the duties of sovereigns, 
which I will discuss in the following section), although God does not necessarily always have 
the authority to command positive law, God does, as previously discussed, always have the 
authority to command natural law.  By virtue of this fact, the natural law is obligatory. 
Therefore, subjects are answerable to the natural law in a commonwealth if the natural laws 
are God’s laws. 
Likewise, subjects are obliged to obey the natural laws in a commonwealth if the 
sovereign is the commanding agent.  In this case, the natural laws would only be obligatory 
when “him that by right hath command over others”, or the sovereign, commands that they are 
law.  This interpretation is consistent with Hobbes’s later description of the way in which the 
laws of nature become “proper law”: 
The law of nature and the civil law contain each other, and are of equal extent.  
For the laws of nature ... are not properly laws, but qualities that dispose men 
to peace and to obedience.  When a commonwealth is once settled, then are 
they actually laws, and not before, as being then the commands of the 
commonwealth, and therefore also civil laws; for it is the sovereign power that 
obliges men to obey them (L, 174). 
Recall that the laws of nature, if they are considered secular laws, do not oblige in foro 
externo prior to the establishment of a commonwealth.  However, after the establishment of a 
commonwealth, Hobbes argues that they do oblige in foro externo, by virtue of the sovereign’s 
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command145.   
Therefore, whether or not the natural laws are God’s laws, subjects of a sovereign are 
also subject to the natural laws.  The question I will address in the following sections is 
whether or not the sovereign is subject to the natural laws.  Since, of course, there exists no 
proper sovereign in a condition of war, or prior to the establishment of a commonwealth, I will 
focus on the obligations of the sovereign of an actual commonwealth.  As just discussed, 
under these circumstances, it would be expected that such an obligation would derive from the 
command of an agent who obliges.  I will argue that the sovereign must indeed abide by the 
natural laws. First I will discuss how Hobbes obliges the sovereign to rule according to the 
natural laws when the sovereign himself is the agent who obliges.  Secondly, I will discuss 
how Hobbes obliges the sovereign to rule according to the natural laws when they are 
perceived to be the command of God, that is, when God is the agent who obliges.  
 
3.3 The sovereign’s obligation to rule in accord with the natural laws 
3.3.1 Secular rationale 
In order to appreciate the way in which Hobbes evidently obliges the sovereign to rule 
in accord with the natural laws, it is first necessary to keep in mind that Hobbes presents the 
natural laws from the two perspectives just discussed.  I am ultimately concerned with 
demonstrating that the sovereign has an obligation to the natural laws once he is the sovereign 
                                                
 
145 Cooke distinguishes between formal obligation, which is an obligation resulting from the laying down of a 
right, and natural obligation, which he writes is an “obligation in the way natural law in Hobbes is law—in 
neither case are they properly so” (Cooke, 55).  However, as demonstrated, divine natural law is considered by 
Hobbes to be obligatory before the establishment of a commonwealth or the laying down of rights.  Therefore, 
while his distinction stands if the natural laws are conceived of in secular terms, it does not if the natural laws are 
conceived of as commands of God.  Recall the following passage: “But yet if we consider the same theorems, as 
delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things, then are they properly called laws (100). 
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of an actual commonwealth and, eventually, how this obligation entails certain restraints on 
the exercise of sovereign authority. Therefore, I need not examine in any detail here precisely 
what the sovereign’s relationship to the natural law is before the establishment of a 
commonwealth.  Nevertheless, Hobbes does seem to insist that if a sovereign is to abide by the 
laws of nature, the sovereign must understand the basis for these laws146.  Moreover, Hobbes’s 
description of the laws of nature from both perspectives is, at least in part, intended to affect 
the sovereign’s decision about the nature of his own authority—a decision from which the 
sovereign’s obligation to the natural laws derives. 
Two decisions which Hobbes urges the sovereign to make are the decision to treat his 
subjects as politically equal, and the decision to treat his subjects as if they had, before the 
establishment of the commonwealth, the right of nature. Thomas J. Lewis, whose lead I will 
take here, writes “... Hobbes explains that political equality and the right of nature are not 
empirically discernible human attributes.  They are, instead, decisions to think of humans in a 
certain way—decisions recommended by Hobbes—to be made and to be implemented by the 
prospective sovereign as he uses man as matter to construct a commonwealth”147.   
Hobbes’s understanding of political equality is derived from his description of humans 
in their natural condition; in strength of body, in prudence, and in their ignorance of God, all 
men in the natural condition are equal (L, 74). Because of this natural equality, Hobbes writes, 
or because there is so little difference between the capabilities of men, one man cannot “claim 
to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he” (L, 74).  There are, in 
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other words, “no human attributes that justify one man ruling another”148.  
Hobbes then turns this apparent description of humans into a prudential decision about 
humans149.  He bases his laws of nature on this factual description of humans as possessing 
political equality in their natural condition. Yet, in the ninth law of nature, he revisits the 
factual basis of the natural laws and claims that they may not actually be factual.  Hobbes 
writes “If nature have made men equal, that equality is to be acknowledged; or if nature have 
made men unequal, yet because men that think themselves equal will not enter into conditions 
of peace but upon equal terms, such equality must be admitted” (L, 97).   
Hobbes, therefore, “insists that if peace is to be achieved equality must be admitted no 
matter what the facts”150.  Men must be treated as if they are equal, even if they factually are 
not.  “Hobbes transforms his apparent description of humans into a prudential decision about 
humans: a decision to treat humans as if they are politically equal”151.  In this manner, Hobbes 
strongly encourages the sovereign to treat his subjects as political equals for the sake of peace.  
This prudential decision, moreover, entails that the sovereign also acknowledges the right of 
nature, the laws of nature, and the idea of consent”152.  This decision obliges the sovereign to 
abide by the natural laws; the obliging agent is the sovereign himself, as the following will 
demonstrate. 
The right of nature signifies for Hobbes “the liberty each man hath to use his own 
power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature, that is to say, of his own life, 
and consequently of doing anything which, in his own judgment and reason, he shall conceive 
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of as the aptest means thereunto” (L, 79).  To treat men as politically equal is, moreover, to 
acknowledge their right of nature.  “The right of nature spells out the radical implication of 
Hobbes’s conception of political equality”153.  In other words, Hobbes derives the natural 
political equality of men from the natural equality of men in ability.  Because no man can 
claim for himself any benefit that anyone else cannot claim, or because there are no human 
attributes that justify one man ruling another, this definition of political equality entails the 
right of nature, or the liberty to do anything.  Political equality suggests that humans who 
possess the right of nature “are constrained by no obligation to defer to the will of, let alone 
obey, any other person”154. 
In addition, Hobbes treats the right of nature as entailing a state of war155.  In this 
condition, possessing equally the right of nature, “every man has a right to every thing; even to 
one another’s body” (L, 80).  The right of nature is, therefore, a restatement of the condition of 
war; the disposition set by the right of nature is the cause of war. “For as long as every man 
holdeth this right of doing anything he liketh, so long are all men in the condition of war” (L, 
80).  Again, “... the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known 
disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary” (L, 76). 
The means to escape this condition of war are detailed by Hobbes in the first and 
second laws of nature.  These laws state that in order “to obtain security men, who have a right 
of nature, must find a way to reduce the extent of their right of nature so that their rights are 
no longer co-extensive”156.  It is the fundamental law of nature, according to Hobbes, that men 
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should seek peace, or a way to avoid this scenario.  The condition of war is avoidable only 
when “a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth as for peace and defence of 
himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things, and be contented with 
so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself” (L, 80).  It is 
only through both the renouncing and transferring of the lion’s share of this right of nature, a 
share comprising one’s alienable rights, that peace may be secured.  This transfer and 
renunciation of rights is, by Hobbes’s definition, achieved by mutual covenant.  The 
sovereign, the beneficiary of these transferred rights, neither transfers nor renounces his own 
right of nature; he thereby possesses what amounts to the rights of all of his subjects to self-
governance, along with his own right of nature. 
However, Hobbes also claims that mutual covenants cannot effectively bring about this 
institution of sovereign authority.  The generation of a commonwealth, with a sovereign at its 
head, is equivalent to every man saying “I authorize and give up my right of governing myself 
to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, 
and authorize all his actions in like manner” (L, 109).  Notice that Hobbes implies that the 
decision to transfer one’s right to govern oneself is a right; humans have a right to consent, 
which is their right to decrease their own liberty for the sake of their own self-preservation.  
This is not intended by Hobbes, however, to signify an act of consent.  Hobbes writes that it is 
“as if” every man said this to every other man (L, 109).   
This implies that “men within a commonwealth are to be thought of by the artificer as 
if they had established a commonwealth by mutual covenants even though they did not; 
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indeed, even though they could not”157.  They could not create a commonwealth, Lewis 
suggests, primarily “because mutual covenants are void if there is any apprehension that one 
party to the covenant will not abide by the covenant”158.  Such apprehension, of course, is 
present before the generation of a commonwealth.  Hobbes writes,  
If a covenant be made wherein neither of the parties perform presently, but 
trust one another, in the condition of mere nature (which is a condition of war 
of every man against every man) upon any reasonable suspicion it is void; but 
if there be a common power set over them both, with right and force sufficient 
to compel performance, it is not void (L, 84). 
This essentially presents a “chicken-and-egg” problem: “Hobbes appears to presuppose 
the prior existence of a common power as a necessary condition for the use of covenants, but 
he also claims ... that the common power is created by covenants”159. 
Hobbes argues, however, that the establishment of sovereign power is achieved in two 
ways: either by institution or by acquisition (L, 110).  It cannot actually be attained by 
institution, however, since covenants made in a state of fear in the absence of a common 
power are void.  Moreover, “commonwealths by institution and by acquisition have the same 
properties”160.  This would suggest, therefore, that commonwealth by institution is the 
definition of a commonwealth, while commonwealth by acquisition is the actual means of 
establishment.  That is,  
Hobbes explains the rights of sovereignty as if sovereignty were by institution.  
He is not claiming that such acts of institution have occurred, but he is 
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continuing the analytical task of specifying the elements of the definition of a 
commonwealth.  Accordingly, the properties of a commonwealth by 
institution are a logical extension of what is entailed by the idea of mutual 
covenants.  Thus, the idea of consent in the form of mutual covenant acts 
remains the central concept for guiding the creation of actual commonwealths 
by acquisition.161   
If, therefore, acts of consent do not institute a commonwealth or establish a sovereign 
power, but rather a commonwealth is established through the acquisition of subjects by an 
already existent power, thereby forming a commonwealth, what role does consent actually 
play in Hobbes’s system?  The role it plays is essentially a practical one:  “the right to consent 
based on a natural equality of right is a practically effective basis for political authority ...”162.  
More specifically, according to Lewis, it is the sovereign’s recognition of this right to 
consent—in contrast to an act of consent—that is a practical basis for the establishment, 
maintenance, and exercise of authority163.   
In other words, were the sovereign to decide that he had a right to rule independently 
of consent, this would demonstrate that his subjects did not possess a right to self-governance, 
or political equality, or the right of nature.  This, in turn, would imply that he was in 
possession of some human attribute that justifies his authority.  This would further imply that 
there are certain human attributes that justify one man ruling another.  This goes against that 
description of political equality which Hobbes derived from his description of the right of 
nature.  Again, it is Hobbes’s contention that men “will not enter into conditions of peace but 
upon equal terms, [and, therefore,] such equality must be admitted” (L, 97).  Were Hobbes’s 
sovereign to treat his subjects as unequal—as if they had submitted instead of as if they had 
                                                
 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid, p. 40. 
163 Ibid. 
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consented—peace could not be attained164.  If, therefore, the sovereign acts as if his authority 
has been consented to, he is in effect demonstrating that his subjects possess a right to self-
governance, by recognising that his subjects transferred their right to self-governance to him in 
order to secure their peace and preservation.  The sovereign must accordingly maintain peace, 
and in doing so requires adherence to the laws of nature, just as his possession of authority 
itself is prescribed by the laws of nature. 
Therefore, “For Hobbes, no matter how a commonwealth comes to exist, the sovereign 
must decide to treat all subjects as politically equal.  He must treat them as if each had the 
right of nature—a right to everything.  Thus he must rule in accord with the laws of nature; 
otherwise he is not a sovereign and there are no citizens”165. 
Actual commonwealths “must be thought of in this way, even though the problem of 
trustworthiness precludes men with natural liberty from using covenants.  According to 
Hobbes, an actual commonwealth can be created and sustained only if the sovereign 
understands the idea of sovereignty as if it were the result of consent in the form of mutual 
covenants”166. 
Hobbes, through these means, therefore, obliges the sovereign to rule according to the 
laws of nature—the laws of nature, in this context, being viewed as directives the sovereign 
can rule according to after the establishment of a commonwealth.  Notice, moreover, that 
                                                
 
164 Submission, Hobbes claims, is an act which occurs upon conquest, and not upon institution (xx; 12, 14).  
Furthermore, Hobbes writes that “in the act of our submission consisteth both our obligation and our liberty ... 
(xxi, 10)”.  Remember, Hobbes does not claim that an act of consent actually occurs.  Therefore, because the 
rights and obligations of a subject are the same whether the commonwealth was generated by institution or by 
acquisition, an act of submission to one’s conqueror results in the same rights and obligations of a subject as if he 
had consented to his conqueror.  That is, the sovereign, upon conquering a people, must treat the submissive 
subjects as if they had consented.   
165 Lewis, p. 48. 
166 Ibid., p. 47. 
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Hobbes does so without an appeal to God; this is a non-theistic obligation.  The agent who 
obliges is ultimately the sovereign: the sovereign’s recognition of his subjects’ right to consent 
and his decision to treat his subjects as politically equal and all that it entails, is in turn what 
entails his obligation to rule in accordance with the natural laws.  
  
3.3.2 Theistic rationale 
Hobbes also obliges the sovereign to an adherence to the natural laws through a theistic 
obligation, as I will argue next.  Specifically, Hobbes obliges the sovereign to observe the 
natural laws through an appeal to God as the obliging agent167.  Of significance, moreover, is 
the fact that this rationale also indicates that the sovereign must treat his subjects as if they had 
consented. 
While an assumption of consent binds a sovereign to an adherence to the natural laws, 
if the natural laws are God’s laws, this would also bind the sovereign to adherence.  God’s 
laws according to Hobbes—in this context specifically referring to the natural laws as 
commanded by God, or divine natural law—are binding both before and after any generation 
of a commonwealth; they are as obliging to humans in a state of nature as they are to subjects 
of a sovereign and the sovereign himself.  Specifically speaking of the obligation of the 
sovereign, Hobbes writes that the sovereign “is the subject of God, and bound thereby to 
observe the laws of nature” (L, 138). 
Important to understanding the sovereign’s obligation to the natural laws, when they 
are considered God’s laws, is Hobbes’s use of the term iniquity.  Iniquity is the word which 
                                                
 
167 This is similar to Warrender’s argument, that the sovereign is subject “to the commands of God and must 
observe the dictates of natural law according to his own conscience, (1957, 155)”.  Warrender does not, however, 
believe that Hobbes based the sovereign’s duty to the natural laws correspondingly on a secular footing. 
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Hobbes uses to condemn an action which is in breach of the natural laws, and injustice or 
injury are the words he synonymously uses to denote acting in such a way as to break one’s 
covenant or duty or obligation (L, 81).  In view of this, “they that have sovereign power may 
commit iniquity, but not injustice, or injury in the proper signification” (L, 113).  That is, 
“That he who has the supreme power can act inequitably, I have not denied.  For what is done 
contrary to the law of nature is called inequitable; what is done contrary to the civil law, 
unjust.  For just and unjust were nothing before the state was constituted” (OL, 113)168.  
Iniquity is equated by Hobbes as an act on the part of the sovereign which breaches the 
divine natural law.  To illustrate this, Hobbes employs two biblical stories.  In the first, 
Hobbes discusses the story of Jephtha who, upon winning victory over the Ammonites in 
battle, recalled the vow he made to God to sacrifice the first person he saw after victory, 
should God allow him that victory.  True to this vow, Jephtha sacrificed his daughter, who 
came to greet her father after the battle169.  Jephtha did not commit an injury to his daughter, 
Hobbes asserts, since his vow to God obliged him to this act.  Nor did his daughter commit 
any wrongdoing; she was clearly innocent.  Hobbes says of this, “therefore it may (and doth 
often) happen in commonwealths that a subject may be put to death by the command of the 
sovereign power, and yet neither do the other wrong” (L, 139).   
Hobbes’s second biblical reference to illustrate this principle is the indirect murder of 
Uriah by David170.  David coveted Uriah the Hittite’s wife, Bathsheba, and accordingly sent 
Uriah to the front of the battle line, to an area in which David knew the fiercest enemy 
warriors were, and where Uriah would no doubt be killed.  Hobbes writes of this,  
                                                
 
168 Notice, too, that Hobbes uses the terms “inequity” and “iniquity” interchangeably here. 
169 Judges 11: 29-40. 
170 2 Samuel 11. 
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For though the action be against the law of nature, as being contrary to equity 
..., yet it was not an injury to Uriah himself; and yet to God, because David 
was God’s subject, and prohibited all iniquity by the law of nature.  Which 
distinction David himself, when he repented the fact, evidently confirmed, 
saying, “To thee only have I sinned” (L, 139)171.   
 In both instances it is clear that the sovereign, in the first example Jephtha and in the 
second example David, is obliged to rule according to the natural laws because they are God’s 
laws.  The sovereign can act injuriously to God, but not to his subjects, and an act injurious to 
God is synonymous with iniquity, or a failure to rule in accord with the natural laws172.   
Hobbes also treats the right of nature and the right of consent as if they are God-given 
rights which, therefore, basically divinises his explanation for the sovereign’s non-theistic 
obligation to the natural laws.  For instance, Hobbes’s treatment of revelation, or supernatural 
inspiration, is interpreted by John W. Seaman as being an attempt to equate claims to such 
inspiration with pride.   He argues that claiming supernatural inspiration  
... entails thinking of oneself as superior to others in God’s eyes, which 
thinking is surely a manifestation of ‘great vaine-Glory’ or extreme pride.  
Now pride, extreme or not, is a violation of one of the central conditions of 
civil peace, the ninth law of nature requiring us to esteem others as having an 
equal natural right to self-governance173.  
Thus, both the theistic and the non-theistic obligations of the sovereign to the natural 
law may require the sovereign’s recognition of his subjects’ right to consent.  If the right to 
consent is a God-given right—as suggested by Hobbes’s equation of claims to supernatural 
                                                
 
171 The reference of David’s confirmation of guilt “To thee only I have sinned” is to Ps. 51: 4 (139). 
172 It is useful to note here Hobbes’s use of the word ‘inequity’.  While ‘iniquity’ is the general term used to 
denote a breach of the natural law, ‘inequity’, while also signifying a breach of the natural law, refers specifically 
to a breach of those laws of nature involving equity or equality.  Inequity, therefore, in Hobbes’s usage, is a form 
of iniquity. 
173 Seaman, p. 237.  For a more detailed description of Hobbes’s apparent divinisation of liberal egalitarian 
principles embedded in the laws of nature by an appeal to the Bible,  as well as other evidence which suggests 
Hobbes ‘found’ an equal natural right to self-governance in Scripture, refer to Seaman (1999). 
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inspiration with pride—then the sovereign’s recognition of that right is a recognition of the 
natural law as God’s command174.  Not recognising his subjects’ God-given right to consent is 
the equivalent of an injustice to God, which is an iniquity, which is a breach of the natural law.  
However, even if Hobbes did not intend the right to consent to be interpreted as a God-given 
right, he nevertheless maintains that the sovereign is subject to God.  Thus, if the natural laws 
are God’s laws, even if for no other reason than this, the sovereign is obliged to rule according 
to the natural laws and, therefore, treat his subjects as if they had a right to consent, and as if 
they had consented.   
Therefore, once a commonwealth has been established, the natural laws are binding 
because they are the command of an agent who obliges.  Hobbes provides two rationales for 
the sovereign’s obligation to rule according to the natural laws, following this principle.  
Hobbes’s secular rationale entails that the sovereign is obliged to rule according to the natural 
laws because the sovereign himself is the agent whose command obliges.  Hobbes’s theistic 
rationale entails that the sovereign is obliged to rule according to the natural laws because God 
is the agent who obliges.  Importantly, both rationales require the sovereign to act as if his 
subjects had consented, even though they could not have in actuality.   
 
                                                
 
174 This is similar to Oakeshott’s comment: “The sovereign, of course, has no obligations to his subjects, only 
functions; but the law of God is to him (though he has made it himself), no less than to his subjects, a command 
creating an obligation.  And iniquity, which in a heathen sovereign could never be more than a failure to observe 
the conclusions of sound reasoning, in the Christian sovereign becomes a breach of law and therefore a sin, 
punishable by God” Oakeshott “Introduction to Leviathan” (Oxford:  Basil Blackwell, 1975)  p.273.  I agree with 
Oakeshott that the sovereign, through his own acknowledgement of the law of God, creates his own obligation to 
divine natural law.  However, I do not believe that it implies that this act of acknowledgement need be made by a 
Christian sovereign.  Instead, this acknowledgement may be made by a non-Christian sovereign for the sake of 
prudence. Later in this chapter, I will argue that whether or not the sovereign is a true Christian is of no 
consequence; what is of consequence is that if the sovereign is sovereign of a Christian commonwealth, Hobbes 
implies that he must teach that both he and his subjects are subject to the natural laws because they are God’s 
laws. 
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3.4 Sovereign duties: Equality 
These two accounts, which obligate the sovereign, imply corresponding duties.  The 
duties, moreover, are the same in either case—with an important exception to be discussed—
and are implied according to either account, but for fundamentally different reasons.  For the 
sake of argument, I will assume for the moment that these two explanations—that the 
sovereign is obliged to rule according to the natural laws through a recognition of consent, or 
because they are God’s laws—are mutually exclusive.  
Taking each in turn, if the sovereign is obliged to rule according to the natural laws 
through a recognition of consent, then in his exercise of authority, and in his maintenance of 
that authority, he must be equitable.  Recall Hobbes’s contention in the ninth law of nature 
that, even if he is mistaken on the fact of natural equality, men must nevertheless be 
considered equal.   
A failure to acknowledge this natural equality, Hobbes argues, is equivalent to a breach 
of the natural laws (L, 97).   The consequences should a sovereign fail to acknowledge 
equality are made explicit by Hobbes in the eleventh law of nature:   
... if a man be trusted to judge between man and man, it is a precept of the law 
of nature that he deal equally between them.  For without that, the 
controversies of men cannot be determined but by war.  He, therefore, that is 
partial in judgment doth what in him lies to deter men from the use of judges 
and arbitrators; and consequently (against the fundamental law of nature), is 
the cause of war (L, 97).   
Hobbes states that the observance of this law is called equity (L, 97). 
In other words, if the sovereign does not treat his subjects—acknowledging them as 
equals—equally, then he is in breach of the fundamental law of nature, which is to seek peace, 
further suggesting that if he fails to do so, he cannot ensure peace and, therefore, is not a 
proper or effective sovereign.  The sovereign, therefore, must act equitably in his exercise of 
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authority, in order to maintain his authority, since otherwise the “controversies of men” will be 
determined by war. 
If, on the other hand—and still taking the two explanations as mutually exclusive for 
the moment—the sovereign is obliged to rule according to the natural laws because they are 
God’s laws, the sovereign is likewise obliged to be equitable for an additional and 
fundamentally different reason.  The sovereign must still acknowledge his subjects’ right of 
nature and natural equality and, therefore, treat them equally but not exclusively because if he 
fails to do so he will be undermining the maintenance of his own authority.  Rather, it is 
because the maintenance of his authority is the command of God.  Moreover, if the natural 
laws are God’s laws, and the natural laws state that equality must be acknowledged and that 
subjects must be treated equitably, then the sovereign is obliged to do so, with no need of 
further explanations or consequences of his failure to do so.  These explanations and 
consequences would nevertheless apply, however, since those commands of God that are 
natural laws are discoverable by reason.   
This is made even more evident by examining those instances in Leviathan where 
Hobbes suggests that the right of nature, and a commandment to acknowledge natural 
equality, has a Scriptural basis.  The laws of nature, Hobbes writes, can be reduced to a 
common principle: “Do not that to another, which thou wouldst not have done to thyself” (L, 
99).  This, of course, is an inversion of the ‘Golden Rule’: “Therefore all things whatsoever ye 
would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them ...”175  This is the core of the second 
law of nature: “... to lay down this right to all things, and be contented with so much liberty 
against other men, as he would allow other men against himself” (L, 80).  This, Hobbes 
                                                
 
175 Matthew 7:12 (KJV) 
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continues, is the “law of the Gospel”: “‘whatsoever you require that others should do to you, 
that do ye to them’.  And that law of all men: quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris”176 (L, 
81).  
So, too, does this provide the formula for the tenth law of nature: “that at the entrance 
into conditions of peace, no man require to reserve to himself any right which he is not content 
should be reserved to every one of the rest” (L, 97).    In this last passage, it is especially clear 
that Hobbes uses a biblical basis to establish an acknowledgement of natural equality and, 
therefore, equitable treatment.  The tenth law, recall, follows from the ninth law, which states 
that people must be acknowledged to have an equal ability of self-governance.  The eleventh 
law, which suggests that a sovereign must “deal equally between” his subjects, since it is 
derived “from the equal distribution to each man of that which in reason belongeth to him” (L, 
97) is, therefore, similarly derived from this biblical basis.   
Hobbes later argues that of those passages of Scripture which do not differ from the 
laws of nature, “there is no doubt but they are the law of God, and carry their authority with 
them ... ” (L, 259).  Therefore, by including in his description of the natural laws explicit 
reference to Scripture, or by “finding” the natural laws in Scripture, Hobbes further binds the 
sovereign to a theistic obligation to rule according to the natural laws, specifically those laws 
directly related to equality and equity177.  
                                                
 
176 i.e., do not do to others what you do not want done to yourself (trans. 81). 
177 Seaman, p. 234.  Seaman notes that in Hobbes’ other major works, this attempt is made more explicit.  “In the 
Elements, Hobbes argues for the scriptural authenticity of the principle of equality of right (the law ‘that men 
content themselves with equality’) by claiming that it is the foundation not only of natural law but also of the 
‘second table of the divine law,’ which claim he takes to be biblically confirmed by Christ’s command, ‘thou 
shalt love thy neighbour as thyself’ (Mt. 22:39).  In De Cive he appears to reserve Christ’s command for the 
biblical defence of the law requiring respect for equal inalienable rights, and turns to various other biblical 
passages to confirm the scriptural presence of the law commanding equality of right.  These include the beatitude, 
‘blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven’ (Mt. 5:3), and various strictures against pride 
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Both of the explanations that Hobbes provides to oblige the sovereign to rule in 
accordance with the natural laws, therefore, result in the obligation of the sovereign to rule 
equitably.  In the secular explanation, or if the sovereign is obliged to the natural laws through 
a recognition of consent, both in his exercise of authority and to maintain that authority, the 
sovereign must rule equitably.  Similarly, if the sovereign is obliged to obey the natural laws 
because they are God’s laws, there are two main reasons the sovereign must treat his subjects 
equitably: (i) the sovereign must maintain his authority because it is God’s command that he 
do so, and thus must act equitably since equity is necessary for the maintenance of authority; 
or (ii) the sovereign must act equitably simply because it is God’s command that he do so. 
 
3.5 Sovereign duties: maintenance of fear 
Thus far in this chapter, I have focused mainly on the sovereign’s obligation to the 
natural law, instead of the obligations of subjects.  I have demonstrated that after the 
generation of a commonwealth, the obligations of both sovereigns and subjects derive from 
the principle that the natural laws are obligatory because they are the command of an agent 
who obliges.  I have also demonstrated that Hobbes accounts for these obligations by 
appealing to two different rationales: a secular rationale in which the sovereign is the agent 
whose command is obliging, and a theistic rationale in which God is the agent whose 
command is obliging.   
Due to this obligation to the natural laws, the sovereign must rule equitably.  In 
addition, and as I will discuss, Hobbes argues that the sovereign has an obligation to manage 
two factors which are crucial in maintaining the sovereign’s authority.  The sovereign is 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
or haughtiness in Proverbs (6:16-19; 11:2; 19:5).” 
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responsible for maintaining a level of fear amongst his subjects, and ensuring that his subjects 
understand the grounds for his—the sovereign’s—rights.  These two factors—subjects’ fear 
and subjects’ understanding of the grounds of their sovereign’s rights—belong to subjects, yet 
are said by Hobbes to be the sovereign’s responsibility.   
In managing these factors, the sovereign is in effect managing the disposition of his 
subjects to obey him.  The ability of the sovereign to manage these two factors is complicated, 
however, by the subjects’ belief in God; that is, when the sovereign’s authority extends over a 
Christian commonwealth.  Hobbes attempts to alleviate this complication within the 
framework of his fundamental objective: the creation of a commonwealth in which choices do 
not arise amongst subjects between obedience to God and obedience to man. 
I will argue that the management of the disposition of subjects to obey requires, 
according to Hobbes, that the sovereign of a Christian commonwealth encourage a fear of God 
amongst his subjects, alongside a fear of the sovereign.  Moreover, the sovereign is obliged to 
teach that the basis of his authority ultimately rests upon God, and corresponds to a Christian 
duty of subjects to obey their sovereign, whether or not their sovereign is Christian.  The fear 
of God, and the idea of God as the agent whose command obliges must, therefore, be viewed 
by the sovereign as instrumental; that is, as practically effective bases for the exercise and 
maintenance of authority in a Christian commonwealth. 
 
3.5.1 Fear of the sovereign 
Fear of the sovereign plays a particularly crucial role in Hobbes’s system.  This is to 
speak of fear not in the context of the establishment of a commonwealth, i.e. in the institution 
or acquisition of a commonwealth, but rather specifically in the context of the sovereign’s 
maintenance of his authority and commonwealth.  The third law of nature states that “men 
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must perform their covenants made”, the breach of which is injustice, and “there must be some 
coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of 
some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant” (L, 89).  
By the authority of the sovereign “he hath the use of so much power and strength conferred on 
him that by terror thereof he is enabled to conform the wills of them all to peace at home ... ” 
(L, 109).  Importantly, “the end of this institution is the peace and defence of them all” (L, 
113).   
Add to this Hobbes’s statements concerning the role of fear in obedience: “Of all 
passions that which inclineth men least to break the laws is fear” (L, 196).  Indeed, fear “is the 
only thing (when there is appearance of profit or pleasure by breaking the laws) that makes 
men keep them” (L, 196).  Fear of the sovereign’s power, therefore, is meant to keep subjects 
to their covenants, or more specifically, to ensure their obedience to the civil laws and their 
sovereign.  
For the laws of nature ... of themselves, without the terror of some power to 
cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to 
partiality, pride, revenge, and the like.  And covenants without the sword are 
but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.  Therefore 
notwithstanding the laws of nature ..., if there be no power erected, or not 
great enough for our security, every man will, and may lawfully rely on his 
own strength and art, for caution against all other men (L, 106).   
Hence, it is necessary for the sovereign, through the means of his power and the fear of 
it, to keep his subjects to “the performance of their covenants and observation of those laws of 
nature” (L, 106).  
His authority, moreover, depends upon his ability to do so, since this obedience is 
necessary for peace.  To maintain his authority, therefore, the sovereign must ensure that his 
subjects fear him.  To fulfill his obligation to the natural laws, the sovereign must ensure that 
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his subjects are in continual fear of his power.   
It is also the sovereign’s “duty”, Hobbes states, in order to procure “the safety of the 
people” to “which he is obliged by the law of nature”, not to “let the people be ignorant or 
misinformed of the grounds and reasons of those his essential rights, because thereby men are 
easy to be seduced and drawn to resist him, when the commonwealth shall require their use 
and exercise” (L, 220).  Subjects must be taught the grounds of their sovereign’s rights 
because the exclusive fear of their sovereign’s power is not a sufficient condition for the 
maintenance of the sovereign’s authority: “And the grounds of these rights have the rather 
need to be diligently and truly taught, because they cannot be maintained by any civil law or 
terror of legal punishment” (L, 220).   
Notice that Hobbes writes the “grounds of these rights” must be taught, and not simply 
“these rights”.  Hence, if the sovereign is obliged to maintain his authority, not only must the 
sovereign ensure that his subjects fear his power sufficiently to “honour their covenants 
made”, but also the grounds of the sovereign’s rights must be taught to the subjects.   
The ability of the sovereign to manage these two factors is complicated, however, by 
his subjects’ belief in God, that is, when the sovereign’s authority extends over a Christian 
commonwealth.  As I will argue below, fear of the sovereign may be threatened or 
overshadowed when a commonwealth’s subjects have a fear of God.  This fear of God, of 
course, presupposes a belief in God, and thus the requisite fear of the sovereign is vulnerable 
in a Christian commonwealth.  Although Hobbes does attempt to diminish the fear of God in 
Leviathan, he does not, however, entirely eliminate it.  I will argue that he does not do so 
because of the practical necessity of it.   
Hobbes obliges the sovereign to teach—to the subjects of a Christian 
commonwealth—that his rights, the sovereign’s rights, are based upon God as the agent whose 
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command is obliging.  This conveys to subjects, in turn, that their rights and duties are also 
based upon God as the agent whose command is obliging.  In order to teach this effectively, 
however, a fear of God amongst subjects is required; it is, of course, necessary to believe in 
God if one is to believe that God is an agent.  The difficulty in this, Hobbes suggests, is that by 
making an explicit appeal to God, the sovereign may also allow the fear of God to overshadow 
the required fear of his own power.  That is, by using the idea of God as the agent whose 
command is obliging to maintain his authority, the sovereign may unintentionally support and 
promote his subjects’ fear of God which would, in turn, undermine his authority.   
Following an account of this argument, I will examine Hobbes’s description of a 
curious yet crucial liberty which belongs to Christian subjects, which the sovereign must 
ensure is taught and to which he must conform his actions.  Hobbes evidently thought that this 
liberty was the solution to the paradox that, in practice, his system would create. 
 
3.5.2 Fear of God 
“It is impossible,” Hobbes notes, that “a commonwealth should stand where any other 
than the sovereign hath a power of giving greater rewards than life, and of inflicting greater 
punishments than death” (L, 301).  Eternal torment, Hobbes adds, is a greater punishment than 
the “death of nature” (L, 301).  The “fear of darkness and ghosts is greater than other fears”, 
often great enough to “destroy a commonwealth” (L, 216).  If, therefore, “fear of death” 
inclines “men to peace”, and the sovereign’s authority depends upon his power to meet out 
this punishment, then the sovereign’s authority would be lessened should his subjects fear 
something greater than death.  That is, if forced to choose between obedience to man and 
obedience to God, subjects would be more inclined to obey God if they feared God’s 
punishment more than they feared the sovereign’s punishment.   
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Jan H. Blits, for instance, argues that Hobbes placed an emphasis on two different fears 
with an eye to managing them appropriately in civil society; “the common good”, she notes, 
“requires a common fear”178.  The first is a fear of “spirits invisible”, or superstitions, while 
the second is a fear of the “power of men”.  According to her, Hobbes argues that men  
... will not enjoy lasting peace unless in the first place they fear ‘powers 
visible,’ that is, death at the hands of other men, more than they fear ‘powers 
invisible,’ that is, hellfire or damnation ... But since men will always choose 
what seems to them the lesser evil, ‘it is impossible a commonwealth should 
stand, where any other than the sovereign hath a power of giving greater 
rewards than life, and of inflicting greater punishments than death.’  Men must 
therefore fear death as the greatest evil.179   
Blits notices Hobbes’s statement, “For no man can serve two masters; nor is he less, 
but rather more a master, whom we believe we are to obey for fear of damnation, than he 
whom we obey for fear of temporal death”180, and from it concludes that “Hobbes’s political 
theory rests on the principle that the popular fear of any power higher than the civil authority 
is destructive of society itself.  Piety subverts society”181. 
Strauss, like Blits, also noticed the emphasis which Hobbes places on the two sources 
of fear.  He ascribes to Hobbes the belief that “the fear of invisible powers is stronger than the 
fear of violent death as long as people believe in invisible powers, i.e., as long as they are 
under the spell of delusions about the true character of reality; the fear of violent death comes 
fully into its own as soon as people have become enlightened”182.   Strauss then writes that this 
implies that Hobbes’s scheme “requires for its operation the weakening or, rather, the 
                                                
 
178 Jan H. Blits, “Hobbesian Fear,” Political Theory 17 (1989), p. 426. 
179 Ibid, p. 426. 
180 De Cive, VI, 11. 
181 Blits, p. 427. 
182 Strauss (1965), p. 198. 
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elimination of the fear of invisible powers”183. 
Richard Sherlock claims that this problem was the driving force behind Hobbes’s 
reinterpretation of the Christian notion of an afterlife in Leviathan. “In Hobbes’s political 
philosophy the fear of violent death is the motivating force behind political obedience.  
However, he argues, the Christian teaching about the world beyond is incompatible with 
political obedience based on this fear since death would then cease to be the worst evil that 
could befall a person”184.   
Sherlock argues that Hobbes attempts to change the content of the Christian afterlife in 
three ways so as to diminish this incompatibility.  First, he notices that Hobbes interprets 
Heaven from Scripture as being a temporal “extension of the earthly commonwealth”185.  
Second, Hobbes denies the immortality of the soul and, along with it, denies the Christian 
doctrine that human souls are resurrected upon death.  In turn, Hobbes “claims that the time of 
the resurrection will be ‘at the last day,’ a time in the future the date or even nearness of which 
he cleverly avoids stating”186.  This has the effect of reducing the resurrection’s “psychic 
significance vis-à-vis a very real threat of death at the hands of the political authorities”187.  
Third, Hobbes interprets hell as a psychological state from “metaphorical” biblical passages.  
Avoiding the very detailed specifics of Hobbes’s doctrine, suffice it to say that:  
For the wicked, those actually inclined to political discord, there will be no 
permanent  torment nor even a permanent life after death.  In both ways the 
significance of the teaching on hell as a source of discord is reduced.  On the 
one hand the ‘torment’ is not necessarily worse than what we might expect 
from a violent death at the hands of political sovereign.  Secondly, there will 
                                                
 
183 Ibid., p. 198.  Cf. Strauss (1963), p. 75. 
184 Richard Sherlock, “The Theology of Leviathan: Hobbes on Religion”, Interpretation 10 (1982), p.55. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Ibid, p. 55. 
187 Ibid. 
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be no eternal life for the wicked to suffer in.”188 
Sherlock notes that there is, however, a weakness to Hobbes’s reinterpretation of the 
afterlife, since he does not entirely eliminate the afterlife189.  Since the notion of an afterlife is 
still present—albeit rendered less dangerous by Hobbes—subjects still may fear the 
punishments of the afterlife more than they fear the punishments of the sovereign.  This may 
not, however, be considered a weakness if it is taken into account that perhaps Hobbes did not 
wish to—even if he acceptably could—entirely eliminate the fear of God’s punishment190.  
Hobbes does certainly diminish the extremity and immediacy of this punishment, but there 
may be—other than Hobbes’s unwillingness to offend his contemporary readers’ religious 
sensibilities—a justifiable reason as to why he does not entirely eliminate this fear. 
Since Hobbes seems to argue that a fear of God and a fear of the sovereign may 
conflict, why does he not entirely eliminate the fear of God?  This question is crucial in 
determining the inherent practical value of God—as the agent whose command obliges 
subjects and sovereigns to the natural law—for maintaining the authority of the sovereign in a 
Christian commonwealth.  The answer is, as I will argue in the following section, that Hobbes 
believes that a fear of God is necessary to support and ground the use of God as a practically 
effective means to maintain authority and peace in a Christian commonwealth. 
 
3.5.3 Management of subjects’ dual fears 
The sovereign must decide, in accordance with his obligation to observe the natural 
                                                
 
188 Ibid, p.57. 
189 Ibid, p.54. 
190 Sherlock argues that Hobbes did not entirely eliminate the afterlife from his system, for “if [Hobbes] argues 
that there is no life after death he would be denying perhaps the most central belief of the Christianity of his 
seventeenth century readers (Sherlock, 54)”. 
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law, which ground for his sovereign rights must be taught to his subjects.  Again, recall that 
according to Hobbes, the sovereign must teach the grounds of his rights rather than simply 
what his rights are.  Furthermore, the sovereign has two choices.  In either case, the 
sovereign’s rights and obligations, after the establishment of a commonwealth, derive from the 
fact that the natural laws are the command of an agent who obliges.  Therefore, either the 
sovereign may teach his subjects that God is the obliging agent, or that he himself is the 
obliging agent.  I will demonstrate below that Hobbes insists that if the sovereign is sovereign 
of a Christian commonwealth, he must teach that God is the obliging agent.  
Heretofore, I have examined the dual rationales which Hobbes provides for the 
sovereign’s obligation to the natural laws.  I have also examined some of the implications that 
follow from each rationale.  Thus far, the implications have corresponded; the implications are 
the same, although the rationales differ.  To summarise the secular explanation, the sovereign 
is obliged to rule in accordance with the natural laws through the recognition of consent; the 
sovereign must rule equitably, and to maintain his authority, the sovereign must ensure that his 
subjects sufficiently fear his power and that his subjects know the basis of that authority.  If, 
on the other hand, the natural laws are God’s laws, then the sovereign is obliged to rule 
according to the natural laws by virtue of their being God’s laws, and must likewise ensure 
equity and fear of his own power, and instill in his subjects a knowledge of the basis of his 
authority.   
There are two significant differences in the practical implications of these 
explanations, however, if we apply these principles to a Christian commonwealth comprising 
Christian subjects.  Hobbes believes that Christian subjects are likely to feel forced to choose 
between obedience to their sovereign’s commands and obedience to what they believe to be 
God’s commands.  
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Since the sovereign must also teach his subjects the grounds for his sovereign rights, if 
the sovereign is sovereign of a Christian commonwealth, would it not be prudent, instead of 
providing simply a secular account of the grounds for his rights, to teach that his rights are 
grounded in God’s law?  This would imply that a Christian duty to obey one’s sovereign 
should be taught191. 
Hobbes highlights Biblical passages stating just this.  Concerning obedience to one’s 
sovereign, Hobbes writes that Scripture exhorts Christians “‘to be subject to the higher power 
[i.e., one’s rightful sovereign],’ [Paul] saith that ‘all power is ordained of God,’ and that ‘we 
ought to be subject to [our higher powers], not only for fear of incurring their wrath, but also 
for conscience sake’192” (L, 338).  Here Hobbes uses Scripture to validate his claim that a 
subject must both fear his sovereign’s power, and believe that it is his duty to obey his 
sovereign, in this instance, because it is God’s command.  Again, according to Paul, Hobbes 
adds that sovereigns must “‘Put men in mind to be subject to principalities, and power, and to 
obey magistrates’193” (L, 338).   
To teach that the natural laws are God’s laws, therefore, is to teach that Christians have 
a Christian duty to obey their sovereign194.  Thus, the sovereign of a Christian commonwealth 
                                                
 
191 I am not suggesting here what Hobbes’ theory of obligation is, or what, in principle, obligates subjects to obey 
their sovereign.  This distinguishes my premise from the debate, sparked primarily by Taylor and Warrender, and 
perhaps given its closest treatment and criticism by Cooke, revolving around what ultimately obligates subjects to 
obey their sovereign.  Rather, I am stating what Hobbes thought should be taught to Christian subjects by 
sovereigns, in order to maintain their authority and further ensure the subjects’ obedience.  In this respect my 
argument is proximate to Geoffrey M Vaughn, Behemoth teaches Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Political 
Education (Lexington Books, 2002), yet my focus is more on the religious aspects of such teachings. 
192 Romans 13: 1-6 
193 Titus 3:1 
194 This is not to argue that “Hobbes regarded natural law as applying only to Christians” (Warrender, 226), a 
view which Warrender attributes to A. E. Taylor and which he opposes.  Warrender’s criticisms of this view do 
not apply to my own view, since I do not argue that the natural law applies only to Christians, but rather that the 
natural law obliges the sovereign of a Christian commonwealth to teach his subjects that the natural law is God’s 
law.  However, I am arguing that the intent of the sovereign in teaching this would result in his Christian subjects 
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must teach to his subjects that they have a Christian duty to obey him.  However, by obliging 
the sovereign of a Christian commonwealth to teach that both his and his subjects’ rights and 
obligations have a theistic basis, Hobbes encounters a difficulty.  By teaching that the grounds 
for his and his subjects rights are ultimately derived from God’s authorship of the natural law, 
the sovereign relies upon his subjects’ belief in and fear of God to ensure their obedience to 
him.  That is, in order to effectively teach that God is the agent whose command is obliging, it 
is necessary that subjects believe in, and fear, God.  The difficulty that arises from this, 
however, is that by making an explicit appeal to God, the sovereign may also allow the fear of 
God to overshadow the required fear of his own power.  The sovereign, by using the idea of 
God as the agent whose command is obliging to maintain his authority, may coincidentally 
encourage his subjects’ fear of God sufficiently to undermine his authority by diminishing 
their relative fear of the sovereign.   
Therefore, while subjects may be taught that their belief in God requires obedience to 
their sovereign, their obligation to obey the sovereign—based upon a theistic rationale—may 
conflict with the fear of God that this teaching relies upon.   
Hobbes, in the following passage, seems to suggest that a Christian duty to obey one’s 
sovereign can indeed come into conflict with a fear of God and a perceived duty to obey God:  
But if the command be such as cannot be obeyed without being damned to 
eternal death, then it were madness to obey it, and the counsel of our Saviour 
takes place (Matt. 10:28): ‘Fear not those that kill the body, but cannot kill the 
soul.’ All men, therefore, that would avoid both the punishments that are to be 
in this world inflicted for disobedience to their earthly sovereign, and those 
that shall be inflicted in the world to come for disobedience to God, have need 
be taught to distinguish well between what is and what is not necessary to 
eternal salvation (L, 398). 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
believing that the reason “I should keep valid covenants, is that this principle is natural law and a command of 
God” (Warrender, 231).  
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In other words, if a Christian subject fears God more than the sovereign, what 
reason has a Christian subject to obey his sovereign?  Hobbes, as we have seen, 
accordingly diminishes the immediacy and severity of God’s punishment, yet does not 
entirely eliminate the fear of God.  If Hobbes had entirely eliminated the fear of God, 
we could not expect Hobbes to propose that the idea of God as an obliging agent was 
useful, since a fear of God depends upon a belief in God, and a belief in God is 
necessary for a belief that God is an obliging agent. 
To ensure that obedience to both God and sovereign does not conflict with a fear of 
God, Hobbes redefines what is necessary for salvation.  Hobbes writes that there are two 
things, and only two things, that are required for salvation:  “faith in Christ and obedience to 
laws” (L, 398).  Hobbes adds, “For if the command of the civil sovereign be such as that it 
may be obeyed without the forfeiture of life eternal, not to obey it is unjust ... ” (L, 398).  
Obedience to the laws as a requisite for salvation further reinforces a Christian subject’s duty 
to obey his sovereign.   
If there is the potential for a sovereign’s command to be contrary to salvation, then 
Christian subjects who may still “fear not those that kill the body” more than God, may thus 
choose to obey God rather than their sovereign.  Since Hobbes has not entirely eliminated the 
fear of God, it is very likely that a Christian subject would still fear God’s punishment, in 
whatever form it took, more than death.  Since obedience to the laws is a requisite for 
salvation and, therefore, cannot be contrary to salvation, Hobbes asks if there is any possibility 
of a sovereign’s command disaffecting one’s faith.  Faith in Christ is, of course, an inward 
belief, which according to Hobbes cannot be affected by “men’s commands” (L, 338).  
Therefore, obedience to one’s sovereign could not in any way affect one’s belief. 
In order to diminish the negative impact upon the sovereign’s authority that the fear of 
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God produces, Hobbes thus makes the requisites of salvation consistent with obedience to the 
sovereign.  This understanding of salvation renders a Christian subject’s obedience—in 
deed—entirely consistent with what is required for salvation.  The fear of God, therefore, is 
not eliminated, but rather the need to fear God’s judgment and punishment for obedience to 
one’s sovereign is eliminated.  The requisite fear of God—requisite for teaching that God is 
the agent whose command is obliging—remains intact.    
 
3.5.4 Naaman’s freedom 
While salvation enables a subject to obey the sovereign in all things without fear of 
God, there is a doctrine in Leviathan which contradicts this.  Hobbes accordingly obliges a 
sovereign of a Christian commonwealth to under-emphasise the following doctrine: consent 
infers authorship and, therefore, accountability.   
Recall that in either instance, whether the sovereign is obliged to the natural laws by a 
theistic or a secular rationale, the sovereign must treat his subjects as if they had consented.  
Although humans cannot, by institution, establish a commonwealth, this idea of consent must 
be acknowledged by the sovereign.  If the sovereign of a Christian commonwealth teaches that 
God is the agent whose command is obliging, then subjects will perceive their duties and 
rights as deriving from God.  One such right is the right to consent.  In other words, it may be 
inferred that if a sovereign must teach his subjects the grounds for his rights, and if he must 
also treat his subjects as if they had consented, then it perhaps follows that the sovereign must 
teach his subjects that they had consented. 
A Christian subject’s knowledge of his right to consent, however, would likely cause 
that subject to question his duty to obey a sovereign command which he believed to be against 
the will or word of God.  Hobbes describes his doctrine of agency by saying that “... every 
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subject is by this institution author of all the actions and judgments of the sovereign instituted” 
(L, 112).  This doctrine of agency entails that subjects are accountable for all of the 
sovereign’s actions.  If the sovereign, therefore, commits what his subjects perceive to be a 
sin, this doctrine of agency would hold his subjects accountable to God.  Moreover, if a 
subject were to obey a sovereign command which the subject perceived to be against God’s 
will, the subject would believe himself to be accountable to God. 
As things stand, however, this is at odds with the intent of Hobbes’s system.  Compare, 
for instance, Hobbes’s notion of salvation with his doctrine of agency: whereas salvation 
eliminates the need to fear God’s judgment and punishment for obedience to one’s sovereign, 
this doctrine of agency implies that the subject is responsible for the actions of the sovereign, 
and if the subject is ultimately responsible, the subject must ultimately be accountable to God.   
A Christian subject is more likely to obey what he perceives to be God’s will than the 
sovereign’s commands, since the subject would perceive himself to be accountable to God, 
and would fear God’s punishment more than that of the sovereign. 
To rid his system of the practical consequences of this, Hobbes provides a unique 
liberty for subjects.  Hobbes illustrates the problem, and the resolution of it, with an extreme 
case: “... what if we be commanded by our lawful prince to say with our tongue, we believe 
not; must we obey such command?” (L, 338).  Hobbes’s answer to this is what amounts to a 
liberty from divine judgment, or Naaman’s freedom:  “Profession with the tongue is but an 
external thing, and no more than any other gesture whereby we signify our obedience, and 
wherein a Christian, holding firmly in his heart the faith of Christ, hath the same liberty which 
the prophet Elisha allowed to Naaman the Syrian” (L, 338).   
  
122 
Naaman, ordered by his sovereign to bow down to the idol Rimmon195, obeyed the 
command, and thereby not only disobeyed God’s second commandment, but “denied the true 
God in effect, as much as if he had done it with his lips” (L, 339).  However, Hobbes notices 
Elisha’s approval of Naaman’s actions, absolving Naaman of any wrongdoing, and that Elisha 
“bid him Go in peace” (L, 339). 
Hobbes concludes from this  
that whatsoever a subject, as Naaman was, is compelled to [do] in obedience 
to his sovereign, and doth it not in order to his own mind, but in order to the 
laws of his country, that action is not his, but his sovereign’s; nor is it he that 
in this case denieth Christ before men, but his governor, and the law of his 
country” (L, 339).   
Such an act is, therefore, not to be imputed to the subject, “but to the king, i.e., it is an 
act of the commonwealth, and is to be imputed to the laws, and that it is not he, but his king, 
who has denied Christ” (OL 339)196.   
This liberty is in stark contradiction to the law of agency Hobbes has earlier laid out, 
that every subject is, by their consent, author of all the actions and judgments of the sovereign 
they consented to.  The passage in which Hobbes discusses Naaman’s freedom occurs just 
lines after Hobbes cites biblical passages which state that men must be put in mind to obey 
their sovereign (L, 338).  It is evident that Hobbes, by discussing Naaman’s freedom in this 
context, believed it to be absolutely necessary that the sovereign ensure that his subjects 
understand this liberty from divine judgment.  Indeed, since Naaman’s freedom is a doctrine 
                                                
 
195 2 Kings 5:17-18 
196 In Chapter Three of Hobbes’s Latin appendix to Leviathan (1668) entitled “On certain objections 
against Leviathan”, Hobbes acknowledges that Elisha’s bidding “Go in peace” may be interpreted as a 
dismissal, rather than denoting permission (app. iii, 31). Hobbes, however, further justifies his 
interpretation by noting that God “easily forgave” even the greatest instance of denial in Scripture, 
Peter’s (app. iii, 32).  
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which ought to be taught, and is necessary to avoid the conflict of choice between obedience 
to God and man—which Hobbes thought inimical to peace—it is evident that the sovereign of 
a Christian commonwealth is obliged to teach his subjects that they have a liberty from divine 
judgment197. 
Importantly, notice that Hobbes succeeds in eliminating the practical implications of 
the paradox only if Naaman’s freedom is emphasised over a subject’s right to consent.  
Although Naaman’s freedom and the doctrine of agency are logically inconsistent, if the 
sovereign emphasises Naaman’s freedom and under-emphasises Hobbes’s doctrine of agency, 
his Christian subjects are far less likely to be aware of the inconsistency.  Moreover, recall that 
Hobbes does not actually argue that an act of consent occurs, only that the sovereign must 
treat his subjects as if they had consented.  Therefore, this may also represent a disparity 
between that which the sovereign is meant to understand and that which his subjects are meant 
to understand.  That is, while the sovereign is meant to understand that he must treat his 
subjects as if they had consented, and must ensure that they understand their liberty from 
divine judgment, perhaps he need not emphasise to his subjects that they had consented.  Nor 
need he teach them that he must act as if they had consented. Nor, in particular, need he teach 
his subjects the doctrine of agency that institution by consent entails.  Instead, the subjects 
must be taught the requisites of salvation, Naaman’s freedom, and that God is the author of the 
natural laws and the basis of their obligation.   
This, in turn, eliminates the fear of God’s punishment only insofar as it conflicts with a 
                                                
 
197 Herzog notes that Hobbes “is ruthlessly opportunistic about agency, pinning responsibility 
for the sovereign’s actions on the subject when that has good political consequences, on the sovereign 
when that has good political consequences” Herzog, Happy Slaves: A Critique of Consent Theory 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989) p. 108.   
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subject’s obligation to obey the sovereign’s command.  Hobbes ingeniously reinforces the 
sovereign’s authority—which is partly dependent upon subjects’ fear of the sovereign and 
partly dependent upon subjects being taught the grounds for their sovereign’s rights—by 
maintaining, not eliminating, the fear of God. According to Hobbes’s requisites for salvation 
and Naaman’s freedom, whether the sovereign be “Christian or infidel”, obedience to one’s 
sovereign does not conflict with the subject’s salvation. “Therefore, whoever gives obedience 
to his Christian king is not prevented from obeying God” (L, 409).  For the sake of peace, 
there can “be no contradiction between the laws of God and the laws of a Christian 
commonwealth” (L, 409). 
  
  
125 
 
Chapter 4 
Limits to the exercise of sovereign authority 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous two chapters I have argued that Hobbes, in the Leviathan, meant not 
only to establish a sovereign with both political and what was traditionally conceived of as 
ecclesiastical authority in order to achieve peace, but also to oblige this sovereign to rule 
according to those laws which Hobbes contends are prescriptive for peace.  This obligation, it 
will be argued, limits the sovereign’s exercise of authority in various ways.   
I will focus in particular on how these limitations include the sovereign’s toleration of 
religious beliefs, and in certain circumstances, religious behaviour.  I will argue that the 
specific obligations of a sovereign of a Christian commonwealth—which were discussed in 
Chapter Three—entail an obligation of the sovereign to be tolerant.  That is, that the 
obligations of the sovereign to rule equitably, to maintain a level of fear of his power amongst 
his subjects, to teach his subjects that the grounds for his rights are based upon divine natural 
law and to ensure that his subjects understand their liberty from divine judgment, collectively 
work to obligate the sovereign to a toleration of religious belief, and in certain circumstances, 
religious behaviour.   
 
4.2 Religious context of Hobbes-as-absolutist 
In the literature concerning the particular question of the extent of Hobbes’s 
sovereign’s authority, which also takes into account the religious aspects of Hobbes’s political 
theory, there are two distinct interpretations.  One group argues that Hobbes’s sovereign has 
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absolute authority over political and ecclesiastical matters, with no restraints on the use of his 
power to enforce his will, while the other group argues that Hobbes’s sovereign is not entirely 
‘absolute’; while the authority of the sovereign is nearly absolute, the sovereign’s exercise of 
authority is ‘hemmed in’ by certain liberal or prudential principles.  John W. Seaman describes 
the debate as revolving “around different understandings of the nature of Hobbes’s conception 
of political authority and its implications for his treatment of religion”198.   
The first, a “‘Hobbes-as-an-absolutist’ interpretation contends that [Hobbes’s] political 
thought entails a defence of the principle of ‘absolute sovereignty,’ or ‘absolute power,’ or 
‘absolute obedience,’ and that the purpose of his reinterpretation of Christianity was simply to 
make it support this principle”199.  Richard Sherlock, for instance, writes that 
Hobbes tries to reshape Christian teaching in order to make it an acceptable, 
even a necessary part of a commonwealth founded on the Hobbesian principle 
of absolute sovereignty.  Since he cannot dismiss religious opinions as 
something to be outgrown he tries to give an account of the fundamental 
religious opinions of his age that will allow those beliefs to be placed in the 
service of sovereign power.200 
James Farr argues that Hobbes’s reinterpretation of Scripture was intended to have the 
effect of “exorcising” those “enthusiastic and superstitious strains in Christianity which 
unglued reason and undermined obedience”201.  By doing so, he argues, Hobbes meant to 
“use” Scripture to support “his political philosophy of absolute obedience”202.  Similarly, 
                                                
 
198 Seaman, p. 229. 
199 Ibid.  See James Farr, "Atomes of  Scripture: Hobbes and the Politics of Biblical Interpretation" in Mary G. 
Dietz, ed., Thomas Hobbes and  Political Theory (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990), p. 175; Lloyd, 
Ideals as Interests in Hobbes's Leviathan, pp. 5, 51, 190, and throughout chapter 9; Hilmar M. Pabel, " 'Give to 
Caesar that Which Is Caesars': Hobbes's Strategy in the Second Half of Leviathan", Journal of Church and State 
35 (1993), pp. 335, 337-38, 343-44, 349 and Richard Sherlock, "The Theology of Leviathan: Hobbes on 
Religion", Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy 10 (1982), pp. 47, 58. 
200 Sherlock, p. 47. 
201 Farr (1990), p. 175. 
202 Ibid. 
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Hilmar M. Pabel argues that Hobbes meant to prove “from Scripture the absolute power of the 
civil sovereign”203.   
On the other hand, the second interpretation, “a ‘Hobbes-as-a-liberal-absolutist’ view, 
while not denying that [Hobbes’s] sovereign is absolute in important respects, suggests that 
there is another significant dimension to his political theory, namely, a pronounced 
individualism that allows us to regard him as one of the main founders of modern 
liberalism”204.  Those holding this view attempt to demonstrate the presence of liberal 
principles in Hobbes’s work, for instance, “that Hobbes tolerated a policy of toleration similar 
to Locke’s, or that his liberalism is manifest in his assault on theocracy, or that his reshaping 
of Christianity was designed to make it fit with his liberal understanding of the natural rights 
of masterless man in the state of nature”205. 
What I intend to argue in this chapter is not whether Hobbes was a founder of modern 
liberalism, although my findings might not be in opposition to this assertion, but rather 
whether or not, and if so, for what reasons, Hobbes’s sovereign is expected to be tolerant of 
religious thought (orthodox, heterodox, and unorthodox), and more controversially, of certain 
religious behaviour.   
 
4.3 The limits of sovereign authority 
The authority of Hobbes’s sovereign can be understood to be limited in two distinct 
ways.  The first entails a lack of authority on the part of the sovereign, that is, what the 
                                                
 
203 Pabel (1993), p. 335. 
204 Seaman, p. 229.  See footnote 13 of this chapter for a list of Hobbes-as-liberal-absolutist interpreters in the 
context of religion and toleration. 
205 Seaman, p. 230. 
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sovereign does not have authority over, or what is not in the sovereign’s domain.  This, of 
course, would imply that the sovereign is not entirely absolute.  The second limitation on the 
sovereign’s authority is not precisely a limit on the sovereign’s authority, but rather, a 
limitation on the exercise of sovereign authority.  In other words, the sovereign may have 
authority over certain matters, however, Hobbes clearly cites both principles and examples 
which stress that the sovereign should not exercise his authority over these matters.  These 
restrictions on the sovereign’s authority and the exercise of sovereign authority are ultimately 
derived from the natural laws, in accord with which, as demonstrated in Chapter two, the 
sovereign is obliged to rule.   
Taking each limitation in turn, what does Hobbes exclude from the sovereign’s 
authority?  Recall that in Chapter Two, Hobbes’s distinction between thought and action was 
discussed, and the implications of this distinction for the inclusion of inner thoughts and 
beliefs as matters within the realm of ecclesiastical authority were outlined.  Coercion, Hobbes 
argues, is a sovereign tool of authority, and thoughts and beliefs are not influenced by 
coercion206.  Coercion, he continues, is not a tool of the church and, therefore, the authority of 
the church does not include the coercive ‘correction’ of people’s religious beliefs.   
Hobbes, recall, also eliminates the distinction between ecclesiastical authority and civil 
authority.  This has the consequence of likewise denying the sovereign the power to coercively 
attempt to change religious beliefs.  While the sovereign has, of course, coercive power 
whereas the church does not, Hobbes maintains that coercion is not an effective means by 
which to change the beliefs of subjects.  Hence, sovereigns do not have the power to change 
                                                
 
206 Coercion is not to be confused with persuasion.  Whereas persuasion is a tool which the sovereign has at his 
disposal to influence his subjects’ beliefs, coercion is said by Hobbes to be unable to influence belief. See, for 
instance, xlii, 8.    
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beliefs through coercive means. 
While this signifies an exclusion from the sovereign’s power, much more common in 
the Leviathan are instances where the sovereign’s authority over some matter is affected.  
These limitations placed upon the sovereign’s authority, moreover, are entirely due to the 
sovereign’s obligation to rule according to the natural laws.   
In Chapter Three I demonstrated that the sovereign is obliged to rule according to the 
natural laws, whether those natural laws are considered to be obliging through a recognition of 
subjects’ rights to consent or because they are God’s laws.  As such, if those natural laws limit 
in any way the execution of the sovereign’s will, the sovereign can be said to be constrained 
by the natural laws.  Seaman effectively summarises the extent to which “the power of a 
prudent sovereign, a sovereign who wishes to retain its authority over the long run” can be 
said to be constrained by the laws of nature:   
Thus, the Leviathan’s ninth law of nature calls on the sovereign to treat its 
subjects as if they have an equal natural right to self-governance . . . Further, 
the sovereign must treat its subjects as having not just inalienable rights, but a 
wide range of equal inalienable rights (the tenth law of nature); as having a 
right to be treated as equal before judges (the eleventh law of nature); and as 
having—preliminarily, at any rate—equal rights to material goods (implied by 
the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth laws of nature).207 
If, therefore, the sovereign is obliged to rule according to the natural laws, and those 
natural laws restrict, for example, inequity, then the sovereign ought not exercise his authority 
in an inequitable manner. His authority remains absolute, save for the one exception discussed, 
yet to maintain his authority, the sovereign ought not exercise his authority in such a way as to 
break the natural laws. It is in this respect, therefore, that the sovereign’s authority can be said 
                                                
 
207 Seaman, pp. 230-31. 
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to be ‘hemmed in’ by the natural laws, and in this case specifically, by the law of equity.   
For instance, the law of equity, or the eleventh law of nature, states that those who 
judge between subjects must “deal equally between them” (L, 97).  Hobbes argues that the 
breach of this law constitutes a breach of the fundamental law of nature.  If, he writes, judges 
are partial in their judgments, this will deter men from using judges.  This reluctance, in turn, 
“is the cause of war” (L, 97).  To cause war, of course, is against the fundamental law of 
nature, which is to seek peace.  Therefore, a sovereign is obligated to ensure the impartial 
judgment of his subjects because failure to do so is inimical to peace.   
Thus far, the sovereign does not have the power to coercively affect his subjects’ 
beliefs, and there is an obligatory injunction against him exercising his authority inequitably.  
The sovereign is even more broadly restricted in his exercise of authority. That is, although the 
sovereign may possess the authority to act in some manner, the sovereign is limited in his 
ability to exercise that authority.  Two examples serve to illustrate that the sovereign is limited 
in this manner by his obligation to abide by the natural laws. 
First, the natural laws spell out certain liberties for subjects, and due to the sovereign’s 
obligation to the natural laws, the sovereign’s exercise of authority is limited by these liberties.  
All liberties, according to Hobbes, are derived from the right of nature, which “is the 
liberty each man hath to use his own power” to preserve his own nature as he sees fit.  The 
right of nature is essentially, therefore, the liberty to do anything.  Liberty is never granted—
even the sovereign’s liberty is simply a retention of his right of nature—but rather transferred 
or renounced.  What is not transferred or renounced is what is properly understood to remain 
of one’s liberty.   
An important liberty belonging to subjects, therefore, is that liberty which cannot be 
renounced or transferred.  The generation of a commonwealth involves the renunciation and 
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transfer of each individual’s rights to the sovereign.  According to Hobbes, however, there are 
rights that are not alienable.  The inalienable rights cannot be “abandoned or transferred” (L, 
82).  First, “a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that assault him by force, to take 
away his life ...” (L, 82).  Second, a man cannot lay down the right of resisting those who aim 
to “wound” or “imprison” him (L, 82).  Finally, since the purpose of renouncing and 
transferring rights is “the security of a man’s person, in his life and in the means of so 
preserving life as not to be weary of it”, then a man can not “despoil himself of the end for 
which those signs were intended” (L, 82). 
These inalienable rights are, therefore, those elements of the right of nature which are 
still possessed by subjects in a commonwealth, those which are not renounced or transferred 
“for the preservation of [one’s] own nature”.  Since the right of nature is “the liberty each man 
hath to use his own power” to attain any and all things as he sees fit, then corresponding to 
these inalienable rights is the liberty to use one’s own power to avoid death, imprisonment, 
and preservation of life so “as not to be weary of it”.   
Thus, the obligations of subjects to their sovereign are limited by the implications of 
the first and second laws of nature:  “... while the sovereign has the absolute right and 
authority to do whatever it wishes, subjects are not obliged to obey the sovereign in 
everything, for they cannot be obliged to help the sovereign, as Hobbes makes clear in his 
explication of the second law of nature, to violate their inalienable right”208.  The sovereign’s 
exercise of authority can be seen as limited by the subjects’ inalienable rights because the 
sovereign cannot expect obedience in these matters.  The sovereign may have the authority to 
violate his subjects’ inalienable rights, but the exercise of that authority is hampered by his 
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subjects’ ability and right to resist the sovereign’s exercise of this authority209.  
A further instance of these restraints on the exercise of sovereign authority, due to an 
obligation to the natural laws, is provided by Hobbes’s discussion of punishment.  Teaching 
subjects the grounds for the sovereign’s rights, as discussed in Chapter three, is an obligation 
of the sovereign as a means to curbing subjects’ ignorance and thereby further maintaining 
sovereign authority.  The sovereign is also obliged to maintain a level of fearfulness of his 
punishment.  This obligation is tempered, however, by other obligations which are spelled out 
in the natural law.   
Hobbes writes,  
But I have also showed formerly that before the institution of commonwealth, 
every man had a right to everything, and to do whatsoever he thought 
necessary to his own preservation, subduing, hurting, or killing any man in 
order thereunto.  And this is the foundation of that right of punishing which is 
exercised in every commonwealth.  For the subjects did not give the sovereign 
that right, but only (in laying down theirs) strengthened him to use his own as 
he should think fit, for the preservation of them all; so that it was not given, 
but left to him, and to him only, and (excepting the limits set him by natural 
law210) as entire as in the condition of mere nature, and of war of every one 
against his neighbour (L, 204). 
The sovereign, therefore, has every right to punish whomever in whatever way he 
deems fit.  Yet there are limits to the exercise of this sovereign right.  What are these “limits 
set him by natural law”?  In one instance, Hobbes argues that the severest punishments should 
be reserved for those crimes that are most of danger to the public (L, 230).  Moreover, crimes 
of infirmity, by which Hobbes means “those which proceed from great provocation, from 
great fear, great need, or from ignorance whether the fact be a crime or not” (L, 230) should 
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often be treated with lenity.  Lenity, Hobbes argues, “when there is such place for it, is 
required by the law of nature” (L, 230).  Here Hobbes seemingly alludes to the seventh law of 
nature, which states “that in revenges (that is, retribution of evil for evil) men look not at the 
greatness of the evil past, but the greatness of the good to follow.  Whereby we are forbidden 
to inflict punishment with any other design than for correction of the offender, or direction of 
others” (L, 96).   
Hobbes continues, regarding crimes of infirmity: “The punishment of the leaders and 
teachers in a commotion, not the poor seduced people, when they are punished, can profit the 
commonwealth by their example” (L, 230).  In certain circumstances, therefore, such as when 
a teacher seduces people to a cause which the sovereign deems punishable, the teacher alone 
ought to be punished.  This is so because the reason for punishment is correction, not revenge.  
Regarding revenge’s relation to the natural law, Hobbes writes “revenge without respect to the 
example and profit to come is a triumph, or glorying, in the hurt of another, tending to no end 
(for the end is always somewhat to come); and glorying to no end is vain-glory, and contrary 
to reason; and to hurt without reason tendeth to the introduction of war, which is against the 
law of nature” (L, 96). 
 Since, therefore, the punishment of their teacher can serve as an example, it is not 
necessary to punish the whole group. Indeed, Hobbes says, it is likely the fault of the 
sovereign if such a problem should arise in the first place:  “To be severe to the people is to 
punish that ignorance which may in great part be imputed to the sovereign, whose fault it was 
they were no better instructed” (L, 230).  If the breach of the seventh law of nature “is 
commonly styled by the name of cruelty”, then not only is the sovereign punishing his subjects 
for his own failure to maintain his authority through teaching the grounds of his sovereign 
rights, which is against the natural law, but he is also acting cruelly, which is also contrary to 
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the natural laws.  Therefore, the sovereign is obliged to be lenient under certain circumstances. 
The natural laws further limit the sovereign’s exercise of his authority to punish when 
that punishment concerns innocent subjects.  The punishment of innocent subjects, Hobbes 
writes, is against the law of nature for three reasons (L, 208).  First it is, again, against the 
seventh law of nature, since it “forbiddeth all men, in their revenges, to look at anything but 
some future good” (L, 208). There can be no good, Hobbes adds, in punishing the innocent.  
Second, it is against the fourth law of nature, or gratitude, “For seeing all sovereign power is 
originally given by the consent of every one of the subjects, to the end they should, as long as 
they are obedient, be protected thereby, the punishment of the innocent is a rendering of evil 
for good” (L, 208).  Third and finally, it is against the law of equity, for it is not “an equal 
distribution of justice” (L, 208). 
Thus, again, the sovereign is limited in how he can maintain sovereign authority.  
While the sovereign has the authority to punish whomever, and however severely he sees fit, 
according to the natural laws in accordance with which he is obliged to rule, this authority 
must be tempered.  It is necessary for peace, Hobbes argues, that the sovereign be the sole 
possessor of the right to punish and, therefore, that right must be laid down by all subjects and 
retained by the sovereign.  However, while the sovereign is the sole possessor of that right, it 
is also necessary for the achievement of peace that the sovereign be limited in how he may 
exercise that right.  The sovereign may not do those things identified by Hobbes as threatening 
peace, which would defeat the very purpose of the sovereign’s possession of the sole right to 
punish in the first place.   
Hence, the above examples—the inalienable rights and punishment of subjects—
demonstrate that the restrictions placed on the sovereign’s exercise of authority are due to the 
sovereign’s obligation to the natural laws.  The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to 
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demonstrating that the sovereign’s obligation to the natural laws also obliges the sovereign to 
be tolerant of the inner religious beliefs of his subjects, and in certain circumstances, the 
religious expression or behaviour of his subjects.  
 
4.3.1 Religious toleration 
Religious toleration in Leviathan comes in two forms, and each is based upon a 
different rationale.  The first type of religious toleration permits freedom of thought, which 
Hobbes contrasts with liberty of conscience—which he opposes.  Hobbes’s defence of this 
type of toleration is based upon either one of two rationales.  One explanation is that Hobbes’s 
sovereign does not have the authority to be intolerant of religious beliefs. This is based on 
Hobbes’s premise that the sovereign cannot affect his subjects’ religious beliefs.  That is, the 
sovereign is incapable of affecting his subjects’ inner religious beliefs and, therefore, he ought 
to be tolerant of his subjects’ inner religious beliefs.  The other explanation is that thoughts 
and beliefs are inalienable rights, based on the liberty of subjects, which in turn implies that 
although the sovereign has the authority to be intolerant, subjects have an inalienable right to 
religious freedom which must be acknowledged by the sovereign. 
The second type of religious toleration is a provisional, prudential toleration of 
religious behaviour.  This is similarly based upon the limitations of the sovereign’s authority.  
However, I will propose that instead of lacking the authority to be intolerant, the sovereign 
does possess the authority to be intolerant of religious behaviour.  Rather, the sovereign is 
limited in his exercise of authority over religious behaviour due to his obligation to rule in 
accordance with the natural laws.   
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The first type of religious toleration has been noted and examined by a number of 
commentators, most recently by Alan Ryan, John W. Seaman, and Richard Tuck211. It is, they 
argue, a toleration of thought and belief, both deriving from and resulting in a freedom of 
thought and belief.  Hobbes argues that “belief or unbelief never follow men’s commands” (L, 
338), and that “faith hath no relation to, nor dependence at all, upon compulsion or 
commandment, but only upon certainty or probability of arguments drawn from reason or 
from something men believe already” (L, 337).  That is, sovereign coercive power—as 
opposed to persuasion—has no effect upon the thoughts and beliefs of subjects.   
This, it is argued, is either due to Hobbes’s epistemology, or from his understanding of 
rights.  Recall that Hobbes writes “As for the inward thought and belief of men, which human 
governors can take no notice of (for God only knoweth the heart), they are not voluntary, nor 
the effect of the laws, but of the unrevealed will, and of the power of God, and consequently 
fall not under obligation” (L, 318).  Subjects, therefore, have no obligation to the sovereign to 
believe.  Now, is this mainly because subjects have an inalienable right to the freedom of their 
inward belief, or is it mainly because the sovereign does not have the power to influence belief 
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through coercive means?   
Alan Ryan, taking the latter position, argues that Hobbes does not offer a morally 
principled defence of toleration, but rather that Hobbes offers epistemologically principled 
reasons.  That is, “There are things we cannot get people to think, and where we cannot we 
ought not to try”212.  Seaman, taking the former position while not dismissing the latter, argues 
that religious freedom is an inalienable right.  Agreeing with Ryan, he argues that although 
“rulers may influence the opinions of their subjects”, the sovereign cannot “change beliefs by 
coercion”213.  There is, however, an added implication in this, as argued by Seaman:   
Since interior beliefs or thoughts cannot be commanded by either oneself or 
others, no one can be understood as being able to transfer a right to command 
his or her beliefs or thoughts to the sovereign.  The implication, clearly, is that 
liberty of thought or belief is a nontransferable, that is, an inalienable, right.214 
That Hobbes understands freedom of thought and belief to be an inalienable right is 
further evidenced, Seaman argues, by Hobbes’s allowance of an exception to subjects’ 
obligations:  “a subject need not obey the sovereign when its commands are ‘repugnant to the 
Lawes of God’”215.  People, Hobbes accordingly believes, will be compelled “to retain control 
over matters having a decisive bearing on their eternal salvation”216.  Seaman claims that this 
is essentially recognising, even if only implicitly, an inalienable right to religious freedom217.   
The primary argument that freedom of thought is an inalienable right, therefore, stems 
from Hobbes’s assertion that freedom of thought cannot be renounced or transferred since 
thoughts “are not voluntary”.  The transfer and renunciation of rights, Hobbes argues, is a 
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voluntary act (L, 82).  Even if, therefore, someone attempted to transfer or renounce their 
freedom of thought, one would be unable to since thought is not voluntary.  Similarly, 
thoughts do not fall under obligation, just as the inalienable rights do not.  One could not, 
accordingly, be obliged to have any particular thought or belief, just as one could not be 
obliged to kill oneself.   
While thought and belief can, therefore, be considered inalienable, are they rights?  
Recall the right of nature, which is the liberty to preserve one’s own nature and life, and “of 
doing anything which, in his own judgment and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest 
means thereunto” (L, 79).  Hobbes rhetorically asks much later in the Leviathan:  “For who is 
there, that knowing that there is so great danger in an error, whom the natural care of himself 
compelleth not to hazard his soul upon his own judgment, rather than that of any other man 
that is unconcerned in his damnation?” (L, 466)218.  Hobbes suggests here that the natural care 
of oneself, the end of the right of nature, includes the care of one’s soul.  This is not to suggest 
that Hobbes believed in the Christian conception of a soul, but rather that Hobbes is being 
practical.  He is asking who, if he believed in God’s judgment, would not believe that the 
natural care of himself included his salvation.  Accordingly Christians, Hobbes evidently 
believes, will prefer to rely, and indeed insist, upon their own personal judgment concerning 
their spiritual self-preservation rather than another’s judgment on their behalf.   
This suggests, therefore, that for Hobbes, freedom of thought and belief is a right.  As 
Seaman notes, Hobbes does not oblige a subject to obey the sovereign when the sovereign’s 
commands are “repugnant to the Lawes of God”, or the laws of nature.  If subjects do not have 
an obligation to obey the sovereign in some respect, then this implies the retention of a right 
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on the part of subjects.  More explicitly, Hobbes seems to add the right to rely upon one’s own 
judgment in matters of personal salvation to the right of nature, by adding spiritual self-
preservation as a component of the right of nature.  
Hobbes does not, however, explicitly state that thought or belief is an inalienable right.  
Recall also Ryan’s assertion that the sovereign does not have authority over thoughts and 
beliefs because he does not have coercive power over thoughts and beliefs.  I do not intend, 
however, to argue that either one or the other is correct while the other is inaccurate.  While 
Ryan’s argument is certainly correct and readily apparent, the argument that Hobbes presents 
beliefs as inalienable rights, although not as readily apparent, is substantively convincing.   
Whatever the rationale, it is clear that Hobbes presents the toleration of inner religious 
belief as an obligation of the sovereign, deriving from the sovereign’s obligation to rule 
according to the natural laws.  One passage in Leviathan makes it clear that to be intolerant of 
inner religious belief is against the law of nature which, therefore, implies an obligation on the 
part of the sovereign to be tolerant of inner religious belief. 
Hobbes argues that an error is made by those who wish  
... to extend the power of the law, which is the rule of actions only, to the very 
thoughts and consciences of men, by examination and inquisition of what they 
hold, notwithstanding the conformity of their speech and actions.  By which 
men are either punished for answering the truth of their thoughts, or 
constrained to answer an untruth for fear of punishment (L, 466).   
Quite clearly, Hobbes is maintaining that a sovereign must not attempt to enforce 
uniformity of belief through coercive means, and thus there exists for subjects a freedom of 
thought and belief.  He continues the argument with an example:  
It is true that the civil magistrate, intending to employ a minister in the charge 
of teaching, may enquire of him if he be content to preach such and such 
doctrines; and in case of refusal, may deny him the employment.  But to force 
him to accuse himself of opinions, when his actions are not by law forbidden, 
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is against the law of nature ... (L, 466).   
Not only does this passage explicitly state that to be intolerant of inner religious 
beliefs, or more precisely, to force someone to “accuse himself of opinions”, is against the law 
of nature, but it also details a tangible limitation on the exercise of the sovereign’s authority.  
Because of the sovereign’s obligation to the natural law, the sovereign must not “extend the 
power of the law” to include thoughts and beliefs. Thus the sovereign must not forcefully 
inquire into his subjects’ inner religious beliefs, nor, by implication, hold people legally 
accountable for their religious beliefs. 
Both explanations as to the reasons for a toleration of thought and belief are based 
upon a preexistent liberty of thought and belief.  Whether the sovereign must tolerate religious 
belief because freedom of thought is not within control of the sovereign’s coercive power, or 
more categorically because freedom of thought is an inalienable right, freedom of thought is a 
precondition for toleration of thought; freedom of thought not only results from a tolerance of 
thought, but the nature of thought as free is the justification for the tolerance of it.  
This liberty is not, however, a liberty of conscience.  Although the sovereign “cannot 
compel me to believe” (OL, 246), the sovereign “may oblige me to obedience” (L, 246).  In 
other words, although the sovereign cannot oblige me “to think any otherwise than my reason 
persuades me”, the sovereign can oblige me “so as not by act or word to declare I believe him 
not” (L, 246). Seaman argues that this distinction between belief and action, and a subject’s 
obligation to obey but not to believe, was thought by Hobbes to be necessary for civil peace, 
since the public exercise of freedom of belief “is exceedingly dangerous to civil order”219.  
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Hobbes goes to great lengths, therefore, to confine the freedom of religion to strictly “the inner 
realm of private belief”220.   
Ryan similarly maintains this intent of Hobbes, arguing that Hobbes was “extremely 
anxious to secure uniformity of profession in matters of religion”, and that he accordingly 
divorced public profession from private conviction221.  What all of this aims at, Ryan claims, 
“is to make uniform public worship a political good and not a religious issue in the usual 
sense, while strongly suggesting that private opinion can be left unfettered”222.  Hobbes’s 
intention “always is to show that there is no way in which our duty to obey God can conflict 
with our duty to obey (at any rate Christian) sovereigns”223. 
To enforce uniformity of belief, as opposed to profession of belief, was believed by 
Hobbes to be inimical to peace.  Evidently, the tolerance of religious belief, according to 
Hobbes, is one further, very crucial, aspect of maintaining the peace of a commonwealth 
consisting of Christian subjects.  Recall, for instance, that the requisites for salvation were 
reduced by Hobbes to include only a faith that “Jesus is the Christ”—the unum necessarium—
and obedience to the sovereign”.  Considering that Hobbes thought that each subject would 
not entrust their salvation to someone other than themselves, Hobbes seemingly compensated 
by simultaneously reducing the requisites of salvation to the above two conditions, and argued 
that even should the sovereign attempt to, the sovereign could not affect one’s faith.  Hobbes 
thus ensured that obedience to the sovereign “would never conflict with the requirements of 
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salvation”224.  As discussed in Chapter three, Naaman’s freedom is further evidence of 
Hobbes’s attempt to eliminate such conflict. 
However, both Ryan and Seaman note that Hobbes may have considered allowing the 
liberty of inner belief “to escape the confines of the private mind and enter the public 
realm”225.  That Hobbes supports this is suggested in Behemoth, where  
... he warns that although a state can make people obey, it cannot change their 
minds if they believe they have ‘the better reason,’ and any attempt at the 
‘suppression of doctrine does but unite and exasperate, that is, increase both 
the malice and power of them that have already believed them.’  The 
implication, clearly, is that the state should attempt to tolerate various 
religious creeds when they have taken strong root.226 
Similarly, Ryan, despite adamantly claiming that Hobbes wished to ensure uniformity 
of profession in matters of religion, writes in conclusion that besides those things that one 
cannot make people believe and, therefore, ought not to try, “All else is a matter of expediency 
in that large sense in which the laws of nature bind sovereigns to act expediently rather than 
selfishly or arbitrarily”227.  If sovereigns are obliged to act according to the natural laws, 
however, and if those natural laws include a provision for the toleration of religious 
behaviour—not just belief—then the sovereign would be, prudently or provisionally at least, 
obliged to be tolerant. 
In order to demonstrate how the sovereign’s obligation to the natural laws also obliges 
the sovereign, under certain circumstances, to be tolerant of religious behaviour, it is useful to 
examine those aspects of the natural law which intolerance of religious behaviour may breach.  
By far the most relevant passage in Leviathan which highlights this aspect of the natural laws 
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seeks to answer a hypothetical question. Hobbes asks whether a member of a different religion 
ought to be forced into the church of one’s own religion.  This is posed, moreover, to 
demonstrate the consistency of Naaman’s freedom with Christian teachings.  Recall Naaman’s 
freedom:  “... that whatsoever a subject, as Naaman was, is compelled to [do] in obedience to 
his sovereign, and doth it not in order to his own mind, but in order to the laws of his country, 
that action is not his, but his sovereign’s; nor is it he that in this case denieth Christ before 
men, but his governor, and the law of his country” (L, 339).  The subject’s actions are, 
therefore, free from God’s judgment if the subject obeys the sovereign’s commands.  Beliefs, 
of course, are not free from God’s judgment.  Hobbes now asks his hypothetical question:   
If any man shall accuse this doctrine as repugnant to true and unfeigned 
Christianity, I ask him: in case there should be a subject in any Christian 
commonwealth that should be inwardly, in his heart, of the Mahomedan 
religion, whether, if his sovereign command him to be present at the divine 
service of the Christian church, and that on pain of death, he think that 
Mahomedan obliged in conscience to suffer death for that cause rather than 
obey that command of his lawful prince (L, 339).   
Hobbes asks, therefore, an either/ or question.  If a sovereign threatens a true believer 
with death lest he obey a command which contradicts the subject’s beliefs—as in the case of 
Naaman—should the subject obey his conscience, and thus suffer death, or obey his sovereign 
despite his belief?  
Although the subject has the freedom of Naaman, Hobbes chooses to focus on the 
legitimacy of the command itself.  In either case, Hobbes argues, the sovereign has made a 
mistake in making the command.  If someone were to argue that the subject “ought rather to 
suffer death,” Hobbes argues that this would be equivalent to authorising “all private men to 
disobey their princes, in maintenance of their religion, true or false” (L, 339).  That is, Hobbes 
presents the following scenario:  the sovereign commands a subject to do something that is 
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entirely against the subject’s belief, and further threatens to punish the subject with death 
should he not obey. Now, if Naaman’s freedom is not a true Christian principle, then the 
subject should obey his conscience, disobey the sovereign, and suffer death.  If this is 
considered the ‘right’ thing to do, however, Hobbes argues that this gives permission to all 
subjects to disobey the sovereign whenever a disagreement arises regarding religious 
behaviour.  Hobbes believes this, of course, to be an untenable situation. 
Just as important, moreover, are the consequences of the sovereign making such a 
command punishable by death in the first place.  In making the command, the sovereign forces 
the subject into a position in which the subject must decide between his God and his 
sovereign, a position which I argued in the previous two chapters that Hobbes’s system is 
intended to avoid creating.  Consider: if the sovereign makes such a command, and the subject 
would not obey if he had the freedom not to, then the subject has two choices.  Either the 
subject may decide to be defiant and thus lose his life, or the subject may begrudgingly decide 
to be obedient.  If the subject is defiant of the sovereign command, the sovereign must punish 
him, which is equivalent to the sovereign publicly acknowledging that ‘this subject was more 
afraid of God than death, so I gave him death’.  Or, ‘This man did not recognise his liberty 
from God’s judgment and his obligation to obey me’.  This puts the sovereign’s authority into 
an adversarial position relative to God’s, again forcing the subjects of a commonwealth to 
question whom they are ultimately obliged to obey.   
Such an action on the part of the sovereign defeats the whole purpose and benefit of 
Naaman’s freedom, since it forces subjects to do something they may feel obliged in 
conscience not to do. If this is not forced, the issue will not arise nearly so often, and certainly 
not as acutely.  It renders inopportune a defiant subject’s ultimate demonstration against the 
sovereign’s authority; by becoming a ‘martyr’ the punished subject publicly questions the 
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existence of Naaman’s freedom, and thus undermines the sovereign’s ability to maintain 
authority. 
It is evident, therefore, that Hobbes thought certain commands, or the legislation of 
certain religious behaviour, could undermine the authority of the sovereign.  Since it is the 
mandate of the sovereign to maintain peace and, to that end, his own authority, this suggests 
that the sovereign should not command religious behaviour that, when performed, would 
symbolise or indicate belief of potentially controversial religious doctrines. In fact, the 
sovereign is obliged not to do so by the natural laws.   
This is, importantly, dependent on the natural laws being God’s laws.  Recall that in 
Chapter three I demonstrated that if the natural laws are God’s laws, then the sovereign is 
obliged to rule according to the natural laws by virtue of their being God’s laws, and must also 
ensure fear of his own power and instill in his subjects a knowledge of the basis of his 
authority.  Naaman’s freedom was also demonstrated to be a doctrine dependent upon the 
natural laws being God’s laws.  If the natural laws are not God’s laws, then subjects’ actions 
in accordance with sovereign commands cannot be absolved of God’s judgment. Accordingly, 
since the doctrine of Naaman’s freedom eliminates the fear of God’s punishment insofar as it 
conflicts with a subject’s obligation to obey the sovereign’s command, any action by the 
sovereign which undermines this doctrine is an action hostile to the natural laws.   
In other words, since the sovereign is obliged to maintain authority and fear of his own 
power, should the sovereign be sovereign of a Christian commonwealth, the sovereign is 
obliged by the natural laws not to undermine the doctrine of Naaman’s freedom.  By being 
obliged not to undermine the doctrine of Naaman’s freedom, the sovereign is accordingly 
obliged to avoid commanding religious behaviour that would force subjects to choose between 
obedience to God and obedience to their sovereign.  This would most obviously result in an 
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obligation to not command public professions of faith. 
Going back to Hobbes’s defence of Naaman’s freedom and his hypothetical question, 
as just discussed, the sovereign could undermine his own authority in making such a command 
by making martyrs of defiant subjects.  On the other hand, Hobbes argues, subjects could 
choose to obey the sovereign despite their beliefs.  If someone were to argue that faced with 
such a choice the begrudging subject should be obedient, Hobbes argues that this someone 
“alloweth to himself that which he denieth to another” (L, 339).  Such a position is, Hobbes 
continues, “... contrary to the words of our Saviour ‘Whatsoever you would that men should 
do unto you, that do ye unto them,’ and contrary to the law of nature (which is the indubitable 
everlasting law of God) ‘Do not to another that which thou wouldest not he should do unto 
thee” (L, 339).   
Hobbes is arguing that in legislating certain religious behaviour, the sovereign is 
treating subjects inequitably, which is against the law of nature.  Either everyone should be 
forced to publicly profess their faith, whether implicitly by church attendance, for instance, or 
explicitly through words, or no-one should be forced to profess their faith.  Since the 
sovereign should not force certain professions because of his obligation to not undermine the 
doctrine of Naaman’s freedom, Hobbes is implicitly arguing that the sovereign should grant 
subjects the liberty to profess or not to profess in accordance with their own consciences. 
Essentially, Hobbes is advancing an argument for the toleration of religious behaviour 
by arguing that one should not claim a liberty, or from the view of the sovereign, grant a 
liberty, that one would deny to another.  For instance, if two opposing beliefs, A and B, are 
predominantly held by subjects of the commonwealth, X and Y, respectively, then if the 
sovereign allowed X to express belief A or even act in accordance with A, he is discriminating 
against Y.  Thus, if the sovereign were to command all subjects, for example, to implicitly 
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profess some article of faith by performing some public action, the sovereign must consider 
two groups.  There will be a number of subjects who believe in that article of faith, and thus in 
performing that action, they are allowed their liberty of conscience, or more accurately, they 
are not being denied their liberty of conscience.  There will also be, however, a number of 
subjects who do not believe in that article of faith, and thus in performing that action, they are 
being forced to act against their conscience, and are being denied their liberty of conscience.  
This is, Hobbes’s arguments suggest, inequitable and, therefore, against the laws of nature.   
Again, by arguing “Do not to another that which thou wouldest not he should do unto thee”, 
Hobbes is arguing that from the perspective of the sovereign, the sovereign should not grant a 
liberty to a subject or group of subjects that the sovereign would deny to another; the 
sovereign should tolerate those who feel obliged to their consciences in matters for which the 
sovereign allows others their liberty of conscience.  In other words, be tolerant when to be 
intolerant would require inequity. 
This is not to suggest that Hobbes argues that his sovereign should not legislate any 
religious behaviour whatsoever, for it may be asked, what religious act would not be against 
someone’s conscience?  However, rather than stressing the importance of religious 
behavioural uniformity, Hobbes explicitly acknowledges religious diversity in these 
arguments.  Religious diversity will and does exist, Hobbes seems to be arguing, and a 
provision is necessary for its toleration should an issue arise that threatens the peace of the 
commonwealth.  Hobbes does not provide, in other words, a general principle of toleration of 
religious expression; rather, he provides a prudential strategy which is obligatory for the 
sovereign to employ under circumstances in which intolerance of religious expression would 
threaten peace.  Specifically, toleration of religious expression for Hobbes is a provisional 
measure in which the sovereign refrains from legislating religious behaviour when doing so 
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will undermine the maintenance of his authority and breach the natural laws.  Hobbes has 
given every reason why a Christian subject should obey his sovereign, yet Hobbes tempers 
this by advising a prudent sovereign not to force obedience in certain instances.   
It is left to demonstrate how this provision is consistent with the rest of Hobbes’s 
system.  Hobbes argues elsewhere that in “whatsoever is not regulated by the commonwealth 
...”, it is equitable “... that every man equally enjoy his liberty” (L, 189).  This suggests a 
means by which the sovereign can be tolerant.  If it can be inequitable to legislate a certain 
religious act because it acknowledges and denies subjects’ liberties unequally, then according 
to this passage, Hobbes implies that by not legislating a certain religious act, by not regulating 
this aspect of religious behaviour, the sovereign is allowing every subject to “equally enjoy his 
liberty”.   
Subjects can have liberties in Hobbes’s system besides those that are derived from 
their inalienable rights: “The Greatest Liberty of Subjects, dependeth on the Silence of the 
Law” (L, 143).  Hobbes writes “In cases where the sovereign has prescribed no rule, there the 
subject hath the liberty to do or forbear, according to his own discretion” (L, 143).  This liberty 
is, therefore, subject to change, “according as they that have the sovereignty shall think most 
convenient” (L, 143).  In the absence of the sovereign’s exercise of authority over some 
particular matter, there is understood to exist a liberty of subjects to govern themselves on that 
matter.  Strictly speaking, the sovereign does not renounce his authority over that matter. 
Rather, the sovereign chooses not to exercise his authority over that matter.   
Hobbes advises the sovereign elsewhere as to what the laws are to be used for, which 
somewhat limits what the sovereign should legislate.  Hobbes writes, “For the use of laws 
(which are but rules authorized) is not to bind the people from all voluntary actions, but to 
direct and keep them in such a motion as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous 
  
149 
desires, rashness, or indiscretion, as hedges are set, not to stop travelers, but to keep them in 
the way” (L, 229).  In the Latin edition of Leviathan, Hobbes notes that “the end of laws is not 
to restrain people from a harmless liberty” (OL, 229).  If  the sovereign were to legislate 
certain religious behaviour, would Hobbes view this as “restraining people from a harmless 
liberty”?  “A law”, Hobbes contends,  
that is not needful, having not the true end of a law, is not good.  A law may 
be conceived to be good when it is for the benefit of the sovereign, though it 
be not necessary for the people; but it is not so.  For the good of the sovereign 
and people cannot be separated.  It is a weak sovereign that has weak subjects, 
and a weak people whose sovereign wanteth power to rule them at his will.  
Unnecessary laws are not good laws ...(L, 229). 
A law, therefore, that is not necessary, is not a good law.  Moreover, since the good of 
the sovereign is equated with the good of the subjects, any law that undermines the authority 
of the sovereign is to be avoided.  This demonstrates more clearly the way in which Hobbes 
enables a sovereign to tolerate religious behaviour.  If a religious law will either cause the 
undermining of the sovereign authority or breach the law of equity, the sovereign should 
refrain from making such an “unnecessary law”.  The silence that results from that religious 
behaviour not being legislated corresponds to a liberty of subjects.  The sovereign, therefore, 
does not grant the liberty; more precisely, the sovereign does not deny the liberty.   
Recall, moreover, that Hobbes seems mainly concerned with those laws that will force 
a subject to choose between obedience to God and obedience to the sovereign.  If the 
sovereign were to not make such a law, therefore, the freedom not denied is the liberty not to 
do something, not the liberty to do something.  That is, the sovereign is being tolerant of 
religious behaviour insofar as the sovereign is not enforcing some particular religious 
behaviour.  What the sovereign does not enforce or legislate corresponds to a liberty for 
subjects.  For instance, rather than forcing the ‘Mahomedan’ into a Christian divine service, 
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the sovereign would not force any one into a Christian divine service.  This corresponds to 
granting subjects the liberty to choose to attend a Christian divine service or to not attend.  
Hobbes at the very least, therefore, advises the sovereign to refrain from making religious laws 
which would result in the sovereign having to be intolerant of those who will likely choose to 
be defiant in accordance with their consciences.  It is, therefore, entirely a provisional, 
prudential measure, yet when it is enacted, or more precisely when the sovereign refrains from 
legislating, subjects find themselves with expressive religious freedom. 
In conclusion, the result of this scenario, Hobbes adds, is akin to the modus vivendi of 
the early Christians, and is likewise suitable for a Christian commonwealth: “And so we are 
reduced to the independency of the primitive Christians, to follow Paul, or Cephas, or 
Appolos, every man as he liketh best.  Which, if it be without contention, and without 
measuring the doctrine of Christ by our affection to the person of his minister ... , is perhaps 
the best” (L, 482). 
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Chapter 5 
The ambivalent Leviathan 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 In the following three chapters, my attention will turn to Hobbes’s theory of 
sovereignty as one intended to ensure not only the effective maintenance of civil peace, but 
also the ability of the sovereign to defend the commonwealth.  With very few exceptions, 
nearly all of the interpreters of Hobbes with which I have been concerned so far focus almost 
exclusively on Hobbes’s system as one designed to ensure civil peace. Very few interpreters, 
however, have problematised or discussed at any length the sovereign’s other purpose: 
defence. I wish to contend that the debate in the literature regarding the extent of Hobbes’s 
absolutism is incomplete, and is so because of a general and pervasive under-emphasis of 
defence as a crucial aspect of sovereignty’s mandate to ensure salus populi.  By 
overemphasising civil peace as effectively being the sole purpose of sovereignty, both sides of 
the general debate—both Hobbes-as-absolutists and Hobbes-as-liberal-absolutists—seek to 
determine which one general strategy of the two (absolutism or liberal-absolutism) Hobbes 
prescribed to procure the sole end, i.e. civil peace.  However, there are two necessary ends 
inherent in Hobbes’s understanding of salus populi, and it has yet to be fully considered how 
the requirements of defence interact, and counteract, with the requirements of civil peace. 
 My starting point in doing so is Hobbes’s description of power.  Generally speaking, 
claims that Hobbes’s sovereign is absolute refer to his sovereign’s absolute authority, and 
those interpreters who focus on the juridical aspects of Hobbes’s thought use the word ‘power’ 
in a juridical sense: the sovereign is in power, in possession of authority. The juridical debate, 
recall from Chapter One, revolves around either (i) sovereignty as an institution which, if it is 
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admitted to be the sole source of positive law, is unlimited in what it can legislate and 
command; or (ii) sovereignty as an institution which may be limited by its accountability to 
subjects and/or the resistance rights of its subjects.   
And as the right of possession is called dominion, the right of doing any action 
is called AUTHORITY.  So that by authority, is always understood a right of 
doing any act; and done by authority, done by commission, or license, from 
him whose right it is (L, 102). 
However, it should not be ignored that Hobbes also uses the term ‘power’ in the sense 
of ‘ability’:  
The power of a man (to take it universally) is his present means to obtain some 
future apparent good … (L, 50). 
Most interpreters, because they choose to focus on juridical aspects, use the term 
‘power’ in the juridical sense to refer to an institution, or a body authorised to exercise power. 
In the following discussion, however, I will be referring not to the juridical meaning of power 
but rather to the other demonstrable meaning that Hobbes ascribed to the word.  
I will also differentiate at some length between two types of power the sovereign must 
exercise and which appear in all three of Hobbes’s major works of political philosophy: 
Elements, De Cive and Leviathan.  These two types of power, I will argue, is the source of 
ambivalence in Hobbes’s system between that which is required for the maintenance of civil 
peace and that which is required for the defence of the commonwealth.  In terms of civil 
peace, and as I have thus far only alluded to, Hobbes describes sovereign power as playing a 
necessary and complimentary role to authority.  As I have argued, the primary cause of civil 
strife is competing claims to authority, the failure to recognise a single authority and, 
ultimately, the confusion amongst subjects concerning whom they are ultimately obliged to 
obey.  The primary obstacle to civil peace, therefore, is the lack of a final arbiter whom 
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subjects are obliged to obey.  The role of sovereign power in this, as I will demonstrate, is to 
enforce sovereign commands and compel obedience.  Sovereign power is distinct from 
authority, yet is necessary to ensure the recognition of, and obedience to, sovereign authority.   
The exercise of sovereign power is intended to ensure civil peace, and authorised to be used at 
the discretion of the sovereign to that effect.   
On the other hand, and as I will argue, power’s role in defence is described in entirely 
different terms.  In order to defend the commonwealth, the sovereign requires the concerted 
action of its subjects and, therefore, requires the ability to govern its subjects according to its 
commands.   Hobbes, more precisely, describes the sovereign’s exercise of instrumental power 
according to three conceptual schemes: it is conceived of (i) as needing to be generated; (ii) in 
terms of its intended exercise; and (iii) as authorized to be exercised by the sovereign.   
I will also lay emphasis on the sovereign’s exercise of instrumental power as having 
two intended purposes: its primary purpose is to effectively defend the commonwealth; its 
secondary purpose is to prevent the internal, domestic conflict that can arise from 
uncoordinated attempts to defend the commonwealth.  The notice of this secondary purpose is 
quite significant, because it indicates Hobbes’s acknowledgment that the generation and use of 
instrumental power can disrupt the conditions of civil peace.  This warrants the close attention 
I will pay in Chapter Seven to the particular ways in which Hobbes thought it may do so, as 
well as what, if any, limits to its exercise Hobbes considered. 
 
5.2 The exercise of two types of power 
Hobbes expressly contends that the means to secure civil peace and defence does not 
merely require the recognition that the sovereign possesses authority; it also does not merely 
require the recognition that the sovereign possesses the authority to be the ultimate judge of 
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matters concerning peace and defence; nor does it merely require the recognition that the 
sovereign possesses the authority to exercise power according to his judgement.  The striving 
for peace and the capability of defence also, necessarily, requires the exercise of power itself.   
“For seeing the sovereign is charged with the end, which is the common peace and defence, he 
is understood to have power to use such means as he shall think most fit for his discharge” (L, 
115).  Of acute and demonstrable concern to Hobbes was that the regulation of behaviour be 
practically effective, yet the mere recognition of authority, while necessary, is insufficient; 
sovereign power must be used. 
However—and this in particular is what is most novel about my interpretation—
Hobbes describes two distinct types of sovereign power, distinguishable by (i) the ends to 
which they are the means, (ii) their direction, and most consequentially (iii) their effect on 
subjects.  My main claim in this section is that Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty describes the 
exercise of two types of power: one of which secures peace amongst subjects within the 
sovereign’s jurisdiction, and the other which constructs and utilises potential publica, and thus 
represents the outward force of the commonwealth.  On the one hand, sovereigns must force 
subjects to submit, or yield, to sovereign power; on the other hand, the sovereign must be able 
to utilise the power of his subjects and govern them, or act through them.  The exercise of 
sovereign power must be twofold.   
In all three of Hobbes’s major works of political philosophy, these two distinct 
descriptions of sovereign power are discernable, differentiable by their effect on subjects.  To 
be subject to sovereign power is to be subject to two different expressions of power: one 
which the subject submits to, another which the subject is governed by.   
The first description of sovereign power is natural power, and its effect on subjects is 
what I refer to as submission.  Submission entails a conception of power in which power is 
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exerted on some thing.  In Leviathan it is described as follows: “Natural power is the 
eminence of the faculties of body or mind, as extraordinary strength, form, prudence, arts, 
eloquence, liberality, nobility” (L, 50).  What distinguishes it from its counterpart, 
instrumental power, is not only that it represents one’s “... present means to obtain some future 
apparent good” (L, 50), but rather its conditionality: it is described by Hobbes as zero-sum; 
“… the power of one man resisteth and hindereth the effects of the power of another power 
simply is no more, but the excess of the power of one above that of another.  For equal powers 
opposed, destroy one another …” (Elements, XIII, 4).   
Since the use of one’s power is only prevented by another’s use of their power, it 
suggests that the power to attain some thing necessitates freedom from an opposing power.  To 
exercise power freely under this conception, therefore, requires an absence of obstacles.   In 
other words, the condition in which one is free to exercise their power is an environment free 
of opposing powers.  
This freedom is what submission affords: the sovereign is free to exercise his power 
because his subjects are not free to exercise theirs.  The effect of submission is such that it 
eliminates obstacles to the sovereign’s exercise of his power.  Submission to the sovereign is 
to “… lay by or relinquish [one’s] own right of resisting him …” (Elements, XIX, 10).  
Submission requires subjects to yield to sovereign power and to refrain from counteracting the 
exercise of it. 
Hobbes explains divesting one’s natural right in these terms:   
When a man divesteth and putteth from himself his right, he either simply 
relinquisheth it, or transferreth the same to another man.  To RELINQUISH it, 
is by sufficient signs to declare, that it is his will no more to do that action, 
which of right he might have done before.  To TRANSFER right to another, is 
by sufficient signs to declare to that other accepting thereof, that it is his will 
not to resist, or hinder him, according to that right he had thereto before he 
transferred it ... And therefore all that a man doth in transferring of right, is no 
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more but a declaring of the will, to suffer him, to whom he hath so transferred 
his right, to make benefit of the same, without molestation (Elements, 15, 3). 
Hobbes here describes both relinquishing and transferring one’s right as yielding to, 
non-resistance to, and as non-hindrance with, another’s exercise of that right.  In De Cive, 
Hobbes describes this as “To have done this simply means ... that he has given up his right to 
resist” (74) and in so doing “... he cannot use his strength against him” (81). 
Sovereign power is described in starkly different terms as well, however:   
It is useless for men to keep peace amongst themselves, if they cannot protect 
themselves against outsiders; and it is impossible to defend themselves if their 
strength is not united.  It is therefore necessary to the preservation of 
individuals that there be some one Assembly or one man who has the right 
arm, muster and unite, on each occasion of danger or opportunity, as many 
citizens as the common defence shall require ... Both swords, therefore, the 
Sword of war and the Sword of justice are inherent in sovereign power, 
essentially and from the very nature of a commonwealth (De Cive, 78-9). 
I will refer to this second description of power as instrumental power, and its effect on 
subjects I will refer to as governance.  The power of “the sword of war”, or potential publica, 
is conceptualised by Hobbes as power through.  According to Hobbes the sovereign has “… 
the right to Use the forces of every particular member” (Elements, 20, 12) because “… sure 
and irresistible power gives the right of ruling and commanding those who cannot resist” (De 
Cive, I, 14).  The end of the exercise of this power is not, like submission, to prevent obstacles 
to the use of one’s power by eliminating the freedom of others, but rather to use the power of 
others, or to govern them.  Subjects of sovereign power are, on the one hand, subjected to its 
power for the sake of peace amongst those subject to it, and on the other hand, are constitutive 
of that power and subject to its control for the sake of defence from those not subject to it.  
Potential publica is what Hobbes describes as an instrumental power, powers which “... are 
means and instruments to acquire more, as riches, reputation, friends, and the secret working 
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of God, which men call good luck” (L, 50).   
Interestingly, he does, at one point, conflate submission and governance:  
This submission of all their wills to the will of one man or of one Assembly 
comes about, when each of them obligates himself, by an Agreement with 
each of the rest, not to resist the will of the man or Assembly to which he has 
submitted himself; that is, not to withhold the use of his wealth and strength 
against any other men than himself ... This is called UNION (De Cive, 72).   
Notice here Hobbes equates not to resist with not to withhold use.  They are 
nevertheless starkly different and this instance of conflation is an exception, not the rule.   
Hobbes’s distinction between two causes of subjection further clarifies this:  
... those who subject themselves to another through fear either submit to the 
person they fear or submit to some other whom they trust for protection.  Men 
defeated in war do the first to avoid being killed; the latter is the way the 
undefeated avoid defeat (De Cive, 74). 
The attaining to this sovereign power is by two ways.  One, by natural force, 
as when a man maketh his children to submit themselves and their children to 
his government, as being able to destroy them if they refuse, or by war 
subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that condition.  
The other is when men agree amongst themselves to submit to some man, or 
assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all 
others.  This latter may be called a political commonwealth, or commonwealth 
by institution, and the former, a commonwealth by acquisition (L, 109-10). 
... the right of all sovereigns is derived originally from the consent of every 
one of those that are to be governed, whether they that choose him do it for 
their common defence against an enemy (as when they agree amongst 
themselves to appoint a man, or an assembly of men to protect them), or 
whether they do it to save their lives, by submission to a conquering enemy (L, 
391). 
 The distinction is evident: Hobbes insists that those who benefit from being governed 
must nevertheless submit.  Those who benefit from submission must nevertheless be 
governed.  The two co-exist in a commonwealth but are not indistinct. 
Sovereigns therefore exercise both natural and instrumental power to distinct ends and 
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to different effect: on the one hand, sovereign power forces subjects to yield in the face of it, 
thereby preventing the use of their own natural power towards their own ends, which would 
otherwise frustrate the sovereign’s exercise of its power.  On the other hand, those natural 
powers of subjects become instrumental to the sovereign’s purposes; a sovereign uses the 
natural powers of its subjects as instruments:  “The greatest of human powers is that which is 
compounded of the powers of most men, united by consent in one person, natural or civil, that 
has the use of all their powers depending on his will, such as is the power of a commonwealth 
... ” (L, 50). 
The implications of distinguishing between two distinctly different ends of sovereign 
power are wide reaching and pervasive throughout Hobbes’s main works.   First, the two ends 
for which sovereign power is exercised lead to two very different consequences. Submitting 
requires no action on the part of subjects, whereas to be governed is to be used to perform 
actions.  Submission—conceived of in terms of power—does not prescribe nor determine 
subjects’ performances in any way; it merely prevents subjects from acting in a way which is 
obstructive or counteractive.  The sovereign’s exercise of natural power, then, can be said in 
general to cause subjects to refrain from acting in ways that would counteract the sovereign, 
and in particular to back up commands directed at subjects to refrain from particular actions.  
The success of a sovereign command requiring subjects to refrain from acting in a certain way, 
in other words, requires the exercise of natural power.    
Governance, however, by its very definition determines subjects’ performances.  The 
sovereign’s exercise of instrumental power can be said to require and compel subjects to 
perform commanded actions.  The realization of a command to perform a particular action, 
therefore, requires effective governance.  Simply put, sovereign power has two ends, and has 
two effects: submission entails the prevention of subjects’ action, whereas governance requires 
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subjects’ action.   
 Subjects’ mere recognition and acceptance of sovereign authority, therefore, is thought 
by Hobbes to be insufficient for the attainment of civil peace and the defence of the 
commonwealth; sovereign power must also be effectively employed.  Civil peace requires that 
subjects’ submit, which requires that they (i) recognise the sovereign’s authority (as discussed 
in Chapter three) and (ii) are prevented from acting in ways contrary to peace by being subject 
to the sovereign’s exercise of natural power.  This submission ensures a condition in which 
their conduct does not counteract the peace amongst each other.  Defence, however, requires 
that subjects be governed, which requires (i) also that they recognise the sovereign’s authority, 
but (ii) contribute to the sovereign’s exercise of instrumental power, and allow themselves to 
be governed.  
Importantly, these two different (and as I will demonstrate, opposing) concepts of 
subjection create a pervasive ambivalence: how can subjects’ performances be conceived of as 
being prevented but simultaneously determined?228  Moreover, does Hobbes’s system 
privilege one conception of agency over the other? It would appear that the answer to this 
second question is yes; since the sovereign’s exercise of instrumental power is dependent on 
the contribution of subjects, this practically hinders the sovereign’s ability to exercise that 
power229.  As I have also argued, the pursuit of civil peace must tolerate individuality and 
                                                
 
228 This question occasions the focus of Chapter Six, in which I will discuss the ambivalence in Hobbes’s system 
between submission and governance, as manifested in subjects on a moral-psychological level, and which, I will 
argue, counteract each other. 
 
229 I will address this in Chapter six, and present an argument which calls into serious question what Schmitt, 
Oakeshott, Strauss and Tuck assert: that because the exercise of the sovereign’s instrumental power is dependent 
on the contribution of subjects, the ability of the sovereign to defend the commonwealth is cripplingly limited.  I 
will add, however, that although yes, the contribution of subjects is required, Hobbes does describes the means to 
generate instrumental power, and because of this, it is unnecessarily presumptive to assume that Hobbes’s 
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freedom where to be intolerant of it would lead to civil discord.  However, I will argue that the 
necessity of defence and the requirement to govern impose severely on the freedom that 
Hobbes otherwise thinks necessary to accommodate for the sake of civil peace.   This is the 
source of the ambivalence in Hobbes, and it is required for one apparent reason: Hobbes 
acknowledges that defence of the commonwealth from foreign nations is desirable and 
essential, and his sovereign requires the means—instrumental power and the contribution of 
subjects—to defend it effectively. 
 
5.3 Derivations of sovereign power 
The sovereign’s exercise of instrumental power, which I will focus on in this section, is 
depicted according to three conceptual schemes: it is conceived of (i) as needing to be 
generated; (ii) in terms of its exercise as being prescribed, intended and warranted; and (iii) as 
being authorized to be exercised by the sovereign.  
Hobbes first describes why a subject would submit to the sovereign’s exercise of 
natural power:  
The end for which one man giveth up, and relinquisheth to another, or others, 
the right of protecting and defending himself by his own power, is the security 
which he expecteth thereby, of protection and defence from those to whom he 
doth so relinquish it. And a man may then account himself in the estate of 
security, when he can foresee no violence to be done unto him, from which the 
doer may not be deterred by the power of that sovereign, to whom they have 
every one subjected themselves; and without that security there is no reason 
for a man to deprive himself of his own advantages, and make himself a prey 
to others (Elements, 20, 5). 
Personal security, therefore, provides the motivation to submit and is partly the answer 
as to why one would subject oneself to sovereign power.  In return, that promise of security 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
sovereign is unable to generate it. 
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requires one to not hinder or resist the sovereign’s exercise of power.   
Security must be assured, however, from not only one threat but two: that of other 
individuals, and that of other groups.  While submission to sovereign power affords security 
from the threat of other individuals, submission alone is insufficient to protect individuals 
from the threat of other groups.   
At first it is evident: that the mutual aid of two or three men is of very little 
security; for the odds on the other side, of a man or two, giveth sufficient 
encouragement to an assault.  And therefore before men have sufficient 
security in the help of one another, their number must be so great, that the 
odds of a few which the enemy may have, be no certain and sensible 
advantage (Elements, 19, 3; see also De Cive, 70, Leviathan, 107). 
Sufficient numbers to defend oneself through mutual aid, however, is still insufficient:  
And supposing how great a number soever of men assembled together for their 
mutual defence, yet shall not the effect follow, unless they all direct their 
actions to one and the same end; which direction to one and the same end is 
that which is called consent.  This consent (or concord) amongst so many men, 
though it may be made by the fear of a present invader, or by the hope of a 
present conquest, or booty; and endure as long as that action endureth; 
nevertheless, by the diversity of judgments and passions in so many men 
contending naturally for honour and advantage one above another: it is 
impossible, not only that their consent to aid each other against an enemy, but 
also that the peace should last between themselves, without some mutual and 
common fear to rule them (Elements, 19, 4; see also De Cive, 70, Leviathan, 
107). 
 Here Hobbes is not merely advocating the need for potential publica to be generated, 
but he is also clearly stressing the importance and necessity of effectively exercising it.  
Submission, or simply yielding to the sovereign’s right to exercise its power, is insufficient for 
common defence; a further requirement is concord, or “the concurrence of many men’s wills 
to one action” (Elements, 19, 5).   
Hobbes also adds that in order to be exercised effectively, potential publica must be 
exercised exclusively by the sovereign:   
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It remaineth therefore still that consent (by which I understand the 
concurrence of many men’s wills to one action) is not sufficient security for 
their common peace, without the erection of some common power, by the fear 
whereof they may be compelled both to keep the peace amongst themselves, 
and to join their strengths together, against a common enemy (Elements, 19, 
6). 
 A union, or that which possesses potential publica, is described by Hobbes not as 
subjects merely submitting to the exercise of a sovereign’s power, merely laying by or 
relinquishing one’s “own right of resisting him to whom he so transferreth it” (Elements, 19, 
10), but rather each subjects’ power contributing to potential publica and being used or 
governed by the sovereign:  
... when a man covenanteth to subject his will to the command of another, he 
obligeth himself to this, that he resign his strength and means to him, whom he 
covenanteth to obey; and hereby, he that is to command may by the use of all 
their means and strength, be able by the terror thereof, to frame the will of 
them all to unity and concord amongst themselves (Elements, 19, 7; see also 
De Cive, 72).   
Potential publica therefore serves a dual purpose: first it is intended to ensure that 
mutual aid is effective for the adequate defence of the commonwealth; secondly, it also serves 
to be a sufficient threat to maintain, reinforce and entrench concord, thereby ensuring “the 
concurrence of many men’s wills to one action”.    
In view of this, it prompts the question: what is potential publica ultimately necessary 
for?  The following passages, one from each of his major works, suggest quite plainly that 
concord is ultimately required for defence: 
And seeing mutual aid is necessary for defence, as mutual fear is necessary for 
peace; we are to consider how great aids are required for such defence, and for 
the causing of such mutual fear, as men may not easily adventure on one 
another (Elements, 19, 3). 
... however many come together in a coalition for defence, nothing will be 
gained if they fail to agree on the best way of doing it, and each one uses his 
resources in his own fashion.  The reason is that, having conflicting ideas, they 
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will obstruct each other, or if in the expectation of victory or booty or revenge, 
they do achieve sufficient agreement for an action, they will still be so divided 
afterwards by differences of purpose and policy or by envy and rivalry (natural 
causes of conflict), that they will refuse to help each other or to keep peace 
among themselves, unless compelled to do so by a common fear (De Cive, 
70). 
And be there never so great a multitude, yet if their actions be directed 
according to their particular judgments and particular appetites, they can 
expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a common enemy, 
nor against the injuries of one another.  For being distracted in opinions 
concerning the best use and application of their strength, they do not help, but 
hinder one another, and reduce their strength by mutual opposition to nothing; 
whereby they are easily, not only subdued by a very few that agree together, 
but also when there is no common enemy, they make war upon each other, for 
their particular interests.  For if we could suppose a great multitude of men to 
consent in the observation of justice and other laws of nature without a 
common power to keep them all in awe, we might as well suppose all mankind 
to do the same; and then there neither would be, nor need to be, any civil 
government or commonwealth at all, because there would be peace without 
subjection (Leviathan, 107). 
What becomes apparent in each of the above passages is that concord is ultimately 
required for its ability to bring efficiency to potential publica. Concord also, however, 
prevents the internecine, civil conflict that uncoordinated potential publica could unleash. 
Concord is primarily required to effectively defend the commonwealth, and the commonwealth 
could dissolve into internecine conflict when forced to defend itself were that concord not 
present.  
Notice, however, that while both concord and potential publica are described as being 
necessary to ensure both defence and civil peace, they are not both described as being 
generated for the sake of defence.  That is, potential publica is not described as being formed, 
produced or generated for both purposes; i.e. it is not described as being generated to ensure 
civil peace, but rather defence alone.  By itself, independent of concord, it is described as 
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actually posing a threat to civil peace.230 
Concord, on the other hand, is described as both controlling and directing potential 
publica to good effect for the sake of defence, and in so doing, that control and direction also 
mitigates the potential for internecine conflict. 
Accordingly, (i) Hobbes grants his sovereign the right to exercise instrumental power 
because not having that right would render his commonwealth defenceless; and (ii) Hobbes 
grants his sovereign the right to exercise instrumental power because without a single source 
of commands there could be no concord, without which, the means of defence could be 
disruptive of civil peace.   
 
5.4 ‘Authorized’ vs. ‘intended’ exercise of instrumental power 
 At this point, it has hopefully been made clear that Hobbes authorizes the sovereign’s 
exercise of instrumental power due to its necessity, its practicability, and its effectiveness in 
relation to defence.  Moreover, it is apparent that Hobbes authorized the sovereign to do so 
because only he can bring concord, thereby coordinating potential publica to effectively meet 
its intended purpose. 
 However, while this is clear, what is also clear is that Hobbes’s sovereign is authorized 
to exercise its instrumental power to whatever ends it deems fit, and therefore is authorized to 
exercise it beyond its intended purpose.  The authorized exercise of sovereign power appears 
to denote that any exercise of it is permitted.    
And because the end of this institution is the peace and defence of them all, 
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and whosoever has right to the end has right to the means, it belongeth of right 
to whatsoever man or assembly that hath the sovereignty, to be judge both of 
the means of peace and defence, and also of the hindrances and disturbances 
of the same, and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both 
beforehand (for the preserving of peace and security, by prevention of discord 
at home and hostility from abroad) and, when peace and security are lost, for 
the recovery of the same (L, 113). 
For seeing the sovereign is charged with the end, which is the common peace 
and defence, he is understood to have power to use such means as he shall 
think most fit for his discharge (L, 115). 
In the following passage, Hobbes succinctly encapsulates the above:   
And forasmuch as they who are amongst themselves in security, by the means 
of this sword of justice that keeps them all in awe, are nevertheless in danger 
of enemies from without; if there be not some means found, to unite their 
strengths and natural forces in the resistance of such enemies, their peace 
amongst themselves is but in vain.  And therefore it is to be understood as a 
covenant of every member to contribute their several forces for the defence of 
the whole; whereby to make one power as sufficient, as is possible, for their 
defence.  Now seeing that every man hath already transferred the use of his 
strength to him or them, that have the sword of justice; it followeth that the 
power of defence, that is to say the sword of war, be in the same hands 
wherein is the sword of justice: and consequently those two swords are but 
one, and that inseparably and essentially annexed to the sovereign power 
(Elements, 20, 8). 
What was originally described as the practicable means by which to defend the 
commonwealth is now thereby freed from the pursuit of any particular ends. What is left is 
the means—instrumental power—not constrained to any ends.  It certainly has an intended 
purpose, yet the sovereign is authorised to use it at his discretion.  Hobbes here is seemingly 
divorcing the purposeful, intended, specified use of sovereign power from being the basis for 
its right or authority to be exercised by the sovereign. It appears that Hobbes’s ultimate 
concern in regards to defence—his sovereign’s ability to effectively exercise sovereign 
instrumental power—trumps the justifiable use of it, or any principle the exercise of it can be 
held account to. Recall Plamenatz’s argument in support of Hobbesian absolutism in terms of 
  
166 
civil peace:  “If there is more than one maker and enforcer of law, there cannot be real 
security,” and the sovereign must not be obeyed “only on condition that he governs according 
to such and such principles”.231  In much the same manner, for defence to be effective, 
potential publica must be harnessed and steered, which requires concord; and concord, 
ultimately, requires that there be only one source of command. 
The sovereign’s exercise of instrumental power is therefore akin to the possession of a 
hammer: its intended purpose is to hit nails and it therefore may be said to inherently possess a 
suggested or recommended limit to its use, yet neither its perceived usefulness nor its actual 
use may be limited to that purpose.  The sovereign is not just authorised to use the power to do 
X, he is simply authorised to use the power.  The other side of this coin, however, is that the 
sovereign is not required to use it to procure any particular end besides defence and civil 
peace.  Although the sovereign is not required to use it for anything other than its intended 
purpose, any use beyond its intended purpose is for the sovereign alone to decide.    
Hobbes, knowingly or not, appears to be heeding Francisco de Vitoria’s advice that “A 
prince is not able and ought not always to render reasons for the war to his subjects, and if the 
subjects cannot serve in the war except they are first satisfied of its justice, the state would fall 
into grave peril”232.  
This is not to say, however, that there are no potential limits to what the sovereign may 
exercise his instrumental power for, and moreover, how that would consequently affect a 
Hobbesian sovereign’s relationship with foreign nations. However, to repeat what I 
emphasized in the Introduction, in this thesis I am limiting my concern to the ambivalence 
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within Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty, between that which is required for civil peace and that 
which is required for defence, and whether there are any limits imposed—by the sovereign’s 
obligation to endeavour for civil, domestic peace—on the sovereign’s intended exercise of 
instrumental power.233   
To that end and within that scope, Hobbes’s insistence that the sovereign’s right to 
exercise instrumental power ensures concord has a very interesting implication: while concord 
is primarily necessary for defence, it also prevents the potential civil discord arising from the 
lack of such concord.  This clearly represents an acknowledgment on the part of Hobbes that 
the defence of the commonwealth may disrupt civil peace, and this is what I intend to focus on 
in the following two chapters.  The purpose for which Hobbes grants his sovereign the 
authority to exercise instrumental power is not simply to defend the commonwealth from 
foreign nations; it is also intended to protect the internal stability of his commonwealth while 
either defending or being prepared to defend against foreign nations.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 Suggesting that Hobbes conceives of sovereign power in two distinct ways for two 
different purposes—natural power intended to be exercised to effect civil peace, and 
instrumental power to be exercised primarily to effectively defend the commonwealth— 
implies an ambivalence in Hobbes’s system between that which is required for civil peace, and 
that which is required for defence. The ambivalence become apparent and occasions the focus 
of Chapter Six, where I will expand on the implications apparent in Hobbes’s description of 
these two on a moral-psychological level. The effect of natural power (submission) and the 
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effect of instrumental power (governance), I will argue, counteract one another. 
 The arguments of this chapter also suggested that Hobbes’s description of the purpose 
of the sovereign’s exercise of instrumental power is not defence alone; it has a secondary 
purpose, which is to prevent the potential civil disorder which the defence of the 
commonwealth may cause if it is not coordinated.  This is very significant, I think, for it 
represents an acknowledgment by Hobbes that both generating and exercising instrumental 
power may be disruptive of the conditions of civil peace.  In Chapter Seven, I will discuss in 
more detail and in particular how Hobbes perceived that the generation and exercise of 
instrumental power may upset civil peace, and present an argument that the limits to the 
authorised exercise of instrumental power are a result of the sovereign’s obligation to maintain 
civil peace, and not primarily, as others have argued, as a result of subjects’ rights to refuse 
their contribution. 
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Chapter 6 
The moral psychology of generating potential publica 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, in addition to arguing that the sovereign has the authority to exercise 
instrumental power, I will demonstrate that Hobbes describes the means by which to generate 
that power.  Recall that I have briefly differentiated between authority and the non-juridical 
concept of power in Hobbes, and cited the following definitional passages from Leviathan: 
… the right of doing any action is called AUTHORITY.  So that by authority, 
is always understood a right of doing any act; and done by authority, done by 
commission, or license, from him whose right it is (L, 102). 
The power of a man (to take it universally is his present means to obtain some 
future apparent good …) (L, 50). 
Despite this clear distinction, there have been a few interpreters who have conflated the 
terms, such as C. E. Vaughn who argues that Hobbes’s sovereign is absolute in the sense of 
sole and total control over subjects’ actions; others, such as Wolin and Tarlton, do not conflate 
the terms, but nevertheless see the absolute authority of Hobbes’s sovereign as a necessary 
condition for the desired achievement of absolute power.  We now have the terminology to 
better describe this: Vaughn, Wolin and Tarlton describe Hobbes’s sovereign as having or 
approaching absolute instrumental power.   
In what is probably the most explicit version of this argument, C. E. Vaughn claims 
that Hobbes’s “… government thus set up must have absolute power, or sovereignty, over the 
actions of the governed; and the latter, by their own act, have lost not only the power, but even 
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the right, to question or resist”234.  Or, restated:  “After running over the ‘twelve points’ of 
sovereignty—they may all be summed up in the one phrase, power arbitrary and unlimited 
…”235.  ‘Power’ is certainly not used in the sense of ‘institution’ here, but rather in the sense of 
‘control’.   Here we have a definition of ‘absolute’ sovereignty that includes the sole and total 
control over subjects’ actions.236  
Sheldon Wolin holds a similar but subtly different view.  His argument is that 
Hobbes’s system is one which represents a ‘culture of despotism’, which he defines as a 
project which attempts to create “… a social mentality and practice that enables power to 
operate unhindered”237.  Wolin, however, makes a distinction that Vaughn’s argument 
downplays.  While he characterises Hobbes’s system as attempting to create a culture of 
despotism, he acknowledges that his ‘absolute’ sovereign has absolute authority, which is not 
the same as, but is a necessary condition for, absolute power: “Although absolutism is the 
necessary condition for the maximization of power, it is not sufficient by itself”238.  While not 
conflating the two terms ‘authority’ and ‘power’, Wolin nevertheless sees the absolute 
authority of Hobbes’s sovereign as a necessary condition for the achievement of the desired 
end: absolute power. 
Following Wolin in this regard is Charles D Tarlton, a stimulating interpreter of 
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Hobbes whose work has been regretfully overlooked by most contemporary Hobbes 
scholars239.  Arguing that Hobbes advances a ‘despotical doctrine’, he states that “… for 
Hobbes, viable government always and necessarily constituted a system of absolute, arbitrary 
and unlimited political power”240.  Like Wolin, Tarlton suggests that Hobbes’s absolutism is 
not limited to authoritarianism, but rather extends to power, and he is well aware of, and 
combative towards, the notion that Hobbes argued for “a jurally absolute but practically 
limited rule”241.  He makes three overarching claims, all of which refer to absolutism as 
absolute power:   
First, Hobbes’s theory explicitly and repeatedly granted an absolute and 
unaccountable magnitude of power to his sovereign.  Second, the underlying 
character of that sovereign’s power was utterly arbitrary.  Third, not only was 
it an absolute, arbitrary and unaccountable power that Hobbes created, but it 
was at the same time intended to be exercised by a ‘Hobbesian man’242.   
This interpretation, however, has been largely overshadowed by a far more influential 
one—made most compellingly by Michael Oakeshott—that is, on the surface, rather straight-
forward: the exercise of Hobbesian sovereign power is limited by the contribution of subjects, 
upon which it entirely depends.  
Hobbes’s system, according to Oakeshott, is one which limits the use of sovereign 
power because that power is conditional on subjects’ contribution to it; subjects must use their 
natural power as a contribution to the pursuit of a common object of will.    The sovereign’s 
exercise of power, to put it simply, is conditional on subjects’ compliance.   It also thereby 
protects individual freedoms for the simple practical reason that subjects can refuse to 
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contribute their power to the pursuit of a common object of will.  The essence of Oakeshott’s 
interpretation is:  “It is precisely because authority relationships are not tied to a conception of 
the common good, stand on no extrinsic end, that they circumscribe the use of power and 
protect individual freedom”243. 
Concerning power, as Ian Tregenza notes,  
One of the implications of the distinction between transactional and practice-
based association is to divorce authority from power.  He rejects the view …. 
that authority is simply legitimized power.  For Oakeshott authority and power 
are distinct.  Rules are not considered legitimate and therefore subscribed to 
because to do otherwise results in punishment, rather, they oblige solely by 
virtue of their acknowledged authenticity.  Power on the other hand is the 
coercive apparatus employed by the authoritative office to ensure compliance.  
Power backs up authority but in no way is it identical to it.244 
As Tregenza also perceptively notes, however, “The only way a Sovereign’s authority 
can become effective is if a sufficiently large number of individuals are inclined to subscribe 
to the terms of the contract: ‘for the Sovereign’s power is only the counterpart of his subjects’ 
disposition to obey (RP 347)’ ... Despite being juridically absolute the Sovereign’s practical 
ability to govern is in fact potentially very weak”245.   
As Stephen Gerencser observes, however, Oakeshott barely mentions power:    
Oakeshott’s only significant comment on power is when he notes that the 
founding institution “is a covenant not merely to transfer a right ... but to be 
continuously active in supplying the power required to exercise it—for the 
Office can have no resources of its own”.  Over and over again in Leviathan 
Hobbes maintains that it is power that ensures that promises are kept, contracts 
are maintained, and covenants are valid ... For Oakeshott’s purposes, however, 
the importance of Leviathan is not that it is a consideration of power, but that 
it is a reflection upon what exercises of power by whom are authoritative.   In 
any event, while Hobbes writes often not only of the authority of the 
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sovereign, but also of the significance of its power, Oakeshott passes by this 
latter dimension of Hobbes’s argument.246 
Note too that this conceives of sovereign power as only natural power; Oakeshott does 
not discuss the exercise of instrumental power.  Oakeshott’s account, by overlooking or 
ignoring instrumental power, would render Hobbes’s sovereign so weak that the sovereign 
would be effectively unable to defend the commonwealth.   
Oakeshott writes,  
... there was no lust for government in Hobbes: the Leviathan, he thought, 
must be omnipotent, but he never imagined it omnicompetent.  Intoxication 
with the opportunity which great power gives for doing great things was no 
part of the character of this Leviathan, whose limited but essential office was 
to be guardian of the peace.  It was to operate, not arbitrarily, but by rule of 
law, and whatever was not forbidden was to be allowed.  Supreme power was 
never more narrowly hedged or more finely directed to a special purpose, 
while being left its necessary supremacy unimpaired.247 
For all that I agree with Oakeshott, I disagree with this: that Hobbes’s Leviathan is 
simply the “guardian of the peace”.  Rather, it is also significantly the guarantor of defence 
and, to this end Hobbes’s Leviathan does require “great power”. Oakeshott is right to point out 
that the sovereign’s exercise of instrumental power is dependent on his subjects’ contribution 
to it, but he doesn’t problematise this in the context of defence; rather, he focuses on how this 
dependency confirms that it is a civil association. I will assert in this chapter that one cannot 
presume that Hobbes intended the contribution of subjects to beneficially limit his instrumental 
power.  The reason why will become obvious: in order to defend the commonwealth, 
Hobbes’s sovereign must be able to generate the means to do so, and his description of how 
that may be generated involves the psychological influence of subjects towards collective 
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action.  Rather than interpreting Hobbes’s sovereign as being unable to generate potential 
publica, then, the consequences of being able to must be considered.  
Corresponding to and preceding from this influential argument—that the sovereign’s 
power is dependent upon subjects’ contribution to it—is another: the sovereign is effectively 
unable to generate potential publica because the exercise of his natural power affects subjects 
in a psychological manner which would prevent their use. In short, there has been made a 
general claim that the sovereign’s exercise of power renders the subjects ungovernable.  Recall 
that in Chapters three and four I discussed the practically effective means by which Hobbes 
advises a prudent sovereign to ensure civil peace: a Hobbesian sovereign must be both feared 
and recognised to be the sole person in possession of the right to exercise authority.  I laid 
significant emphasis on the role of fear in Hobbes’s system; I spoke of it not in the context of 
the establishment of a commonwealth, i.e. in the institution or acquisition of a commonwealth, 
but rather specifically in the context of the sovereign’s maintenance of his authority and 
commonwealth.  Recall also that the third law of nature states “men must perform their 
covenants made”, the breach of which is injustice, and “there must be some coercive power to 
compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment 
greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant” (L, 89).  By the authority 
of the sovereign, “he hath the use of so much power and strength conferred on him that by 
terror thereof he is enabled to conform the wills of them all to peace at home ...” (L, 109).  
Importantly, “the end of this institution is the peace and defence of them all” (L, 113).   
Add to this Hobbes’s statements concerning the role of fear in obedience: “Of all 
passions that which inclineth men least to break the laws is fear” (L, 196).  Indeed, fear “is the 
only thing (when there is appearance of profit or pleasure by breaking the laws) that makes 
men keep them” (L, 196).  Fear of the sovereign’s power, therefore, is meant to keep subjects 
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to their covenants, or more specifically, to ensure their obedience to the civil laws and their 
sovereign.  
For the laws of nature . . . of themselves, without the terror of some power to 
cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to 
partiality, pride, revenge, and the like.  And covenants without the sword are 
but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.  Therefore 
notwithstanding the laws of nature . . ., if there be no power erected, or not 
great enough for our security, every man will, and may lawfully rely on his 
own strength and art, for caution against all other men (L, 106).   
Hence, it is necessary for the sovereign, through the means of his power and the fear of 
it, to keep his subjects to “the performance of their covenants and observation of those laws of 
nature” (L, 106).  
His authority, moreover, depends upon his ability to do so, since this obedience is 
necessary for peace.  To maintain his authority, therefore, the sovereign must ensure that his 
subjects fear him.  To fulfill his obligation to the natural laws, I argued, the sovereign must 
ensure that his subjects are in continual fear of his power.   
Now, a number of influential interpreters of Hobbes have noticed that the 
recommended and requisite fear of the sovereign’s power is ultimately advocated by Hobbes 
to be the psychological cause of peaceable conduct which is both conducive to civil peace and 
corresponds to a moral psychology that is intended to moralise fear.   This moral 
psychology—best described by Leo Strauss and characterised as the morality of the 
bourgeoisie—is argued to be characterised by Hobbes as generating the ideal disposition 
amongst subjects to effect civil peace. This bourgeois morality and its corresponding political 
psychology was, so the argument goes, proposed by Hobbes as a counter to aristocratic 
virtues, the moral psychology of which was a chief cause of civil strife because it valourised 
self-governance, resistance, and opposition.   
  
176 
This, I will agree, is most certainly accurate.  Hobbes does indeed describe fear of the 
sovereign’s power as generating the necessary disposition amongst subjects that ensures peace 
and obedience.  Moreover, I will argue that the natural power of the sovereign is described by 
Hobbes as the means by which to effect this amenable disposition.  However, the key 
interpreters of this branch—namely Strauss, Oakeshott, Schmitt and marginally Tuck—
assume that the exercise of power—without differentiating between natural and 
instrumental—renders the effective exercise of potential publica impossible.  They correctly 
notice that the sovereign’s power requires the contribution of its subjects, but by 
simultaneously over-emphasising natural power and its effect—submission—they do not 
sufficiently notice nor account for instrumental power and its effect—governance.  They thus 
presume that Hobbes’s sovereign is unable to govern, unable to generate potential publica, 
and ultimately, would be unable to effectively defend the commonwealth.  The generation of 
the disposition amongst subjects to remain peaceful, therefore, is thought to preclude the 
ability to generate the disposition to govern and use subjects for the purpose of defence.  Each 
of these influential interpreters, in one way or another, have understood Hobbes’s political 
system as preventing, or rendering impossible, the exercise of potential publica.   
I will argue, however, that Hobbes does indeed describe the means by which his 
sovereign can effectively generate potential publica. Most importantly, I will argue that the 
psychological means Hobbes describes of generating this—civil honour—require not only that 
the sovereign overcomes the otherwise peaceful disposition of its subjects, but also counteract 
this otherwise peaceful disposition.  The sovereign’s two types of power, in general effect, 
pull his subjects in two opposing directions which create an ambivalence, not only in the 
minds of his subjects, but pervasively throughout Hobbes’s political system as well.   
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6.2 Fear and the moral psychology of submission 
Numerous interpreters, focusing on the moral psychology of Hobbes, have concluded 
that for the sake of civil peace, glory and honour must be removed as both moral and 
psychological sources of volition amongst subjects; amongst these, Leo Strauss and Michael 
Oakeshott stand out for their influence, careful attention to textual detail, and originality.  I 
have argued elsewhere that Oakeshott’s interpretation of Hobbes, particularly in terms of 
Hobbes’s morality, was formed in large measure by both his sympathy for Strauss’s account 
and by his perception of it as the principal rival to his own248.  For my purposes here, however, 
I will describe the similarities and differences between the two in terms of their respective 
interpretations of Hobbes’s moral psychology.  Both, I point out, focus less on finding 
adequate reasons for Hobbes to call something just, then they do on discovering what Hobbes 
believed caused just conduct.  Moreover, both agree that the human conduct Hobbes wished to 
find sufficient cause for is the endeavour for peace.  Both, in other words, focus on and 
generally agree upon what Hobbes identified as the conditions for civil obedience.  
Oakeshott begins his excellent essay The Moral Life in the Writings of Thomas Hobbes 
by claiming “In considering the writings of a moralist the first thing to be ascertained is … the 
understanding he has of the nature of human beings”249.  According to Oakeshott, Hobbes’s 
image of the nature of human beings rests upon two postulates: “the postulate of ‘natural 
appetite’ or passion, and the postulate of ‘natural reason”250.  
Examining Hobbes’s postulate of natural appetite, Oakeshott attributes to him a belief 
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that the characteristic difference between men and animals is “… the competitive nature of 
human appetite and passion: every man wishes to out-do all other men”251.  Hobbes is said to 
assert that “Man, whose Joy consisteth in comparing himself with other men, can relish 
nothing but what is eminent”252.  Oakeshott characterises this postulate as implying that  
… the greatest pleasure of a human being, what most of all stimulates the vital 
movement of his heart, is the consciousness of his own power; the spring of 
his natural appetite is not what the present world offers him, but his desire for 
precedence, his longing to be first, for glory and to be recognized and 
honoured by other men as pre-eminent.253  
Man, according to Hobbes, is thus fundamentally driven by pride; “His supreme and 
characteristic passion is Pride; he wishes above all else to be convinced of his own 
superiority”254.  So important is this wish to be convinced, that one may—when reality 
threatens to demonstrate otherwise—believe oneself to be superior to others despite all 
evidence to the contrary.  Pride may, therefore, degenerate into vain-glory: “… the mere 
supposition of glory ‘for delight in the consequences of it’’’255.  In so doing, in revelling in a 
false-sense of superiority, one actually “… loses ground in the race for precedence”256. 
Pride has a partner: fear.  They are linked in the thought of Hobbes by the following 
rationale which Oakeshott identifies: “Any creature of imagination engaged in maintaining his 
superiority over others of his kind must be apprehensive of not being able to do so”257.  Fear is 
provoked by the dread resulting from the realisation that one may be denied felicity as a result 
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of “falling behind in the race”258.   This dread reflects the ultimate fear, the fear of death.  It is 
not simply death, however, that human beings fear.  It is much more inextricably coupled with 
pride:  
… the ultimate fear in man is the dread of violent (or untimely) death at the 
hand of another man; for this is dishonour, the emblem of all human failure.  
This is the fear which Hobbes said is the human passion ‘to be reckoned with’; 
its spring is not the mere desire to remain alive in adverse circumstance, nor is 
it a mere aversion from death, least of all from the pain of death; its spring is 
aversion from shameful death.259 
Oakeshott, therefore, understands Hobbes’s postulate of natural appetite as constituting 
a tension between pride and fear.  This tension also defines the ‘ambivalent relationship’ 
between human beings:  
They need one another, for without others there is no precedence, no 
recognition of superiority, no honour, no praise, no notable felicity; 
nevertheless every man is the enemy of every man and is engaged in a 
competition for superiority in which he is unavoidably apprehensive of 
failure.260 
Oakeshott then moves on to examine Hobbes’s second postulate, that of natural reason.  
Reason as Hobbes understood it, according to Oakeshott, “… is generated by the passion of 
fear itself”261.  He explains “… fear of the mischances that may befall him in the race awakens 
man from his dreams of vain-glory (for any belief in continuous superiority is an illusion) and 
forces upon his attention the true precariousness of his situation”262.  One wishes to be 
released permanently from their fear of shameful death; reason suggests the race for 
precedence must be modified:  
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The consequence of natural appetite is pride and fear; the ‘suggestion’ and 
promise of reason is peace.  And peace, the product of the mutual recognition 
of a common enemy (death) is to be achieved only in a condition of common 
subjection to an artificially created sovereign authority …263 
Oakeshott, therefore, views Hobbes as desiring survival above standing first; as he puts 
it, “… proud men must become tame men in order to remain alive”264.  Hobbes is portrayed as 
interpreting human life as a tension between pride and fear—where pride is a passion for 
honour and fear is an apprehension of dishonour—while reason suggests a resolution265.  
Oakeshott’s understanding of Hobbes’s depiction of human nature in this respect is 
virtually parallel to Leo Strauss’s; consider that it is in the first chapter of The Political 
Philosophy of Hobbes that Strauss discusses Hobbes’s conception of human nature—a chapter 
entitled ‘The Moral Basis’.  At the very least, Oakeshott is in concord with Strauss regarding 
the necessity of first ascertaining the role of human nature in the writings of a moralist. 
Not only do they share the same starting point, but both emphasise the same key 
elements of Hobbes’s understanding of human nature.  Strauss similarly summarises human 
life in Hobbes as primarily constituting a tension between pride and fear266; he emphasises the 
element of shame in the fear of death, and he assigns precisely the same origin and task of 
reason that Oakeshott does267. 
More significantly, the two share an important premise: Hobbes sought in human 
nature the existence of, or potential for, psychological characteristics which could be relied 
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upon to cause just behaviour.   Strauss’s depiction culminates in the claim: “… fear is thus 
considered the sufficient motive for all right behaviour …”268  Oakeshott’s focus on causes is 
slightly different, but the same in essence: rather than identifying a definitive account of 
obligation in Hobbes, as does Strauss, Oakeshott sought to explain—without recourse to an 
ultimate reason which would justify obedience—how Hobbes identified the conditions for 
civil obedience.  Oakeshott first settles on Hobbes’s account of morality; not on why one is 
obliged to be moral, but rather on how Hobbes expressed morality, or in other words, what 
Hobbes said to constitute morality.  Oakeshott then pays close attention to Hobbes’s 
distinction between “the sufficient causes for human conduct” and “the reasons which may be 
given in justification of it”.  The “human conduct” which Hobbes wishes to find “sufficient 
cause” for is the endeavour for peace.  The “sufficient cause” Hobbes identifies, according to 
Oakeshott, is the “… fear of shameful death: fear prompts reason and reason discloses what 
must be done to avoid the circumstances which generate fear”269.   
Strauss then argues that by making the fear of violent death the basis for morality, 
Hobbes “… denied the moral value of all virtues which do not contribute to the making of the 
State, to consolidating peace, to protecting men against the danger of violent death, or, more 
exactly expressed, of all virtues which do not proceed from fear of violent death”270.  Because 
of the tension between fear of violent death and pride, Hobbes identifies vanity as “the root of 
all evil”271.  Strauss attributes to Hobbes the belief that because vanity “… hinders man from 
perceiving his true situation”, that is, because pride obscures one’s fear of violent death, pride, 
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and all that is associated with it, is the obstacle to be overcome to ensure men endeavour for 
peace272. 
Strauss summarises:  
As fear is thus considered the sufficient motive for all right behaviour … it is 
impossible to approve any virtues which do not arise from fear, fear of violent 
death, and whose essence consists in the conquest or denial of fear.  Once 
Hobbes has fully elucidated his conception of fear, he cannot but reject 
aristocratic virtue.  For ‘fear’ and ‘honour’ are irreconcilable: ‘fear can hardly 
be made manifest, but by some action dishonourable, that betrayeth the 
conscience of one’s own weakness.’ Honour … is finally directly opposed to 
justice and therefore to virtue in general.273 
The endeavour for peace, which the fear of violent death compels, is viewed by 
Strauss, and rightly so, to exhibit prudence.  Accordingly,  
The criticism of aristocratic virtue thus, in the last analysis, means the 
replacement of honour by the fear of violent death.  And even though one may 
characterize Hobbes’ss morals as utilitarian morals, it is only with the 
important limitation that these morals are based on the fear of violent death, on 
a passion which is not in itself prudent, but which makes man prudent.274 
It is this connection with prudence, the making of men who are prudent, which Strauss 
relies upon to label Hobbes’s new moral attitude a ‘bourgeois morality’.  The ‘concrete 
significance’ of Hobbes’s moral attitude is that “… the ideals set up in his political philosophy 
are precisely the ideals of the bourgeoisie”275.  That is,  
His morality is the morality of the bourgeois world.  Even his sharp criticism 
of the bourgeoisie has, at bottom, no other aim than to remind the bourgeoisie 
of the elementary condition for its existence.  This condition is not industry 
and thrift, not the specific exertions of the bourgeoisie, but the security of 
body and soul, which the bourgeoisie cannot of itself guarantee.276 
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 The state of nature, or rather the belief in the state of nature, reinforces the fear of 
violent death which this bourgeoisie morality requires to be maintained.  Hobbes, therefore, 
”… ‘prefers’ these terrors of the state of nature because only on awareness of these terrors can 
a true and permanent society rest.  The bourgeois existence which no longer experiences these 
terrors will endure only as long as it remembers them”277. 
Oakeshott, however, questions this aspect of Strauss’s argument.  Recall that both 
agree that the fear of violent death is the ‘sufficient cause’ for the endeavour for peace.   
Oakeshott agrees with Strauss, moreover, that Hobbes does elaborate “the morality of the tame 
man” or a bourgeois morality:  “… pride, even when it does not degenerate into vain-glory, is 
too dangerous a passion to be allowed, even if its suppression somewhat dims the brilliance of 
life”278. 
However, Oakeshott identifies another line of argument in Hobbes’s thoughts, and 
despite not being extensively elaborated by Hobbes, Oakeshott insists it is “… enough to push 
our thoughts in a different direction”279.  Oakeshott elaborates: 
In this line of thought the just disposition is still recognized to be an endeavour 
for peace and what is sought is still emancipation from the fear of violent and 
shameful death at the hands of other men, but the desired condition is to be 
attained, not by proud man, awakened by fear, surrendering his pride and 
becoming (by covenant) tame man, but by the moralization of pride itself.280 
The line of argument that Oakeshott explores, therefore, runs counter to that of Strauss; 
Oakeshott argues that men need not necessarily be ‘tamed’ in order to endeavour peace.  
Oakeshott considers whether Hobbes’s psychological account “… can accommodate the man 
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in whom pride occupies a greater place than fear”281.  Such a man, in order to remain 
consistent with Hobbes’s psychology, would on account of his vulnerability and weakness, be 
his own best friend.  On account of this vulnerability, he is “… subject to the fear of finding 
himself shamed and dishonoured and even killed”282.  However, perhaps this man’s 
preponderant passion is not fear, but rather pride.  In other words, this man does not exhibit 
the bourgeois morality.  He is a test to Strauss’s thesis that the bourgeois existence which no 
longer experiences the fear of violent death will endure only so long as it remembers the fear.  
Oakeshott continues the portrayal:  
… he is a man who would find greater shame in the meanness of settling for 
mere survival than in suffering the dishonour of being recognized a failure; a 
man whose disposition is to overcome fear not by reason (that is, by seeking a 
secure condition of external human circumstances) but by his own courage; a 
man not at all without imperfections and the illusion of his achievements 
…;283 
and adds:  
Now, a man of this sort would not lack stimulus for the vital movement of his 
heart, but he is in a high degree self-moved.  His endeavour is for peace; and if 
the peace he enjoys is largely his own unaided achievement and is secure 
against the mishaps that may befall him, it is not in any way unfriendly to the 
peace of other men of a different kind.  There is nothing hostile in his conduct, 
nothing in it to provoke hostility, nothing censorious.  What he achieves for 
himself and what he contributes to a common life is a complete alternative to 
what other may achieve by means of agreement inspired by fear and dictated 
by reason; for, if the unavoidable endeavour of every man is for self-
preservation, and if self-preservation is interpreted (as Hobbes interprets it), 
not as immunity from death but from the fear of shameful death, then this man 
achieves in one manner (by courage) what others may achieve in another (by 
rational calculation).284 
This man, therefore, understands his vulnerability, yet does not fall prey to vain-glory.  
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Although he does not allow the fear of shameful death to overcome his pride or courage, his 
actions in no way jeopardise the endeavour for peace.  His pride does not jeopardise the fear of 
others of shameful death; nor do the means by which he endeavours for peace jeopardise the 
larger endeavour for peace by his community.  He avoids shameful death through courage, and 
not through timidity285. 
To support the existence of such a character, or at least the possibility of such a 
character, in the writings of Hobbes, Oakeshott cites the following passage: “That which gives 
to human actions the relish of justice …. Is a certain Nobleness or Gallantness of courage 
(rarely found), by which a man scorns to be beholden for the contentment of life, to fraud or 
breach of promise.  This justice of Manners, is that which is meant, where justice is called a 
virtue”286.   Nobleness, or courage, is what binds this man to keep his promises, and not the 
fear of shameful death.  Hobbes notes that a man may be motivated to his word by “… a glory 
or pride in appearing not to need to break it”287.   
Simply put, therefore, both Oakeshott and Strauss focus on the psychological cause 
Hobbes believed could be relied upon to prompt subjects to remain peaceful. That cause, 
ultimately, is the fear of shameful death.  A slight difference emerges between the two, 
however; whereas Strauss argues that all the passions which counteract fear must be fully 
diminished, Oakeshott argues that Hobbes does allow that, for a very few subjects, honour and 
pride will be sufficient to prompt them to moral—that is peaceable—conduct.   Both, 
however, identify the fear of shameful death as either the only, or at least the far dominant, 
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effective psychological cause of peaceful conduct which Hobbes asserts. What are, however, 
the implications of this for defence?   
Strauss more clearly teases out the implications of this for defence, and since 
Oakeshott is so similar in the relevant details of interpretation, the same implications can be 
made on his behalf.  Arguing that in Hobbes’s earlier works he identified honour—the 
counteracting passion to fear—as a virtue, Strauss notes the following passage in Elements 
which “unequivocally co-ordinat[es] honour (aristocratic virtue) and war”288:   
The sum of virtue is to be sociable with them that will be sociable, and 
formidable to them that will not.  And the same is the sum of the law of 
nature; for in being sociable, the law of nature taketh place by the way of 
peace and society; and to be formidable, is the law of nature in war, where to 
be feared is a protection a man hath from his own power; and as the former 
consisteth in action of equity and justice, the latter consisteth in actions of 
honour.289 
Even more explicitly, Hobbes writes: “The only law of actions in war is honour”290.  
Strauss claims, however, that although Hobbes identified aristocratic virtue and honour as a 
virtue in his earlier work (Elements), his analysis of honour as the law of war remains the 
same throughout his later works, including in the Leviathan.  That is, while Hobbes held 
honour to be inimical to peace throughout his work, he dropped its status as a virtue of any 
kind in his later work:   
It is therefore all the more striking that the express characterization of honour 
as virtue (i.e. in war) occurs only in the earliest exposition.  It is true, in De 
cive courage is still called virtue, but no longer in connexion with honour; 
moreover, in the Leviathan and in De homine courage itself is completely 
omitted  In place of the triad ‘honour, justice and equity’, we have more and 
more the two concepts ‘justice and charity’.  Thus the more Hobbes elaborated 
his political philosophy, the further he departed from his original recognition 
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of honour as a virtue, from the original recognition of aristocratic virtue.291 
Thus the important conclusion for our purposes here is that for Strauss—and Oakeshott 
also, by proximity in argument—since fear and honour in the thoughts of Hobbes are viewed 
to be fundamentally irreconcilable, and “since honour as virtue of war is identical with valour, 
the negation of honour as a virtue means the negation of valour as a virtue”292.  In other words, 
the psychological cause of civil peace (fear of shameful death) and the morality that is based 
on and consistent with it (bourgeois morality) is privileged to the exclusion of what Hobbes 
believes to be the psychological cause of war and thus defence (honour) and the morality that 
is based on and consistent with it (aristocratic virtue).  It is implicitly asserted, then, that 
Hobbes precludes the moral psychology necessary for the defence of the commonwealth; the 
moral psychology required for civil peace, in other words, would render the subjects of a 
commonwealth effectively unable to defend themselves. 
I will generally agree with both of these accounts by arguing that the exercise of 
Hobbes’s sovereign’s natural power is meant to affect subjects to the same effect.  That is, the 
way Hobbes describes the sovereign’s exercise of natural power as affecting subjects is the 
same in effect as Strauss’s and Oakeshott’s description of the psychological cause of a 
peaceful disposition amongst subjects.  I will argue that the exercise of sovereign natural 
power causes the submission of subjects by instilling a fear of the sovereign’s power, which 
counteracts honour and is meant to ensure the prevention of subjects’ performances.  
However, I will follow this agreement with a disagreement: I disagree with both Strauss and 
Oakeshott who believe that Hobbes does not equip his sovereign with the means to generate a 
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psychological disposition that would enable the sovereign to use his subjects, and which 
would overcome their fear of shameful death.  Hobbes not only demonstrably does so, I will 
argue, but he does so precisely because of the need for this ability, and for this psychological 
disposition, to effectively defend the commonwealth.   
 
6.3 Carl Schmitt and potential publica 
A second important and influential argument which interprets Hobbes’s sovereign as 
lacking the means to effectively defend the commonwealth due to a dearth of subjects’ 
otherwise necessary contribution to it, is made by Carl Schmitt.   In effect, his argument 
reaches the same implicit conclusion as those of Strauss and Oakeshott, albeit due to a 
different rationale.  In The Concept of the Political he writes:  
To the state as an essentially political entity belongs the jus belli, that is, the 
real possibility of deciding in a concrete situation upon the enemy and the 
ability to fight him with the power emanating from the entity. … The state as 
the decisive political entity possesses an enormous power: the possibility of 
waging war and thereby publicly disposing of the lives of men.  The jus belli 
contains such a disposition.  It suggests a double possibility: the right to 
demand from its own members the readiness to die and unhesitatingly to kill 
enemies.293 
This right of the sovereign is dependent on the disposition of subjects to die and kill on 
command of their sovereign, and on behalf of their commonwealth.  Schmitt talks not of a 
mere obligation, but rather of a disposition to do so which subjects must possess in order to 
make effective the capabilities of the political entity to wage a war.  According to Schmitt, 
however, this disposition is lacking in Hobbesian subjects.  In Chapter five of The Leviathan 
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in the state theory of Thomas Hobbes, entitled “The sovereign-representative person dies of 
the separation of inner from outer”,  Schmitt writes,  
… when public power wants to be only public, when state and confession 
drive inner belief into the private domain, then the soul of a people betakes 
itself on the ‘secret road’ that leads inward.  Then grows the counterforce of 
silence and stillness … Public power and force may be ever so completely and 
emphatically recognized and ever so loyally respected, but only as a public 
and only an external power, it is hollow and already dead from within294. 
What Schmitt identifies in Hobbes is that although the sovereign power requires the 
ability to exercise public power, Hobbes cripples his sovereign from effectively doing so 
because of the passive resistance he permits.  By separating the inner lives of subjects from the 
will of the state, Schmitt accuses Hobbes of thereby alienating subjects and impeding their 
potential contribution.  According to Schmitt, Hobbes’s sovereign is unable to harness 
potential publica because he is prevented from instilling sources of agency in subjects which 
overcome the fear of death and which are required for defence and conquest.  Hobbes, Schmitt 
criticises, disabled his sovereign by failing to give him the means to effectively use his 
subjects. 
Like Strauss and Oakeshott, therefore, Schmitt focuses on what is required for the 
maintenance of civil peace:  in the cases of Strauss and Oakeshott, the fear of shameful death 
and a bourgeois morality would counteract the disposition required for subjects’ contribution 
to public power; in Schmitt’s case, the sovereign cannot rely upon subjects’ contribution to 
public power because of their retention of private judgment and subsequent alienation from 
the public will.  As I have mentioned, I will partly agree with Strauss and Oakeshott, and I will 
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also do so with Schmitt.  I agree that instrumental power—which is required for defence—
does require the contribution of subjects.  I further agree that Hobbesian subjects are described 
as being affected in a way that would disable or counteract that effective contribution. I will, 
though, point out that this counteraction is a result of the exercise of sovereign natural power.  
I will also add, however, to contradict the uniformity of their three arguments, that Hobbes 
nevertheless describes the means to generate instrumental power, which relies upon instilling 
a sense of honour in subjects. Thus, while this counteracts the fear of shameful death, it is 
nevertheless asserted by Hobbes, and creates a necessary ambivalence in the psychology of 
subjects caused by the opposing means by which it concurrently ensures both civil peace and 
defence. 
 
6.4 Sovereign natural power and submission 
While Richard Tuck paints, in my mind, the most accurate picture of Hobbes’s 
psychological account of submission, he nevertheless appears to agree with Strauss, Oakeshott 
and Schmitt on this: that submission, in Hobbes, precludes use.   
Tuck, in an unfortunately under-appreciated essay entitled The Utopianism of 
Leviathan, focuses upon how Hobbes envisioned subjects submit to sovereign power.295  
Recall that submission entails a conception of power in which power is exerted on something.  
This type of power is described by Hobbes as zero-sum; “… the power of one man resisteth 
and hindereth the effects of the power of another power simply is no more, but the excess of 
the power of one above that of another.  For equal powers opposed, destroy one another 
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…”296.  Since the use of one’s power is only prevented by another’s use of their power, it 
suggests that the power to do some thing necessitates freedom from an opposing power.  To 
exercise power under this conception, therefore, requires an absence of obstacles.   In other 
words, the condition in which one is free to exercise their power is an environment which is 
free of opposing powers.   
This freedom is what submission affords; the sovereign is free to exercise his power 
because his subjects are not free to exercise theirs.  Submission, in other words, eliminates 
obstacles to the sovereign’s exercise of his power.  Submission to the sovereign is to “… lay 
by or relinquish [one’s] own right of resisting him …”297.  Subjects yield to sovereign power.   
This is what submission is in effect.  But how precisely does Hobbes envision 
submission to occur?  How does sovereignty induce submission?  Interestingly, Hobbes argues 
that upon consideration of the sovereign’s power, an emotional state will be produced which 
amounts to submission.  This is resultant from Hobbes’s explanation of the source of passions.  
As Richard Tuck puts it, on behalf of Hobbes: “Our entire emotional life … extraordinary as 
this might seem, is in fact a complicated set of beliefs about the best way of securing ourselves 
against our fellow men … in the end reducible simply to a set of ideas about our own relative 
safety from other people’s power”298. 
This is best explained in Hobbes’s Elements, and it is well worth taking some time to 
fully explain it.  Hobbes argues that an appetite “… is the beginning of animal motion toward 
something which pleaseth us …”299.  The pleasure which is conceived to result from the 
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attainment of an object, in this respect, precedes the appetite.  An appetite is produced towards 
the attainment of an object not for the achievement itself, but rather for the pleasure one 
expects or conceives to receive from the attainment of it. 
The term conception must here be delineated from the term passion.  Whereas 
conception refers to a “motion and agitation of the brain”, a passion is a continuation of that 
motion “to the heart”300.  From conceptions proceed “every one of those passions which we 
commonly take notice of”301.  Importantly, “… whosoever therefore expecteth pleasure to 
come, must conceive withal some power in himself by which the same may be attained”302.   
The implicit corollary, of course, is that if one is unable to conceive of such power, that which 
follows the conception—a passion—will not arise. 
Additionally, Hobbes names these conceptions of power “honour”303.  Pleasure is, 
therefore, ultimately dependent upon, and proceeds from, honour. So too do appetites proceed 
ultimately from honour, from one’s conception of their ability to attain some thing. 
Since the initiators are conceptions of power, Hobbes’s next step is to identify signs by 
which power is conceived. “The signs by which we know our own power are those actions 
which proceed from the same …”304.   In other words, we know our own power by recognising 
signs which proceed from that power.  However, note that Hobbes’s sentence is not yet 
complete; he adds “ … and the signs by which other men know it, are such actions, gesture, 
countenance and speech, as usually such powers produce …”305.  Hobbes hereby adds a 
comparative element to conceptions of power: the signs of my power are conceived by not 
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only myself but by others.   
Passions are, therefore, based upon conceptions of power which are in turn based upon 
comparison. He writes 
 … and the acknowledgment of power is called HONOUR; and to honour a 
man (inwardly in the mind) is to conceive or acknowledge, that that man hath 
the odds or excess of power above him that contendeth or compareth himself.  
And HONOURABLE are those signs for which one man acknowledgeth 
power or excess above his concurrent in another.306 
The conception of one’s own power is made by comparison.   One compares the signs 
of one’s own power—by which a conception of one’s own power is made—with the signs of 
power of others.  Thus, while honour itself is an acknowledgement of power, and may be 
conceived as belonging to oneself and another, to honour is inherently comparative: to 
acknowledge or conceive that another is more powerful than oneself.  To honour is to 
acknowledge that another’s power represents an obstacle to the use of your own power.   
Submission to sovereignty is readily explained in these terms.  Submission to 
sovereign power is preceded by honour; one must conceive the sovereign’s power as being 
vastly greater than one’s own to submit.  To submit is essentially to deny oneself the liberty to 
act307, i.e. creating an inability to act which correspondingly increases the sovereign’s freedom 
to act.  “And because it is impossible for any man really to transfer his own strength to 
another, or for that other to receive it; it is to be understood: that to transfer a man’s power and 
strength, is no more but to lay by or relinquish his own right of resisting him to whom he so 
transferreth it”308. 
This notion of submission as yielding—ceasing to prevent another’s exercise of their 
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power—is evident in Hobbes’s description of various signs of honour.  Each symbol 
exemplifies giving way, of removing oneself as an obstacle:   
The signs of honour are those by which we perceive that one man 
acknowledgeth the power and worth of another.  Such as these: To praise; to 
magnify; to bless, or call happy; to pray or supplicate to; to thank; to offer 
unto or present; to obey; to hearken to with attention; to speak to with 
consideration; to approach unto in decent manner, to keep distance from; to 
give the way to, and the like; which are the honour the inferior giveth to the 
superior.309  
How Hobbes believed submission will occur is equally evident: the elimination of 
obstacles to the exercise of sovereign power is achieved by the cessation of subjects’ passions.  
The awe inspired by the power of the sovereign forms a conception of power within the minds 
of the subjects from which they infer that they cannot expect to fruitfully exercise their power 
in the face of it.  One renounces his right of nature because he realises that, in the face of 
sovereign power, the exercise of that right is futile.  The acknowledgment that it is futile leads 
to resignation, and ultimately, the cessation of passion itself. 
Tuck argues “If Hobbesian man were to live according to the laws of nature, he would 
not only renounce his individual judgment to his sovereign, but would live a strikingly 
passionless life …”310.   
 In his short commentary on Tuck’s essay, Tom Sorell makes the remark “… the ideal 
commonwealth can only work if passionate human beings can be turned into something like 
passionless citizens”311. Sorell then asks the crucial question: “How can a theory aim at 
changing people psychologically to the degree Tuck suggests Leviathan does, and not ask a 
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very great deal in return?”312.   
The problem is—as Strauss and Oakeshott overlook, and Schmitt contends that Hobbes 
belies—Hobbes does ask a very great deal in return.  In the following passage, Hobbes 
presents the problem:   
And forasmuch as they who are amongst themselves in security, by the means 
of this sword of justice that keeps them all in awe, are nevertheless in danger 
of enemies from without; if there be not some means found, to unite their 
strengths and natural forces in the resistance of such enemies, their peace 
amongst themselves is but in vain.  And therefore it is to be understood as a 
covenant of every member to contribute their several forces for the defence of 
the whole; whereby to make one power as sufficient, as is possible, for their 
defence.  Now seeing that every man hath already transferred the use of his 
strength to him or them, that have the sword of justice; it followeth that the 
power of defence, that is to say the sword of war, be in the same hands 
wherein is the sword of justice: and consequently those two swords are but 
one, and that inseparably and essentially annexed to the sovereign power.313 
A similarly telling passage reinforces this dual power:  
This submission of all their wills to the will of one man or of one Assembly 
comes about, when each of them obligates himself, by an Agreement with 
each of the rest, not to resist the will of the man or Assembly to which he has 
submitted himself; that is, not to withhold the use of his wealth and strength 
against any other men than himself …314 
Here Hobbes conflates the two: not to resist is equated with not to withhold use.  
Whereas it is clear what Hobbes believes is required as an additional element of subjection 
beyond submission—a means must be found to use the subjects—there is a problem: in 
submission, the emotional life of the subjects has been subjected to the awe of sovereign 
power which discourages action.  Thus far subjection consists exclusively of yielding to 
sovereign power; there is nothing yet to suggest the sovereign’s ability (apart from the right) 
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to use, harness and commandeer the power of subjects.  By what means, and to what extent, 
can the sovereign use submissive subjects? As the arguments of Strauss, Oakeshott and 
Schmitt implicitly ask, in what meaningful way may a Hobbesian sovereign be said to possess 
the ability to use his subjects if his subjects have no source of volition from which to act? 
No-one, in my opinion, has posed the problem more elegantly and simply than the 
eighteenth-century social and political thinker Bernard Mandeville, who noticed that the 
power of the state requires both submission and governance.  He wrote:  
There is great Difference between being submissive, and being governable; for 
he who barely submits to another, only embraces what he dislikes, to shun 
what he dislikes more; and we may be very submissive, and be of no Use to 
the Person we submit to: But to be governable, implies an Endeavour to 
please, and a Willingness to exert ourselves in behalf of the Person that 
governs …315  
This is, in essence, the basis of Oakeshott’s, Strauss’s and Schmitt’s critique: Hobbes’s 
sovereign lacks the ability to govern, and Hobbesian sovereignty is conceived to be 
exclusively concerned with submission.  I would propose, alternatively, that sovereignty as 
conceptualised by Hobbes is concerned with both submission and governance. Submission 
and governance have distinct ends; governance is an inextricable element of sovereignty, and 
this is, although largely overlooked, clearly evident in Hobbes.  I am proposing here that the 
notion of sovereignty—as included in its greatest 17th century articulation—included an art of 
governance and entailed the means by which to pursue collective enterprise.  Not only did 
Hobbes articulate the necessity of the sovereign possessing the power to govern, and grants his 
sovereign the authority to govern, he most interestingly suggested the means to do so—civil 
honour—to which I will now turn.   
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6.5 Sovereignty and governance 
Recall that the power which governance represents is conceptualised by Hobbes as 
power through.  The end of the exercise of this power is not, like submission, to prevent 
obstacles to the use of one’s power by eliminating the freedom of others, but rather to use the 
power of others.   
According to Hobbes, the sovereign has “… the right to Use the forces of every 
particular member”316 because “… sure and irresistible power gives the right of ruling and 
commanding those who cannot resist”317.   
The problem is with the how; the sovereign may have the authority to exercise both 
types of power, yet is, as it currently stands, unable to.  As Hobbes acknowledges, “… it is 
one thing to say, I give you the right to command whatever you wish, another to say, I will do 
whatever you command”318. 
The question of how to govern, or the means by which to ensure governance, is 
answered by Hobbes in terms of civil honour.  By way of introduction, it is helpful to compare 
two directions of honour; from the inferior to superior (which indicates submission), and from 
the superior to inferior (which indicates governance).   Recall that the signs of honour which 
indicate that an inferior honours a superior signify giving way.  Honour in the reverse direction 
is signified as follows:   
But the signs of honour from the superior to the inferior, are such as these: to 
praise or prefer him before his concurrent; to hear him more willingly; to 
speak to him more familiarly; to admit him nearer, to employ him rather, to 
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ask his advice rather; to like his opinions; and to give him any gift rather than 
money, or if money, so much as may not imply his need of a little: for need of 
little is greater poverty than need of much.319   
Rather than giving way, each of these symbols indicate encouragement, respect and 
recruitment, and at the bottom, symbolise A’s acknowledgment that B is useful to A.   
Whereas submission, therefore, requires an inferior to yield to a superior, governance 
requires that an inferior be used wilfully to achieve a superior’s ends.  Whereas submission 
affords the sovereign the freedom to use his power without obstacles, governance affords the 
sovereign the use of those who are subject to his power.   
So, whereas the honour a subject pays a sovereign involves conceiving of the 
sovereign’s power as preventing the exercise of one’s own power, the honour a sovereign pays 
a subject involves conceiving of the subject’s power as useful to the achievement of the 
sovereign’s ends.  In the former, power is conceived of in terms of the freedom to use it; the 
way in which one conceives of power is in respect to how another impedes the use of it.  In the 
latter, power is conceived of in terms of what can be used to achieve ends.     
This suggests an important relationship between honour, or conceptions of power, and 
worth.  Hobbes writes, “Those things which please us as the way or means to a farther end, 
we call PROFITABLE; and the fruition of them, USE; and those things that profit not, 
VAIN”320.  That which is honourable is that which is conceived to be useful.  
Thus, “… according to the signs of honour and dishonour, so we estimate and make 
the value or WORTH of a man”321.  Since the signs of honour are those which we take to 
indicate honouring, and to honour is to acknowledge another’s power or ability to achieve 
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some end, to evaluate the value or worth of a man based on whether or not he is honoured is to 
judge his worth upon his ability.  Hobbes adds, “For so much worth is every thing, as a man 
will give for the use of all it can do”322. 
 Whereas the psychological imperative related to submission is how to make men 
submit and give way to the exercise of sovereign power, the question related to governance is 
how to make men useful and contribute to the exercise of sovereign power.  Recall that the 
means to make men submit was influencing their conception of power in such a way that 
rendered them passionless.  The means by which to govern men, suggested Hobbes, is to 
redirect their passions in such a way that they become instrumental.   
Ambition and longing for honours cannot be removed from men’s minds, and 
sovereigns have no duty to attempt to do so … If we saw a consistent pattern 
on the part of those who administer sovereign power of distinguishing with 
honours and punishing the factious and branding them with contempt, there 
would be more ambition to obey than to oppose … It is their duty, I say, to 
encourage obedient citizens … for it is the only way by which public power 
[potential publica] … can be preserved.323 
So with the citizens: they would be without initiative if they did nothing 
except at the law’s command.324 
So that of civil honour the fountain is in the person of the commonwealth, and 
dependeth on the will of the sovereign, and is therefore temporary and called 
civil honour … and men honour such as have them, as having so many signs 
of favour in the commonwealth, which favour is power.325 
Public power, reliant on the instrumental power of subjects, is to be harnessed by 
honouring subjects for their usefulness.  Recall that, according to Hobbes’s account of 
political psychology, passions proceed from conceptions of power. It is evident that Hobbes 
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believed that if subjects conceived of their power in terms of sanctioned instrumentality, the 
necessary supporting passions would emerge.  Glory, pride, and other emotive passions would, 
in a sense, be reconstructed; worth would be reconstituted on the basis of their sanctioned 
instrumental value, rather than on their self-judged value.  Not only, therefore, does the 
sovereign estimate the worth of a man according to the signs of honour, but the sovereign also 
makes the worth of a man accordingly326. 
It is also very important to note that this prescription is present in Leviathan; recall that 
Strauss argues that by this later work, Hobbes had stripped honour of its status as virtuous, and 
that his “criticism of aristocratic virtue thus, in the last analysis, means the replacement of 
honour by the fear of violent death”327.  This is quite simply not the full case.  Hobbes, it must 
be noted, does at points strip honour of its moral standing; consider:  “Nor does it alter the 
case of honour, whether an action (so it be great and difficult, and consequently a sign of 
much power) be just or unjust; for honour consisteth only in the opinion of power” (L, 54).   
Hobbes then cites two illustrations of the factual, empirical claim that honour is not ultimately 
a matter of morality but rather of power. 
Therefore the ancient heathen did not think they dishonoured, but greatly 
honoured the Gods, when they introduced them in their poems committing 
rapes, thefts, and other great, but unjust or unclean acts: insomuch as nothing 
is so much celebrated in Jupiter, as his adulteries; nor in Mercury, as his 
frauds and thefts, of whose praises, in a hymn of Homer, the greatest is this: 
that being born in the morning, he had invented music at noon, and before 
night stolen away the cattle of Apollo from his herdsman (L, 54). 
Also amongst men, till there were constituted great commonwealths, it was 
thought no dishonor to be a pirate or a highway thief, but rather a lawful trade, 
not only amongst the Greeks, but also amongst all other nations, as is manifest 
by the histories of ancient time.  And at this day, in this part of the world, 
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private duels are and always ill be honourable, though unlawful, till such time 
as there shall be honour ordained for them that make the challenge.  For duels 
also are many times effects of courage; and the ground of courage is always 
strength or skill, which are power; though for the most part they be effects of 
rash speaking and of the fear of dishonor in one or both the combatants, who, 
engaged by rashness, are driven into the lists to avoid disgrace (L, 55). 
However, as discussed in Chapter One, and as I agreed with Preston King, “… the 
commands of the sovereign, in so far as he remains sovereign, must be read as coterminous 
with the designation of right and wrong”328.  The sovereign, once a commonwealth is 
instituted or acquired, becomes the sole arbiter of just and unjust, right and wrong, moral and 
immoral.  Were the sovereign’s concern civil peace exclusively, Strauss would be far closer to 
being correct that Hobbes removed any moral content from honour. Honour is indeed spoken 
of by Hobbes as counteracting the fear of shameful death, which is the disposition most likely 
to effect civil peace.  However, due to the need for defence, which requires potential publica, 
in turn requiring governance and honour, the sovereign, as the ‘fountain of honour’, moralises 
honour. Honour is indeed an ‘opinion of power’.  However, insofar as that opinion is the 
sovereign’s, honour, once again, becomes a moral virtue.  Honour, once a threat to civil peace, 
is now recast as civil honour and becomes a civil virtue. 
Clear evidence of this is found in Behemoth, where Hobbes makes a distinction 
between the virtues of ordinary subjects—which fundamentally entails simple “obedience to 
the laws of the commonwealth”—and what he calls “royal virtues”: 
The virtues of sovereigns are such as tend to the maintenance of peace at 
home, and to the resistance of foreign enemies.  Fortitude is a royal virtue; and 
though it be necessary in such private men as shall be soldiers, yet, for other 
men, the less they dare, the better it is both for the commonwealth and for 
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themselves.  Frugality (though perhaps you will think it strange) is also a royal 
virtue: for it increases the public stock, which cannot be too great for the 
public use, nor any man too sparing of what he has in trust for the good of 
others.  Liberality also is a royal virtue: for the commonwealth cannot be well 
served without extraordinary diligence and service of misters, and great 
fidelity to their Sovereign; who ought therefore to be encouraged, and 
especially those that do him service in the wars (Behemoth, 44-5). 
Crucially, “In sum, all actions and habits are to be esteemed good or evil by their 
causes and usefulness in reference to the commonwealth …” (Behemoth, 45, italics added).  
Fortitude, or courage, is clearly described as a royal virtue—or civil virtue—and is so because 
it is useful for the defence of the commonwealth. 
Consider also Hobbes’s crucial discussion of honour and ignominy in Chapter xxviii of 
Leviathan entitled “Of Punishments and Rewards”:    
Ignominy is the infliction of such evil as is made dishonourable (or the 
deprivation of such good as is made honourable) by the commonwealth.  For 
there be some things honourable by nature: as, the effects of courage, 
magnanimity, strength, wisdom, and other abilities of body and mind.  Others 
made honourable by the commonwealth: as, badges, titles, offices, or any 
other singular mark of the sovereign’s favour.  The former (though they may 
fail by nature or accident) cannot be taken away by a law; and therefore, the 
loss of them is not punishment.  But the latter may be taken away by the 
public authority that made them honourable, and are properly punishments; 
such are degrading men condemned of their badges, titles, and offices, or 
declaring them incapable of the like in time to come (L, 206-7). 
Hobbes here, as in the passage from Behemoth, clearly uses the terms ‘evil’ and ‘good’ 
to describe the honours emanating from the sovereign; subjects are to be justly proud of being 
honoured, and ashamed of being dishonoured.  Consider also that “Of the Rights of 
Sovereigns by Institution”, the ninth through twelfth capture perfectly Hobbes’s moralisation 
of honour for the sake of defence.  The ninth right is the making of war and peace as the 
sovereign thinks best; the tenth a reminder that “the sovereign is charged with the end, which 
is the common peace and defence, he is understood to have power to use such means as he 
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shall think most fit for his discharge” (L, 115).  Hobbes then turns to discuss honour’s role; it 
is no coincidence that Hobbes does so directly after asserting the sovereign’s right to the 
means of defence:   
Eleventhly, to the sovereign is committed the power of rewarding with riches 
or honour, and of punishing with corporal or pecuniary punishment or with 
ignominy, every subject according to the law he hath formerly made (or if 
there be no law made, according as he shall judge most to conduce to the 
encouraging of men to serve the commonwealth, or determining of them from 
doing disservice to the same (L, 115, italics added).   
And the final right of sovereigns:  
Lastly, considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon themselves, 
what respect they look for from others, and how little they value other men, 
from whence continually arise amongst them emulation, quarrels, factions, and 
at last war, to the destroying of one another, and diminution of their strength 
against a common enemy, it is necessary that there be laws of honour and a 
public rate of the worth of such men as have deserved (or are able to deserve) 
well of the commonwealth … But it hath already been shown that not only the 
whole militia, or forces of the commonwealth, but also the judicature of all 
controversies is annexed to the sovereignty.  To the sovereign therefore it 
belongeth also to give titles of honour, and to appoint what order of place and 
dignity each man shall hold, and what signs of respect, in public or private 
meetings, they shall give to one another (L, 115). 
 
Recall that whereas Strauss argues that all the passions which counteract fear must be 
fully diminished and considered immoral, Oakeshott argues that Hobbes does allow that, for a 
very few subjects, honour and pride will be sufficient to prompt them to moral—that is 
peaceable—conduct.   Both, however, identify the fear of shameful death as either the only, or 
at least the far dominant, effective psychological cause of peaceful conduct.  Against Strauss, 
Hobbes clearly—even and notably in Leviathan—asserts honour’s virtue.  Against Oakeshott, 
it is far more evident that Hobbes held honour to be a civil virtue, than it is to believe that 
Hobbes thought personal honour was merely not necessarily an obstacle to civil peace.  
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Moreover, Oakeshott’s characterisation of a rare personality type, which may not necessarily 
make one afraid of shameful death but which would nevertheless lead one to conduct oneself 
peaceably, can be better recast.  A subject whose preponderant passion is not fear but pride is 
not primarily described by Hobbes to be a peaceful subject; rather, a prideful subject, seeking 
civil honour, is a useful subject.  
My objection to Tuck is that although I agree that Hobbes’s subjects appear to be 
rendered passionless through submission, Hobbes nevertheless details a means by which to 
reconstruct their passions such that they be made use of by the sovereign.   
Turning back to Schmitt, who claims that Hobbes’s sovereign does not possess the 
means by which to govern, again, I answer that Hobbes details a theory of civil honour which 
is meant to instill in the subjects the spirit by which to defend and conquer upon the 
sovereign’s orders.  In Chapter two, recall, Hobbes’s distinction between thought and action 
was discussed, and the implications of this distinction for the inclusion of inner thoughts and 
beliefs as matters within the realm of ecclesiastical authority were outlined.  Coercion, Hobbes 
argues, is a sovereign tool of authority, yet thoughts and beliefs are not influenced by 
coercion. Coercion, he continues, is not a tool of the church and, therefore, the authority of the 
church does not include the coercive ‘correction’ of the religious beliefs of people.   
Hobbes, recall, also eliminates the distinction between ecclesiastical authority and civil 
authority.  This has the consequence of likewise denying to the sovereign the power to 
coercively attempt to change religious beliefs.  While the sovereign has, of course, coercive 
power, whereas the church does not, Hobbes maintains that coercion is not an effective means 
by which to change the beliefs of subjects.  Hence, sovereigns do not have the power to 
change beliefs through coercive means. 
It is this non-coercive realm of inner belief upon which Schmitt bases his critique of 
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Hobbes; Hobbes cripples his sovereign from effectively exercising public power because of 
the passive resistance he permits.  By separating the inner lives of subjects from the will of the 
state, Schmitt accuses Hobbes of thereby alienating subjects and impeding their potential 
contribution towards the sovereign’s will.  According to Schmitt, Hobbes’s sovereign is 
unable to harness potential publica because it is prevented from instilling sources of agency in 
subjects which overcome the fear of death and which are required for defence and conquest.  
Hobbes, Schmitt criticises, disabled his sovereign by failing to give him the means to 
effectively use his subjects.   
While Hobbes’s sovereign is indeed unable to coerce beliefs in his subjects that would 
instill a source of volition that the sovereign can depend upon, enabling him to use them, I 
have just detailed the means by which the sovereign can nevertheless persuade and instill this 
source of volition.  It is, more accurately, much more than mere persuasion. As I have 
detailed, Hobbes believed that if subjects conceived of their power in terms of sanctioned 
instrumentality, the necessary supporting passions would emerge.  Glory, pride, and other 
emotive passions would be, in a sense, reconstructed: worth would be reconstituted on the 
basis of their sanctioned instrumental value, rather than on their self-judged value.  The 
sovereign, as Schmitt argues, may not indeed be able to coerce the beliefs of subjects that 
would otherwise compel them to contribute to the purposeful ends of the commonwealth.  The 
sovereign has, however, potentially far greater power: the sovereign not only estimates the 
worth of a man according to his service to the commonwealth; the sovereign makes the worth 
of a man accordingly. 
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Chapter 7: 
Defence and the authorised exercise of instrumental power 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I argued that while the sovereign’s exercise of instrumental 
power does indeed depend upon the contribution of subjects, Hobbes nevertheless details the 
means by which his sovereign can overcome the psychological disposition preventing their 
use, and which, although conducive to civil peace, otherwise represents an obstacle to defence.  
I argued that one cannot, therefore, presume that Hobbes intended the dependency on the 
contribution of subjects to necessarily, and beneficially, limit the sovereign’s exercise of 
instrumental power. The reason for this is obvious: defence. Before too rashly interpreting 
Hobbes’s sovereign as unable to generate potential publica, therefore, the consequences of 
being able to govern need to be considered.  While the exercise of natural power—which 
renders subjects akin to becoming passionless and, therefore, effectively unable to act—the 
exercise of instrumental power is made possible by instilling civil honour in the minds of 
subjects in order to use them.  This, however, clearly counteracts the psychological effects of 
natural power. Therefore, we may now ask, does it threaten the conditions of civil peace? 
Hobbes’s own statement of the problem is written in the Review and Conclusion of 
Leviathan:  “And amongst the passions, courage (by which I mean the contempt of wounds 
and violent death) inclineth men to private revenges, and sometimes to endeavor the unsettling 
of the public peace.  And timorousness many times disposeth to the desertion of the public 
defence” (L, 489). 
Hobbes, however, casually refers to it as not presenting an insurmountable problem.  
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He adds: “Both these, they say, cannot stand together in the same person … To which I 
answer that these are indeed great difficulties, but not impossibilities.  For by education and 
discipline they may be, and are sometimes, reconciled … ” (L, 489).  Specifically, there is no 
“… repugnancy between fearing the laws and not fearing a public enemy …” (L, 489). 
As discussed in the previous chapter, key influential commentators on Hobbes have 
either explicitly or implicitly settled on the opinion that, nevertheless, there is indeed a 
problem: psychologically speaking, the very thing that causes civil peace—fear of shameful 
death and the exercise of sovereign natural power—prevents that which is required for 
defence—a sense of civil honour and governance. 
We ought now discuss the plausibility of the corollary premise: do the means by which 
Hobbes describes generating potential publica—civil honour—by its very definition 
counteract the disposition otherwise required for civil peace—fear of shameful death?  Rather 
than presuming that Hobbes’s system implies a nearly insurmountable problem of generating 
potential publica, I now wish to study—having previously demonstrated that the sovereign 
can indeed generate it—how this may conflict with the conditions of civil peace within a 
commonwealth.  I will do so in two main ways: I will discuss (i) how the means of generating 
instrumental power conflicts with civil peace and (ii) how the authorised exercise of 
instrumental power conflicts with civil peace.   
 It is important to note, as I will review, that influential and recent interpreters who do 
acknowledge the instrumental power of the sovereign also generally argue that it is limited. 
While I will agree, I will do so not only on different grounds, but will also argue that it is not a 
resolvable tension—as these interpreters suggest—but, within Hobbes’s system, it is an 
entrenched, necessary and yet insoluble one.  I have already argued that interpreters who have 
characterised Hobbes’s sovereign’s ability to generate instrumental power as cripplingly 
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limited, have done so without adequately acknowledging the detailed means by which Hobbes 
describes it can be generated, as I discussed in the previous chapter.  In this chapter, I will 
argue against interpreters who focus exclusively on the limits to its exercise from the 
perspective of subjects, and who do so by either arguing that (a) subjects have a right to resist 
being used by the sovereign for the sake of defence or (b) ordinary subjects, with the notable 
exception of soldiers, do not have an obligation during peacetime to contribute to the 
commonwealth’s defence.   While acknowledging the sovereign’s ability and right to 
commandeer subjects, these interpreters suggest that the rights of subjects are agonistic and 
limiting to the sovereign’s corresponding right to command them for the sake of defence. 
However, as I have demonstrated, Hobbes has described the means by which the 
sovereign is able to overcome the general psychological dispositions of subjects in order for 
them to contribute to defence. In so doing—as I will argue in this chapter—Hobbes has also 
described the psychological and practical means by which to overcome the legal and moral 
claims subjects may have to resist or refuse their contribution.  That is, while subjects may not 
have an obligation to contribute, and may indeed have a right to resist their use, a Hobbesian 
sovereign must nevertheless be able to compel subjects to contribute. This clearly requires 
being correspondingly able to effectively overcome or render inadequate subjects’ moral or 
legal objections.  The psychological motivation Hobbes encourages the sovereign to employ to 
that end is, in other words, also represents a practically effective means by which to overcome 
the moral or legal objections of subjects.   
While I generally agree with these interpreters that there are moral and legal limits to 
the use of ordinary subjects, rather than looking primarily at the ways in which subjects may 
be entitled to refrain from contributing, I think it more fitting to understand it according to 
Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty (rather than according to his theory of subjects’ rights), and to 
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look at the ways in which generating their contribution may counteract and contradict the 
conditions of civil peace.  I look at it, as I have done throughout this dissertation, from the 
sovereign’s perspective, upon whom, ultimately, the obligation to manage and balance all of 
this rests.  I look at the requirements of defence, therefore, not primarily in the de jure sense of 
sovereign commands contra subjects’ rights, but rather in the de facto sense that the 
requirements of defence itself are considered by Hobbes as potentially disruptive of the 
conditions of civil peace. 
In other words, the limits to the authorised exercise of sovereign instrumental power 
are a result of the sovereign’s obligation to maintain civil peace, and not primarily, as others 
have argued, as a result of subjects’ rights to refuse their contribution. 
  
7.2 Limits to generating instrumental power 
 
7.2.1 The uniformity of passions and Hobbesian roles 
It is important to briefly qualify the practical ability of Hobbes’s sovereign to generate 
instrumental power absolutely.  Plamenatz writes, “For power, as Hobbes knew, is never 
unlimited.  No man or body has ever stood, or could in the real world stand, to other men in 
such a relation that whatever he or it commanded they would do”329.  King provides a similar 
reminder:  
Where political organisation persists, political power or authority can no more 
be made absolute than it can be absolutely destroyed … It is not absolute (i.e. 
entirely concentrated in one locus) where the controller requires any degree of 
assent from either co-controllers (actual or potential) or from those controlled.  
In every social organisation someone influences or controls someone else and 
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no ruler rules without some degree of assent from the ruled or from co-rulers … 
Political absolutism is impossible in so far as it recommends a ‘complete’ 
concentration of power.  To restrict our concern to political absolutism, we can 
see that it is built around a recommendatory exaggeration.  In the strict sense, it 
is plain that power cannot be made absolute; hence it is foolish to wish it so.330 
 
To say, then, that the sovereign’s ability to exercise instrumental power is absolute, is 
to say that the sovereign can depend upon the contribution of all of its subjects. This is a 
scenario which both King and Plamenatz assert is impossible, not just in Hobbes’s system, but 
matter-of-factly due to the practical impossibility of always being able to rely upon all 
subjects contributing.  It would be prudent to heed King and Plamenatz’s prima facie 
observation here, and a careful reading of Hobbes suggests more specifically that, as Hobbes 
understood it, the sovereign’s absolute instrumental power is indeed limited in this way.  
Hobbes’s acceptance of this is evident from two specific Hobbesian arguments:  (i) Hobbes’s 
conception of the passions are not uniform across individuals and exceptions to contributions 
depend upon, and may be limited by, character, and (ii) expectations of contribution to 
sovereign instrumental power are assigned to different groups of subjects; that is, subjects are 
assigned different roles. 
Two interpreters in particular have added most to our understanding of these 
rationales, Deborah Baumgold and Gabriella Slomp.  First, Baumgold critiques the 
preoccupation amongst many Hobbes scholars with determining a uniform psychological 
foundation.331  Her brief review covers J. W. N. Watkins and M. M. Goldsmith, who both 
assume uniformity in human nature, C. B. Macpherson, who characterises Hobbesian man as 
innately desiring power without limit along bourgeois lines, and Michael Oakeshott, who, as 
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we have seen, also asserts that although an aristocratic figure may not necessarily counteract 
the conditions of civil peace, Hobbes nevertheless thinks the passion to be reckoned with in 
most cases is fear.  The interpretative remedy to this preoccupation is, Baumgold believes, 
implicit in this dismissive statement of Gauthier’s:  “No doubt a detailed analysis of their 
arguments [L, Chapters 22-25, 28] is unnecessary to an understanding of the structure of 
Hobbes’ss political theory, [although] their general character casts an important light on what 
Hobbes deemed to be the nature of the society to which his theory applied”332. 
Baumgold, however, thinks it is indeed necessary to analyse these chapters of 
Leviathan, and on their basis, wishes to question “… the assumption that everyman is the 
principal subject of Hobbes’s arguments, and the related notion that the power of a Hobbesian 
sovereign hinges, in the first instance, on the support of ordinary citizens, Hobbism becomes 
first and foremost a theory about the obligations and motivation of individuals more or less 
abstractly conceived” 333.   
Instead, she notes that Hobbes “counts on special offices, or roles, for the performance 
of civic functions.  In the notable instance, only soldiers, those who have enlisted or taken 
impressment money, have a strong obligation to fight for the state”334. Importantly, she rightly 
notes that “… cowardice, for example, excuses a subject from having to fight”335. 
Gabriella Slomp similarly questions the universal psychological nature of Hobbesian 
man by specifically examining the changing role of glory in Hobbes’s works.336  She asserts—
based on the different treatment Hobbes gives the passions between the Elements of Law and 
                                                
 
332 Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan, p. 139. 
333 Baumgold, Hobbes’s Political Theory, p.82. 
334 Ibid. 
335 Ibid.  
336 Gabriella Slomp, Thomas Hobbes and the political philosophy of glory (London: Macmillan, 2000). 
  
212 
both Leviathan and De Homine—that “… on the whole Hobbes seems to be no longer 
convinced that glory is the fundamental universal motivation.  Therefore the existence of non-
glory-seekers is consistent with the general tenor of Leviathan, whereas their presence was 
inexplicable and contradictory in the context of the psychological theory of the Elements of 
Law and De Cive”337.  Her convincing argument holds that, in Leviathan, glory is just one of 
many motivating passions, and importantly, it is not the common ultimate motivation of all 
people 338.  Glory, therefore, “is no longer the genus, or ultimate source of all passions and 
desires, but becomes a species, or an instance of human passions”339. 
Inferred by these two arguments, therefore, the expectations of subjects’ contributions 
would be expected to be contingent on their different motivations, their various characters and 
their assorted roles within the political system. I agree with this, and what this means in the 
context of defence is that although the sovereign is incapable of generating absolute 
instrumental power, the extent to which the sovereign can generate it is a matter of degree, 
dependent on the characters of subjects, and also as attested to by the varying roles (whether 
chosen or assigned), his subjects are described as fulfilling.  Due to Hobbes’s 
acknowledgment that limits to the generation of instrumental power are a matter of degree, 
one cannot assume, however, that the sovereign is incapable of generating an impressively 
significant amount of instrumental power, the need for which would most obviously present 
itself during a time of war.  
To summarise, the insightful interpretations of Slomp and Baumgold concerning the 
non-uniformity of Hobbesian subjects’ passions, and the various roles subjects may assume 
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within Hobbes’s system, represent the most convincing arguments for believing that Hobbes 
acknowledged the impossibility of generating absolute instrumental power. Therefore, both 
the characters of Hobbesian subjects and the fact that their roles differ, limit the generation of 
instrumental power.  Note that it is a matter of degree and not a matter of either/or; while the 
interpreters discussed in the previous chapter assume in the main that the very fact that the 
sovereign’s exercise of instrumental power is dependent upon subjects’ contribution 
necessarily severely limits the ability of the sovereign to generate it, these two more subtle 
interpretations by Slomp and Baumgold persuasively suggest, however, that the extent to 
which the sovereign is able to generate instrumental power is a matter of degree.  Sovereign 
instrumental power can be generated to a greater or lesser extent, dependent specifically on the 
different characters and roles of subjects.  Their arguments do not refute the ability of the 
sovereign to generate instrumental power; instead, truer to Hobbes’s intent, they refine the 
parameters and degrees of how the dependency on subjects’ contribution may limit its 
generation without necessarily preventing it. 
It is also important to note here that this does not yet suggest that the sovereign lacks 
the absolute authority to commandeer all subjects.  True, the means to generate such power 
are described and authorised, even though Hobbes acknowledges that it is not possible to 
generate it absolutely, but also importantly—and this has yet to be discussed adequately in the 
literature—despite the fact that it may counteract the conditions of civil peace.   While Hobbes 
importantly acknowledges the practical impossibility of generating absolute instrumental 
power, in making this acknowledgement, he does not necessarily concede the occasional need 
to generate near-absolute instrumental power, nor does he concede the right of the sovereign 
to attempt to generate it to a near-absolute degree.  I will now argue that this authorised 
exercise of instrumental power, while necessary, does simultaneously conflict with the 
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conditions of civil peace. 
 
7.3 Introduction to the authorised exercise of instrumental power 
In Chapter Three I discussed the two ways in which Hobbes obligates his sovereign to 
rule according to the natural laws, and what that obligation generally requires.  To briefly 
review my argument, according to Hobbes, once a commonwealth has been established, the 
natural laws are binding because they are the command of an agent who obliges, and Hobbes 
provides two rationales for the sovereign’s obligation to rule in concurrence with the natural 
laws according to this principle. Hobbes’s secular rationale entails that the sovereign is 
obliged to rule according to the natural laws because the sovereign himself is the agent whose 
command obliges.  Alternatively, Hobbes’s theistic rationale entails that the sovereign is 
obliged to rule according to the natural laws because God is the agent who obliges.   
Importantly, the sovereign’s decision regarding which of these two rationales he ought 
to teach and instil in his subjects is contingent on their respective practical effectiveness for 
maintaining civil peace, which in turn is contingent upon the prior beliefs of subjects.  
However, whichever rationale it is grounded upon, I argued, the sovereign is in either case 
obliged to (i) rule equitably and (ii) manage his subjects’ disposition to obey him.  To do 
otherwise, Hobbes argues, would be to invite civil disobedience, civil disorder and, ultimately, 
defeat the very purpose of sovereignty itself.  In other words, when the sovereign does not rule 
in accord with the natural laws, the sovereign is in effect mismanaging his subjects’ 
disposition to obey him and hence undermining his own authority, an act which the sovereign 
is duty bound to refrain from doing.   
Accordingly, as I argued in Chapter Four, the authority of Hobbes’s sovereign can be 
understood to be limited in two distinct ways.  The first entails a lack of authority on the part 
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of the sovereign; that is, what the sovereign does not have authority over, or what is not in the 
sovereign’s domain. The second limitation on the sovereign’s authority is a limitation on the 
exercise of sovereign authority.  In other words, the sovereign may possess authority over 
certain matters, however, Hobbes clearly cites both principles and examples which stress that 
the sovereign should not exercise his authority over these matters.  These restrictions on the 
sovereign’s authority and the exercise of sovereign authority are ultimately derived from the 
natural laws, in accord with which the sovereign is obliged to rule.   
Now, this is Hobbes’s argument as it pertains exclusively to civil peace; we must now 
add to it the authority to exercise instrumental power for the sake of defence.  The first 
limitation—a lack of authority—is not evidently relevant here; as I argued in Chapter five, the 
sovereign certainly and clearly does possess the right to freely exercise sovereign instrumental 
power as he deems fit.  However, as for the second type of limitation—a limit to the exercise 
of authority—the exercise of it for the sake of defence becomes acutely pertinent. 
Upon the establishment of a commonwealth, the sovereign is obliged to rule according 
to the natural laws; such an obligation necessarily requires an acknowledgement of their truth. 
Were the sovereign to violate the natural laws, he not only denies his obligation to rule in 
accord with them, he also challenges the truth of their content.  To breach one rule is to 
challenge the validity of all the others. 
As I argued in Chapter Four, the natural laws spell out certain liberties for subjects, 
and due to the sovereign’s obligation to the natural laws, the sovereign’s exercise of authority 
is limited by these liberties.  All liberties, according to Hobbes, are derived from the right of 
nature, which “is the liberty each man hath to use his own power” to preserve his own nature 
as he sees fit.  The right of nature is essentially, therefore, the liberty to do anything.  Liberty 
is never granted—even the sovereign’s liberty is simply a retention of his right of nature—but 
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rather retained, transferred or renounced.  What is not transferred or renounced is what is 
properly understood to remain of one’s liberty.   
An important liberty belonging to subjects, therefore, is that liberty which cannot be 
renounced or transferred.  The generation of a commonwealth is conceived of as involving the 
renunciation and transfer of each individual’s rights to the sovereign.  There are, according to 
Hobbes, however, rights that are not alienable.  The inalienable rights cannot be “abandoned 
or transferred (L, 82)”.  First, “a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that assault 
him by force, to take away his life . . . (L, 82)”.  Secondly, a man cannot lay down the right of 
resisting those who aim to “wound” or “imprison” him (L, 82).  Lastly, since the purpose of 
renouncing and transferring rights is “the security of a man’s person, in his life and in the 
means of so preserving life as not to be weary of it”, then a man cannot “despoil himself of the 
end for which those signs were intended (L, 82).” 
These inalienable rights, therefore, are those elements of the right of nature which are 
still possessed by subjects in a commonwealth, those which are not renounced or transferred 
“for the preservation of [one’s] own nature”.  Since the right of nature is “the liberty each man 
hath to use his own power” to attain any and all things as he sees fit, then corresponding to 
these inalienable rights is the liberty to use one’s own power to avoid death, imprisonment, 
and preservation of life so “as not to be weary of it”.   
Thus, the obligations of subjects to their sovereign are limited by the implications of 
the first and second laws of nature.  The sovereign’s exercise of authority can be seen as 
limited by the subjects’ inalienable rights because the sovereign cannot expect obedience in 
these matters.  The sovereign may have the authority to violate his subjects’ inalienable rights, 
but the exercise of that authority is hampered by his subjects’ right to resist the sovereign’s 
exercise of this authority.  
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It is important to note, however, that this agonistic relationship is due to choices made 
by the sovereign and not principally agonistic.  Were the sovereign to violate these rights, the 
sovereign would in effect be denying their inalienability. However, because the natural laws in 
general must be affirmed for the sake of civil peace, the sovereign is obliged to rule in accord 
with them.  As I argued, then, the exercise of sovereign authority is limited by the sovereign’s 
obligation to rule according to the natural laws, from which follows the sovereign’s 
affirmation of subjects’ inalienable rights. 
However, as the remainder of this chapter will discuss, the natural laws and the 
affirmation of subjects’ inalienable rights are not a practically effective means by which to 
ensure the other purpose of sovereignty: defence.  The sovereign’s authorised exercise of 
instrumental power, I will argue, necessarily requires breaching the obligation to rule 
according to the natural laws.  
Whereas I suggested, in Chapters Three and Four, that for the sake of civil peace the 
sovereign is obliged to refrain from making commands which would needlessly undermine or 
thwart that purpose, defence is an altogether different purpose which, I will argue, requires the 
sovereign to make commands that will undermine the maintenance of civil peace. 
Recall that in Chapter Four I argued that the sovereign’s obligation to the natural laws 
also obliges the sovereign, under certain circumstances, to be tolerant of religious behaviour, 
and to do so I examined those aspects of the natural law which intolerance of religious 
behaviour may breach.  To command and to enforce certain religious behaviour, I concluded, 
not only risks the ability of the sovereign to maintain his authority through the management of 
his subjects’ disposition to obey him, but also constitutes a form of inequitable rule.  Hobbes’s 
sovereign must, accordingly, refrain from legislating religious behaviour that would needlessly 
threaten the peaceful maintenance of the commonwealth. 
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In the context of defence, however, the difference between tolerating religious 
behaviour and tolerating subjects’ resistance to contributing to the sovereign’s exercise of 
instrumental power is this: whereas intolerance of religious behaviour would constitute a 
breach of the natural laws and commanding religious behaviour is not necessary, subjects’ 
contribution to the defence of the commonwealth is necessary, and tolerating their resistance 
would limit the necessary authority of the sovereign to exercise instrumental power. 
Moreover, I will assert that while both purposes are necessary yet also counteract one 
another, Hobbes’s system provides no resolution to this and instead represents an entrenched 
and insoluble ambivalence which is inherent in his theory of sovereignty. I will present an 
argument that conceives of this ambivalence as neither a result of an imbalance between 
subjects’ rights contra sovereign’s rights, nor of an agonistic counter-balance between the two.  
Instead, I will assert that it is a necessary ambivalence within Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty 
itself—albeit a potentially and, acknowledgedly, dangerous one—and is to be managed solely 
according to the sovereign’s judgement. 
What ultimately limits the authorised exercise of instrumental power, I will argue, is 
the simultaneous obligation to ensure civil peace.  Recall that the sovereign’s affirmation of 
subjects’ ‘inalienable’ rights is practically effective means by which to ensure civil peace. 
However, if the sovereign judges that the defence of the commonwealth requires revoking 
these inalienable rights and in their stead obliges subjects to risk their lives on behalf of the 
commonwealth’s defence, he is free to do so and indeed, has the right to suspend even the 
contravening inalienable rights of subjects.  One cannot presume, therefore, that subjects’ 
rights are what limits the sovereign’s exercise of instrumental power; more accurate is to say 
that the assertion of subjects’ rights are a practically effective means of ensuring civil peace, 
but if defence requires it, these rights may be revoked since they are practically ineffective, 
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and present an obstacle, for the defence of the commonwealth.  
Integrated into this argument is a comparison of Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty during 
what can be called peacetime, with its exception, war.  Evident from this comparison are: (i) in 
war, the higher the degree to which the sovereign must command the contribution of subjects, 
the more it will disrupt the conditions of civil peace; (ii) the requirements of defence conflict 
with the requirements of civil peace in both peace and war; and (iii) in peacetime the 
requirements of civil peace are paramount, yet nevertheless, the sovereign’s necessary 
preparedness for war may counteract civil peace. 
At the same time, recall that I have argued that the exercise of authority is contingent 
on its efficacy for civil peace. I will now subsequently argue that this extends to the 
sovereign’s exercise of authority for the sake of defence.  This, however, limits the authority 
of the sovereign to effect defence because (i) it is not contingent on its efficacy for defence in 
isolation, the obligation of the sovereign to rule according to the natural laws for the sake of 
civil peace do not suddenly loose their primacy, and therefore, (ii) the limits to the exercise of 
instrumental power are due in a large part to the impact that exercise may have on the 
conditions of civil peace.  There are, in other words, commands that the sovereign may make 
that are judged by him to be necessary for defence, yet those same commands would 
undermine his authority, otherwise requisite for civil peace.  
 
7.4 Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty in war 
In war, to ensure the commonwealth is able to defend itself, and as I argued in Chapter 
Five, the sovereign is described as being both able to generate, and authorised to exercise, 
instrumental power.  Following from this, it is evident that a Hobbesian sovereign must enact 
five key practically effective measures: (i) affirm the obligation of subjects’ to contribute; (ii) 
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command their contribution and concord; (iii) mitigate subjects’ fear and motivate their 
courage by bestowing honours; (iv) valuate the worth of subjects according to their ability, 
inevitably resulting in inequitable treatment; and (v) punish subjects’ resistance or refusal to 
contribute to defence.   
The first measure is made clear in Leviathan: 
And when the defence the commonwealth requireth at once the help of all that 
are able to bear arms, every one is obliged, because otherwise the institution of 
the commonwealth, which they have not the purpose or courage to preserve, 
was in vain (L, 143). 
In the Latin edition of Leviathan, Hobbes phrases it even more emphatically:  “… all 
citizens, each person who either can bear arms or contribute something, however little, to 
victory, is obliged to military service” (OL, 143). 
In the Review and Conclusion of Leviathan, Hobbes reiterates and adds to this:   
To the Laws of Nature declared in Chapter 15, I would have this added: that 
every man is bound by nature, as much as in him lieth, to protect in war the 
authority by which he is himself protected in time of peace.  For he that 
pretendeth a right of nature to preserve his own body cannot pretend a right of 
nature to destroy him by whose strength he is preserved; is a manifest 
contradiction of himself.  And though this law may be drawn by consequence 
from some of those that are there already mentioned, yet the time require to 
have it inculcated and remembered (L, 490). 
Closely linked to this first measure is the second: when war requires it, the sovereign is 
to command subjects’ contribution and ensure concord.  Recall from Chapter five the 
importance Hobbes places on concord, evident in the following passage:  
And be there never so great a multitude, yet if their actions be directed 
according to their particular judgments and particular appetites, they can 
expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a common enemy, 
nor against the injuries of one another.  For being distracted in opinions 
concerning the best use and application of their strength, they do not help, but 
hinder one another, and reduce their strength by mutual opposition to nothing 
… (L, 107). 
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Also cited in Chapter Five, recall Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty as it pertains to the 
authority of the sovereign to exercise its power for the sake of defence:  
And because the end of this institution is the peace and defence of them all, 
and whosoever has right to the end has right to the means, it belongeth of right 
to whatsoever man or assembly that hath the sovereignty, to be judge both of 
the means of peace and defence, and also of the hindrances and disturbances 
of the same, and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both 
beforehand (for the preserving of peace and security, by prevention of discord 
at home and hostility from abroad) and, when peace and security are lost, for 
the recovery of the same (L, 113). 
The sovereign, as the following passage clearly indicates, does not simply have the 
right to defend the commonwealth; the sovereign requires the ability to make war “as he shall 
think it best”.  It … 
… is annexed to the sovereignty the right of making war and peace with other 
nations and commonwealths, that is to say, of judging when it is for the public 
good, and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and paid for that end, 
and to levy money upon the subjects to defray the expenses thereof.  For the 
power by which the people are to be defended consisteth in their armies; the 
strength of an army, in the union of their strength under one command; which 
command the sovereign instituted therefore hath, because the command of the 
militia, without other institution, maketh him that hath it sovereign.  And 
therefore, whoever is made general of an army, he that hath the sovereign 
power is always generalissimo (L, 114). 
Quite clearly, therefore, the sovereign’s right to exercise instrumental power must 
actually and effectively be exercised when required to defend the commonwealth. Moreover, 
the decision of when, and to what extent, the coordinated contribution of subjects is required 
for that end is the sovereign’s alone. 
The third measure, overcoming fear and motivating courage by bestowing honours, 
pertains to the means of generating the required amount of instrumental power (and the 
number of subjects needed) that the sovereign judges to be necessary.   This was, recall, 
covered in Chapter Six and is nicely encapsulated by the following passage from Leviathan:  
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Lastly, considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon themselves, 
what respect they look for from others, and how little they value other men, 
from whence continually arise amongst them emulation, quarrels, factions, and 
at last war, to the destroying of one another, and diminution of their strength 
against a common enemy, it is necessary that there be laws of honour and a 
public rate of the worth of such men as have deserved (or are able to deserve) 
well of the commonwealth … But it hath already been shown that not only the 
whole militia, or forces of the commonwealth, but also the judicature of all 
controversies is annexed to the sovereignty.  To the sovereign therefore it 
belongeth also to give titles of honour, and to appoint what order of place and 
dignity each man shall hold, and what signs of respect, in public or private 
meetings, they shall give to one another (L, 115). 
The fourth measure is a consequence of the third: honouring subjects for their utility 
and success in defending the commonwealth. Since not all subjects will be equally useful or 
able, by honouring those who are more so, the sovereign is in effect treating them unequally in 
comparison by judging them less useful or less able.   
The fifth and final measure—punishing subjects’ resistance to their commanded 
contribution to assist in the defence of the commonwealth—is evident from the eleventh “right 
of sovereigns”: 
… to the sovereign is committed the power of rewarding with riches or 
honour, and of punishing with corporal or pecuniary punishment or with 
ignominy, every subject according to the law he hath formerly made (or if 
there be no law made, according as he shall judge most to conduce to the 
encouraging of men to serve the commonwealth, or deterring of them from 
doing disservice to the same) (L, 115). 
To summarise, the key point I wish to draw from these five measures is not that they 
are merely sovereign rights; they are, in a time of war, requirements.  The sovereign is 
required to effectively defend the commonwealth, and to do so in a time of war he must (i) 
assert the obligation of subjects’ to contribute; (ii) command their contribution and concord; 
(iii) mitigate subjects’ fear and motivate their courage by bestowing honours; (iv) treat 
subjects unequally on the basis of their utility to defence; and (v) punish subjects’ resistance to 
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contributing to defence.   
Note, however, that each of these measures, while necessary for defence, conflict with 
or counteract the conditions of civil peace.  In other words, Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty 
during war contradicts and counteracts Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty during peacetime.  In 
order to effectively maintain peace within a commonwealth, the five key measures to defend 
the commonwealth are precisely the opposite of those required during peacetime, as I’ll 
discuss in the proceeding section; in peacetime, the sovereign must (i) assert subjects’ right to 
withhold their use (inherent in their right of nature); (ii) refrain from conscription; (iii) instill 
fear (thereby overcoming their personal honour); (iv) treat subjects equally; and (v) refrain 
from punishing subjects’ refusal to contribute.   
 
7.5 Hobbes’s ambivalent theory of sovereignty in peacetime 
7.5.1 Conscription and resistance 
To determine whether Hobbesian subjects possess the right to withhold their use for 
the defence of the commonwealth—during peacetime—the following passage is crucial: 
Upon this ground a man that is commanded as a soldier to fight against the 
enemy, though his sovereign have right enough to punish his refusal with 
death, may nevertheless in many cases refuse without injustice, as when he 
substituteth a sufficient soldier in his place; for in this case he deserteth not the 
service of the commonwealth.  And there is allowance to be made for natural 
timorousness, not only to women (of whom no such dangerous duty is 
expected) but also to men of feminine courage.  When armies fight, there is, 
on one side or both, a running away; yet when they do it not out of treachery, 
but fear, they are not esteemed to do it unjustly, but dishonourably.  For the 
same reason, to avoid battle is not injustice, but cowardice.  But he that 
enrolleth himself a soldier, or taketh imprest money, taketh away the excuse of 
a timours nature, and is obliged, not only to go to the battle, but also not to run 
from it without his captain’s leave.  And when the defence the commonwealth 
requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear arms, every one is 
obliged, because otherwise the institution of the commonwealth, which they 
have not the purpose or courage to preserve, was in vain (L, 143; OL, 143). 
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Amongst the recent literature to discuss this matter, Sreedhar’s sensitive interpretation 
of this passage is highly influential and notable.  There are a number of important liberties of 
subjects measured here, which Sreedhar summarises well:  
(1) a subject can avoid conscription without injustice if he pays another to take 
his place; (2) if a drafted subject flees the battlefield out of fear, he is 
dishonorable but not unjust; and (3), if all are needed to fight, then the excuse 
is lost340.   
Sreedhar accurately draws the important implications: in a time of war when 
the contribution of all subjects is necessary, there is no right to refuse one’s 
contribution.  On the other hand,  
… if such a contribution is not necessary—that is, if the sovereign’s ability to 
provide for the defence of the commonwealth is unaffected by the refusal—
then there is a liberty to disobey.  As long as he provides a substitute to take 
his place in battle, the conscripted soldier “deserteth not the service of the 
commonwealth341.   
Such disobedience is morally permissible, she argues, because it does not affect the 
sovereign’s ability to provide for the common defence 342. She concludes, and this is where I 
will ultimately disagree, that “an individual draft-dodger or deserter does not threaten political 
stability, and so can be excused without consequence”343.  
However, for the sake of argument let us approach this—as I have throughout—from 
the sovereign’s perspective, and discuss the sovereign’s choice (for the decision belongs to the 
sovereign alone) whether to assert or deny subjects’ ‘liberty of timidity’ in the same way as I 
did ‘Naaman’s freedom’. Rather than looking at it from the perspective of subjects’ right to 
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resist or their obligation to obey, let us look at it from the perspective of the sovereign and the 
pragmatic logic behind either asserting or violating the liberty. 
If a Hobbesian sovereign were to threaten to punish a timorous subject lest he obey a 
command which would threaten his life—and which would simultaneously deny a subjects’ 
‘liberty of timidity’—should the subject (i) resist and consequently suffer punishment at the 
hands of the sovereign, or (ii) begrudgingly obey his sovereign, despite the risk to his life in so 
doing? 
Let us, therefore, presuppose that the sovereign has commanded either general 
conscription (which some subjects of timorous nature would be caught up in) or commanded a 
specific, timorous subject to fight.  If such a subject, in defiance of such a command, were to 
assert his ‘liberty of timidity’, he would clearly be disobeying the sovereign’s command and 
the sovereign would be forced to choose between permitting this disobedience—and in so 
doing generally affirming subjects’ ‘liberty of timidity’—or punishing this disobedience— in 
so doing generally denying the ‘liberty of timidity’. 
In either case, I will argue, it is evident that Hobbes believed—according to the 
requirements of maintaining civil peace—that the sovereign has made a mistake in making the 
command in the first place insofar as and because it is disruptive of civil peace.   
Ultimately, in issuing a conscription order during peacetime (rather than, as a 
Hobbesian sovereign otherwise should, relying solely on enlistment), the sovereign is forcing 
the subject into a position in which he must choose between his own self-preservation and 
obedience to his sovereign. However, Hobbes’s system, and as I have discussed at length in 
Chapter three, is intended to reconcile these two. 
Unlike other commands, though, a conscription order puts the subjects’ life at risk and, 
therefore, a subjects’ choice in the face of such a command is not so much between his own 
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self-preservation and obedience to his sovereign, but rather becomes a gamble between who is 
more likely to take his life: a foreign enemy in battle, or one’s own sovereign (whose capital 
punishment one could expect from disobeying the order). 
Now, instilling honour in subjects is the means by which the sovereign can overcome 
this fear of violent death for some subjects and hopefully in sufficient numbers, thereby 
overcoming their appeal to their right of self-preservation (for these honour-driven subjects 
feel not the need to assert their right of self-preservation).   
For those other subjects who do feel the need to preserve their lives, the ‘liberty of 
timidity’ is a legal right permitting them to do so.  Moreover, to deny them that right would be 
to deny the inalienable right of self-preservation, as demonstrated in Chapter three.  It is 
derived directly from the first two natural laws and so the sovereign, in denying it, would 
simultaneously deny the very basis and purpose of his authority.  Were a timorous subject to 
disobey a conscription order, and were the sovereign to punish the subject for doing so, this 
would be equivalent to not only denying the ‘liberty of timidity’ but would undermine the 
inalienable right to self-preservation itself.    
Therefore, during peacetime, the sovereign’s perspective correlates with Sreedhar’s 
account of the subjects’ perspective.  From the subjects’ perspective, there is indeed a ‘liberty 
of timidity’ they can appeal to.  From the sovereign’s perspective, punishing the resistance of 
subjects to conscription would represent a denial of that liberty, which would be 
simultaneously disruptive of civil peace. Such a liberty must, therefore, be respected.  
 
7.5.2 Conscription and begrudging obedience 
 However, and this is where Sreedhar’s account becomes problematic, Hobbes also 
asserts precisely the opposite of her reading.  While she asserts—and there is no denying that 
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Hobbes asserts it as well—that there is an affirmed liberty of timidity, Hobbes also asserts in a 
subsequently ‘added’ law of nature (in the “Review and Conclusion” of Leviathan) precisely 
the opposite:  “that every man is bound by nature, as much as in him lieth, to protect in war the 
authority by which he is himself protected in time of peace” (L, 490).  The caveat “as much as 
in him lieth” cannot be interpreted as an exception based on character or timorousness; it is, 
instead, a particular caveat to the prior premise “that every man is bound by nature” and, 
therefore, is far more likely to be intended as a physical exemption from such an obligation.  
Hobbes importantly adds: “For he that pretendeth a right of nature to preserve his own body 
cannot pretend a right of nature to destroy him by whose strength he is preserved; it is a 
manifest contradiction of himself” (L, 490).  This directly contradicts the rationale for the 
‘liberty of timidity’ in the first place: that it is meant to reconcile, and not force the choice 
between, the right of self-preservation and one’s obedience to the sovereign when that would 
threaten one’s own life.  It is entirely possible that Hobbes here is referring to defending one’s 
sovereign from internal enemies during a civil war344.  However, this does not mitigate the 
implications for the ‘liberty of timidity’ in war, either civil or foreign.  Whether the threat to 
the sovereign and the commonwealth come from an army within, or from an army without, to 
not defend one’s sovereign in order to preserve one’s own life is to deny sovereignty’s 
necessary role in preserving one’s own life in the first place.  Hence, “every man” has a 
preceding and natural obligation to fight to protect one’s sovereign and one’s commonwealth. 
This poses to Sreedhar’s account some problematic questions, however.  Why would 
Hobbes extend this obligation to “all men”, deny what he otherwise affirms (the liberty of 
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timidity) and risk, in so doing, the peaceful maintenance of the commonwealth?  Why would 
he blatantly contradict the carefully constructed reconciliation between subjects’ rights of self-
preservation and the sovereign’s duty to defend the commonwealth, meant to avert the 
dissolution of the commonwealth while still being prepared to defend it?  
Sreedhar’s account implies that the reconciliation is brought about by striking a 
systemic, agonistic yet somehow harmonious balance—between the subjects’ rights of self-
preservation and the sovereign’s duty to defend the commonwealth—by providing an absolute 
exemption during peacetime to the subjects’ contribution that could be appealed to by 
timorous subjects without fear of punishment. However, this exemption—the liberty of 
timidity—is evidently not absolute during peacetime:  there is a corresponding natural 
obligation to contribute to the commonwealth’s defence applicable to all subjects.   
Moreover, because it is not an absolute exemption it cannot be described as an 
entrenched or constitutional tension between subjects’ and sovereign which is somehow 
maintained in balance without supervision. In other words, Sreedhar’s account suggests that 
the ever-present ‘liberty of timidity’ during peacetime entrenches an agonistic, yet somehow 
balanced, relationship between the subjects’ right of self-preservation and the sovereign’s duty 
to protect the commonwealth.  I contend, however, that Hobbes’s assertion that the ‘liberty of 
timidity’ is not necessarily absolute during peacetime suggests that it is not an entrenched or 
constitutional resolution. Her overarching argument is that “Hobbes’s commitment to uniting 
enlightened self-interest with political obligation requires that his theory includes retained 
rights”345.  However, Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty insofar as it is concerned with effecting 
defence clearly does not ‘require’ retained rights; in fact Hobbes asserts precisely the opposite.  
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More accurately, the affirmation of the ‘liberty of timidity’, and the corresponding denial of it, 
reflects Hobbes’s intent to make the choice of whether to assert either the liberty or the 
contrary obligation to be overseen and managed by the sovereign and is, therefore, entirely 
contingent on the sovereign’s judgement.  
That being said, due to the sovereign’s obligation to rule according to the natural law, 
the sovereign would be, during peacetime, obliged to assert this ‘liberty of timidity’ for 
reasons I have already discussed.  Recall, it is meant to reconcile, and not force the choice 
between, the right of self-preservation and one’s obedience to the sovereign when that would 
threaten one’s own life.  However, because Hobbes asserts both the ‘liberty of timidity’ and 
the obligation of subjects to defend the commonwealth, this enables the sovereign to judge—
with no small amount of risk involved—which of the two to assert.  Hobbes’s sovereign would 
base this judgement on the degree and extent to which subjects’ contribution is required to 
defend the commonwealth, and as I have previously demonstrated.  In other words, although 
the ‘liberty of timidity’ is necessary to preserve civil peace, Hobbes nevertheless enables the 
sovereign to revoke that liberty when the sovereign judges it to be restrictive and counter-
productive to the defence of the commonwealth. 
I mentioned that there is ‘no small amount of risk involved’, and the risk is this:  the 
sovereign, having the authority to conscript according to his own perception of foreign threats, 
has the right and option to appeal to and enforce every physically able subject’s natural 
obligation to contribute to defence.  Now, conceivably and legitimately, the number of 
conscripts the sovereign deems he needs could reach such a number that the conscription order 
extended to those who lacked the courage to fight and had not consented prior by enlisting as 
soldiers and thereby renounced their ‘liberty of timidity’.  
Recall from previous chapters that a key rationale which Hobbes provides for the 
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restraint on the sovereign’s exercise of authority arises from the sovereign’s obligation to rule 
equitably.  Commanding a public profession of faith, for instance, that not all subjects in 
conscience ascribe to, may result in inequity.   Some subjects would sincerely believe what 
they were being commanded to profess, while others would not believe what they were being 
commanded to profess.  By enforcing the command, therefore, the sovereign would be 
allowing some subjects their liberty of conscience, while denying it to others.  This is, Hobbes 
argues, inequitable; even though it is a command that applies equally to all, in the sense that 
all must obey it, it is also, according to Hobbes, potentially inequitable in the sense that some 
subjects are permitted their liberty of conscience while others are denied it.  Since Hobbes 
insists repeatedly that the sovereign must not act inequitably, for inequity is a form of iniquity, 
a restraint on the sovereign may be derived from this: the sovereign should not grant to one 
subject or group of subjects a liberty that the sovereign would deny to another.  Or to restate 
this, tolerate those who feel obliged to their consciences in matters which the sovereign allows 
others their liberty of conscience.  In other words, be tolerant when to be intolerant would 
require inequity.  
In the case of conscription, this same logic of equity applies.  Crucially, what Sreedhar 
fails to account for is the inevitable phenomenon of begrudging obedience.  If the sovereign 
conscripted a large number of subjects, inevitably amongst them would be: (a) those who were 
not prior soldiers but who nevertheless had no expressed objection to being conscripted; (b) 
those who lacked the courage to fight and would consequently resist the conscription order; 
and (c) those who lacked the courage to fight yet would begrudgingly obey the conscription 
order.  Group A poses no significant problem; groups B and C, however, create the potential 
for inequity. 
Were the sovereign to deem the current militia insufficient for the defence of the 
  
231 
commonwealth, a conscript order would be the obvious Hobbesian solution.  Now, a general 
conscript order could allow for the refusal of some subjects based on their ‘liberty of timidity’, 
and thus group B would be exempt and there would be no group C.  
However, what if, following the conscription order, the sovereign deemed the current 
militia, plus the addition of group A, to still be insufficient?  The sovereign would then have to 
resort to what I have already argued he has the right to do whenever he deems it necessary: 
deny subjects their ‘liberty of timidity’ and affirm their natural obligation to defend the 
commonwealth.  This could, moreover, be enforced by capital punishment, since “a man that 
is commanded as a soldier to fight against the enemy …his sovereign have right to punish his 
refusal with death” (L, 142).  Herein lies the problem:  if at this point, the sovereign allowed 
resistance to go unpunished, no subject that had not yet obeyed would have reason to do so 
now.  The sovereign would be forced to punish resistance because these remaining subjects 
have already demonstrated that for them, there is no motivation sufficient aside from avoiding 
the sovereign’s last resort: punishment.  In so doing, however, the sovereign pushes the 
remaining non-contributing subjects into groups B and C.   
If the sovereign were to then allow resistant conscripts their ‘liberty of timidity’ after 
he threatened punishment, he would be denying it to others who would not have obeyed if that 
clemency had been acknowledged beforehand.  If we were to agree with Sreedhar, in that 
those who resist conscription in peacetime are always immune from punishment, the 
begrudgingly obedient subjects would feel unequally treated to say the very least.  This, of 
course, is precisely what the sovereign is obliged to not do or allow. Recall from Chapter four, 
Hobbes argues that from the perspective of the sovereign, the sovereign should not grant a 
liberty to a subject or group of subjects that the sovereign would deny to another.    
Unlike religious commands, however, which Hobbes deemed ultimately unnecessary 
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and potentially disruptive of civil peace, commands made for the sake of defence are indeed 
necessary. The sovereign’s mandate to defend the commonwealth does require commands that 
will nevertheless counteract and undermine the sovereign’s authority, otherwise required for 
civil peace.  Again, the essential difference between exercising authority for the sake of civil 
peace, and the authorised exercise of instrumental power is this: for the sake of civil peace, 
commands which are deemed in conflict with the natural laws limit the sovereign’s exercise of 
authority and are deemed unnecessary; for the sake of defence, certain commands that will 
disrupt the internal peace of the commonwealth, and are in violation of the natural law, are 
nevertheless deemed necessary. 
Sreedhar, therefore, is wrong to conclude that what ultimately limits the sovereign’s 
exercise of instrumental power during peacetime is a result of subjects’ ‘liberty of timidity’, 
for the simple reason that the ‘liberty of timidity’ in and of itself is not absolute in peacetime.  
As Sreedhar acknowledges, it is revocable during wartime.  However, the stark contrast 
Sreedhar draws between peacetime and war is not an objective one; it is instead a subjective 
decision to be determined by the sovereign alone and in accord with his own judgement.  
Additionally, the sovereign also determines the degree to which subjects’ contribution to 
defence is required.  This determination, moreover, is based not on an objective standard, but 
rather is based on the sovereign’s own perception of whether the commonwealth is at peace or 
war, or somewhere in between. 
This does not mean, however, that there are no limits to the sovereign’s exercise of 
instrumental power; rather it suggests that any such limits are not implied by the ‘liberty of 
timidity’ being absolute during peacetime.  Limits are instead due to the obligation of the 
sovereign to rule according to the natural laws for the sake of civil peace. The sovereign, 
ruling in accord with the natural laws, has an obligation to not conscript when it is not 
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necessary, for to do so would deny subjects their inalienable rights, which as I have argued 
before, would threaten the conditions of civil peace.  The sovereign’s affirmation of subjects’ 
‘inalienable’ rights are, recall, practically effective means by which to ensure civil peace.  
However, if the sovereign judges that the defence of the commonwealth requires 
revoking these ‘inalienable’ rights and in their stead obliges subjects to risk their lives on 
behalf of the commonwealth’s defence, he is free to do so.  One cannot presume, therefore, 
that subjects’ rights are what limits the sovereign’s authorised exercise of instrumental power; 
more accurate is to say that the assertion of subjects’ rights are a practically effective means of 
ensuring civil peace, but if defence requires it, these rights may be revoked since they are 
practically ineffective, and present an obstacle, for the defence of the commonwealth. 
  What ultimately, therefore, limits the authority of the sovereign to exercise 
instrumental power, is not the rights of subjects. Rather, although the sovereign must defend 
the commonwealth, he must simultaneously endeavour to do so without needlessly or 
subsequently causing civil disorder. What ultimately limits the authorised exercise of 
sovereign instrumental power, therefore, is the sovereign’s obligation to ensure civil peace. 
 
7.6 Leviathan’s soldier 
Deborah Baumgold shares Sreedhar’s focus on the potential threat to civil peace 
implied by subjects’ rights contra the sovereign’s rights in the context of defence.  Like 
Sreedhar, she heeds the too-often overlooked passage xxi, 16 of Leviathan.  From it, 
Baumgold concludes that “… only soldiers, those who have enlisted or taken impressment 
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money, have a strong obligation to fight for the state”346. 
Baumgold’s argument can be summarised as follows: (i) soldiers have stronger 
obligations than ordinary subjects; (ii) the act of consent which confers this stronger obligation 
onto soldiers is signified by remuneration; (iii) these different obligations of soldiers and 
ordinary subjects protect the right of ordinary subjects to resist, while the stronger obligations 
of soldiers enable the sovereign to defend the commonwealth without interfering with the 
conflicting rights of ordinary subjects; and (iv) the agonistic relationship between subjects’ 
rights and sovereign rights is, therefore, circumvented347.  
Baumgold’s larger interpretative point is that this protects ordinary subjects from being 
obliged to fight for either competing elites or on behalf of a unified commonwealth.  I agree, 
but I nevertheless wish to assert that this attempt causes problems of its own, which Baumgold 
overlooks.  The problem, ascertainable from Hobbes’s own comments, is that a militia, while 
necessary, may nevertheless pose a threat to the general security of a commonwealth.  This 
forces us to view the role of the militia in Hobbes’s system in a rather different way; rather 
than viewing a militia as exempting ordinary subjects from contributing to defence and, 
therefore, conducive to civil peace I, while not denying this aspect, assert that at the same time 
the preparedness for foreign wars which a militia affords may very well counteract the 
conditions of civil peace.   
More specifically, Baumgold’s assertion that ordinary subjects retain their inalienable 
rights and have weaker obligations, while soldiers have a stronger obligation to fight on behalf 
of the state, may not be, as would follow from her account, believed by Hobbes to be a 
                                                
 
346 Baumgold, (1988) p.82. 
347 Ibid. p.87-89 
  
235 
sufficient measure to prevent civil disorder.   
Instead, Hobbes recognises and describes that although the preparedness for war that a 
militia affords is necessary, it may nevertheless disrupt the internal conditions of civil peace.  I 
will focus, therefore, not on the higher vs. lower obligations of subjects and soldiers, but rather 
on the methods available to a Hobbesian sovereign to effect adequate defence—of how to 
‘cause’ soldiering—and these are what I will argue may ultimately counteract civil peace. 
 
7.6.1 The necessity of a militia for the defence of a commonwealth 
The importance of the sovereign’s control over the militia is explained in Leviathan, 
Chap xviii, 12, cited earlier in this chapter, and additionally so in Behemoth, one of the major 
themes of which is the necessity of the sovereign’s control over the militia; a point Hobbes 
forcefully and repeatedly makes: 
… the power of the militia, … is in effect the whole sovereign power.  For he 
that hath the power of levying and commanding the soldiers, has all other 
rights of sovereignty which he shall please to claim (Behemoth, 80). 
… so stupid they were as not to know, that he that is master of the militia, is 
master of the kingdom, and consequently is in possession of a most absolute 
sovereignty (Behemoth, 98). 
…. I make account that the legislative power (and indeed all power possible) 
is contained in the power of the militia (Behemoth, 102). 
Nor is it simply the sovereign right that is of paramount importance; the sovereign 
must have the ability to defend the commonwealth, which entails the practically effective 
control of the militia: “The King had these things indeed in his right; but that signifies little, 
when they that had the custody of the navy and magazines, and with them all the trained 
soldiers, and in a manner all his subjects …” (Behemoth, 27).   For “… when they have laid 
the burthen of defending the whole kingdom, and governing it, upon any person whatsoever, 
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there is very little equity he should depend on others for the means of performing it; or if he 
do, they are his Sovereign, not he theirs”. 
In following with my general interpretative approach, I wish to identify how Hobbes 
advises the sovereign to effectively control and maintain a militia. I have identified three 
methods, all of which, interestingly, concern fiscal and remunerative measures: (i) 
remuneration as a sign of honour; (ii) remuneration as compensation; and (iii) the sovereign’s 
sole right and ability to levy taxes.  Each of these means, however, are acknowledged by 
Hobbes to simultaneously counteract the conditions of civil peace.   
Taking each in turn, Hobbes, in Leviathan, includes remuneration as a sign of honour 
or sovereign favour, since “… in commonwealths, where he or they that have the supreme 
authority can make whatsoever they please to stand for signs of honour …” (L, 53).  Amongst 
these, “Covetousness of great riches and ambition of great honours are honourable, as signs of 
power to obtain them.  Covetousness, and ambition of little gains or preferments, is 
dishonourable” (L, 54).  Importantly, “Riches are honourable, for they are power.  Poverty, 
dishonourable” (L, 53).   
However, to honour or show favour towards one group of subjects (for instance, 
soldiers) over another (ordinary subjects) based on their relative utility, though of course 
necessary to motivate soldiers, reintroduces into the public realm pride, arrogance, and 
ultimately, inequality.  Consider the following passage where Hobbes discusses the 
sovereign’s role in rewarding subjects who serve the commonwealth:  
In like manner it belongeth to the office and duty of the sovereign to apply his 
rewards always so as there may arise from them benefit to the commonwealth, 
wherein consisteth their use and end; and is then done, when they that have 
well served the commonwealth are, with as little expense of the common 
treasure as is possible, so well recompensed as others thereby may be 
encouraged, both to serve the same as faithfully as they can … (L, 230). 
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However, while honouring a subject through remuneration is motivational and 
necessary, it also has its negative effects.  The essence of the problem is this: it promotes, and 
rewards, ambition.  On the one hand, the sovereign must reward such ambition.  On the other 
hand, this causes inequality and also puts the sovereign in a position where he is vulnerable to 
extortion from popular subjects. 
Concerning the inequality this would inevitably result in, Hobbes reminds his readers:   
The inequality of subjects proceedeth from the acts of sovereign power, and 
therefore has no more place in the presence of the sovereign … than the 
inequality between kings and their subjects, in the presence of the King of 
kings.  The honour of great persons is to be valued for their beneficence and 
the aids they give to men of inferior rank, or not at all.  And the violences, 
oppressions, and injuries they do are not extenuated, but aggravated by the 
greatness of their persons, because they have least need to commit them.  The 
consequences of this partiality towards the great proceed in this manner.  
Impunity maketh indolence; insolence, hatred; and hatred, and endeavor to 
pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatness, though with the ruin of 
the commonwealth (L, 227). 
Simply put, the sovereign, by turning useful subjects into “great” subjects, might very 
well engender partiality, which eventually leads to ruinous consequences. 
Hobbes also emphasises that the sovereign must not be perceived to be dependent on 
and subsequently buying a popular subjects’ loyalty.   
To buy with money or preferment from a popular ambitious subject, to be 
quiet and desist from making ill impressions in the minds of the people, has 
nothing of the nature of reward (which is ordained, not for disservice, but for 
service past), nor a sign of gratitude, but of fear … (L, 230). 
In the Latin ed., Hobbes adds to this passage in parentheses “… moreover, the 
commonwealth is king of the children of pride, and is so made that he ought not to fear”.  This 
suggests that, while the sovereign must honour subjects’ utility, the sovereign must be acutely 
cautious not to be seen as honouring an ambitious subject so much so that the signs of honour 
conferred appear to be a sign of fear, since this does not “… tend to the benefit, but to the 
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damage of the public (OL, 231). 
Inevitably, conferring signs of honour upon useful subjects will also lead ambitious 
subjects to strive for such honours, and their numbers will surge:  
It is a contention with ambition, like that of Hercules with the monster Hydra, 
which, having many heads, for every one that was vanquished there grew up 
three.  For in like manner, when the stubbornness of one popular man is 
overcome with reward, there arise many more (by the example) that do the 
same mischief, in hope of like benefit (L, 231). 
The ‘mischief’ Hobbes is referring to here is, I believe, best described as extortion.  A 
sovereign who has rewarded and honoured a subject so much so that the sovereign is 
perceived to need that subject, is vulnerable to extortion from that subject.   This is quite 
evident in Behemoth, where Hobbes makes the same allusion to Hercules and Hydra: 
… I have observed often, that such as seek preferment, by their stubbornness 
have missed of their aim; and on the other side, that those princes that with 
preferment are forced to buy the obedience of their subjects, are already, or 
must be soon after, in a very weak condition … For Hercules at first did not 
cut off those heads, but bought them off; and afterwards, when he saw it did 
him no good, then he cut them off, and got the victory (Behemoth, 72).  
Hobbes concludes: 
And though sometimes a civil war may be deferred by such ways as that, the 
danger grows still the greater, and the public ruin more assured.  It is, 
therefore, against the duty of the sovereign, to whom the public safety is 
committed, to reward those that aspire to greatness by disturbing the peace of 
their country, and not rather to oppose the beginnings of such men, with a little 
danger, than after a longer time, with greater (L, 231). 
The obvious problem is, therefore, that on the one hand the sovereign must honour 
subjects for their utility, which is necessary at the very least for defence; on the other hand, 
however, such honouring may disturb the peace.  Note, too, that Hobbes does not prescribe 
any practical solution to this; it is simply presented as a worrying, yet necessary, ambivalence 
left for the sovereign to manage. 
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The insoluble character of these problems, and the interminable attention and prudence 
required to simply manage them, is equally evident in Hobbes’s discussion of commanders of 
the militia: 
A commander of an army in chief, if he be not popular, shall not be beloved 
nor feared as he ought to be by his army; and consequently, cannot perform 
that office with good success.  He must, therefore, be industrious, valiant, 
affable, liberal and fortunate, that he may gain an opinion both of sufficiency 
and of loving his soldiers.  This is popularity, and breeds in the soldiers both 
desire, and courage, to recommend themselves to his favour, and protects the 
severity of the general, in punishing (when need is) the mutinous or negligent 
soldiers.  But this love of soldiers (if caution be not given of the commander’s 
fidelity) is a dangerous thing to sovereign power, especially when it is in the 
hands of an assembly not popular (L, 232). 
So what advice does Hobbes offer?  Merely this: “it belongeth, therefore, to the safety 
of the people, both that they be good conductors, and faithful subjects, to whom the sovereign 
commits his armies” (L, 233). 
As for the second of Hobbes’s fiscal measures to control and maintain a militia—
remuneration as compensation—Hobbes’s use of the word “vendible” is highly suggestive in 
this passage:   
… when the stubbornness of one popular man is overcome with reward, there 
arise many more (by the example) that do the same mischief, in hope of like 
benefit; and as all sorts of manufacture, so also malice increaseth by being 
vendible (L, 231 italics added).   
The fiscal motivation just discussed concerns ambition, insofar as remuneration is a 
sign of honour. However, conferring honours via remuneration also creates a market culture: 
“For in a market where honour and power is to be bought with stubbornness, there will be a 
great many as able to buy …” (Behemoth, 72).   This would reach downwards and, when 
applied not to particularly popular subjects but more generally to soldiers and ordinary 
subjects, will attract those of a mercenary character.  The incentive to fight on the sovereign’s 
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behalf may not always be, as conceded by Hobbes, civil honour but rather necessity, profit or 
simple greed.  The mercenary character of such soldiers would make them ripe for recruitment 
by wealthy malcontents and ambitious contenders of sovereignty.  In Behemoth, Hobbes 
identified this as one of the seven chief causes of the civil war:  
… there were a great number that had either wasted their fortunes, or thought 
them too mean for the good parts which they thought were in themselves; and 
more there were, that had able bodies, but saw no means how honestly to get 
their bread.  These longed for a war, and hoped to maintain themselves 
hereafter by the lucky choosing of a party to side with, and consequently did 
for the most part serve under them that had greatest plenty of money 
(Behemoth, 4). 
Consideration of these first two measures foreshadows the importance of the third: the 
sovereign’s sole right to levy taxes, so justified by the necessity of it to maintain control over 
the militia.  While the sole source of honour needs to stem from the sovereign, the sole right to 
levy taxes also belongs to the sovereign, thus depriving anyone else in the commonwealth 
from that ability or right to command soldiers, either by bestowing honour upon them, 
incentivising mercenaries or, more generally, by affording potentially seditious and popular 
subjects their own soldiers, munitions and ships. 
Recall, it  
… is annexed to the sovereignty the right of making war and peace with other 
nations and commonwealths, that is to say, of judging when it is for the public 
good, and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and paid for that end, 
and to levy money upon the subjects to defray the expenses thereof.  (L, 114). 
The subject of taxation in the context of defence—indeed of taxation as being 
necessary and primarily justified in terms of defence—is clearly stated in Leviathan:   
To equal justice appertaineth also the equal imposition of taxes, the equality 
whereof dependeth not on the equality of riches, but on the equality of the debt 
that every man oweth to the commonwealth for his defence (L, 227).  
However, and for instance, listed amongst the “diseases of a commonwealth” is, 
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… the difficulty of raising money for the necessary uses of the 
commonwealth, especially in the approach of war. This difficulty ariseth from 
the opinion that every subject hath of a propriety in his lands and goods, 
exclusive of the sovereign’s right to the use of the same (L, 217). 
These reluctant subjects who are unwilling to contribute “to their own defence, make it 
necessary for their governors to draw from them what they can in time of peace, that they may 
have means on any emergent occasion, or sudden need, to resist or take advantage on their 
enemies” (L, 118), despite the fact that for many, “every little payment appeareth a great 
grievance” (L, 118).  
In Behemoth, this theme is picked up again by Hobbes.   
And though it be prudence also in private men, justly and moderately to enrich 
themselves, yet craftily to withhold from the public or defraud it of such part 
of their wealth, as is by law required, is no sign of prudence, but of want of 
knowledge of what is necessary for their own defence (Behemoth, 44). 
While taxation is necessary for defence to enable the sovereign to effectively defend 
the commonwealth (beyond merely having the right to), Hobbes acknowledges that it 
nevertheless leads to resentment on the part of subjects.  And, once again, this is stated as a 
necessary yet insoluble problem to be solely managed by the sovereign in an advisedly 
prudent and cautious fashion. 
To quickly summarise the above, while I agree with Baumgold for the most part, she 
nevertheless pays insufficient attention to how, during peacetime, Hobbes’s sovereign’s 
preparedness to defend the commonwealth through maintaining and controlling a militia 
necessarily counteracts the conditions of civil peace.  Her interpretation, therefore, in seeking 
to reconcile the particular conflict between the rights of subjects and the rights of sovereigns 
that defence occasions, pays insufficient notice to how Hobbes’s resolution of that conflict 
presents another: Hobbes concedes that the maintenance of a militia itself may counteract his 
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stated conditions of civil peace.   
Hobbes’s awareness of this problem, moreover, indicates that he thought the 
requirements of defence will present an intractable problem because a militia is nevertheless 
necessary.  Generally speaking, therefore, the requirements of defence represent a necessary 
and entrenched ambivalence with the conditions of civil peace.   
 
7.7 Conclusion 
Having now discussed the issue of whether or not there are limits to the authorised 
exercise of instrumental power, I have shown that there are indeed, but they are a result of the 
sovereign’s obligation to maintain civil peace, and not primarily, as others have argued, as a 
result of subjects’ rights to resist their contribution. The contribution of subjects to the 
commonwealth’s defence is entirely dependent upon the sovereign, upon whom the obligation 
to manage and balance all of this rests.  
Were the sovereign to violate the inalienable rights of subjects, the sovereign would in 
effect be denying their inalienability. However, because the natural laws in general must be 
affirmed for the sake of civil peace, the sovereign is obliged to rule in accord with them.  As I 
have argued, therefore, the exercise of sovereign authority is limited by the sovereign’s 
obligation to rule according to the natural laws, which simultaneously requires the affirmation 
of subjects’ inalienable rights. 
However, the natural laws and the affirmation of subjects’ inalienable rights are not a 
practically effective means by which to ensure the other purpose of sovereignty: defence.  The 
sovereign’s authorised exercise of sovereign instrumental power, I have argued, necessarily 
requires breaching the obligation to rule according to the natural laws.  
While both purposes are necessary yet also counteract, there is in Hobbes’s system no 
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resolution to this, which represents an entrenched and insoluble ambivalence inherent in his 
theory of sovereignty. This ambivalence is neither a result of an imbalance between subjects’ 
rights contra sovereign’s rights, nor of an unsupervised agonistic counter-balance between the 
two.  Instead, it is a necessary ambivalence within Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty itself—
albeit a potentially, and acknowledgedly, dangerous one—and is to be managed solely 
according to the sovereign’s—ideally, prudent and practicable—judgment. 
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Conclusion 
 
Reviewing my arguments of Chapters One to Four, my basic intent had been to 
demonstrate how Hobbes’s primary concern in Leviathan—the maintenance of a peaceful 
commonwealth—leads him to limit the authority of his “absolute” sovereign by ensuring that 
the sovereign abide by select dictates of rule.  Hobbes creates a number of principles, the 
natural laws, which he believes must be adhered to in order for his objective—civil peace—to 
be achieved.  Hobbes accordingly obligates his sovereign to rule in accord with them, and this 
obligation, in turn, entails a limit on the sovereign’s exercise of authority.  While the 
obligation entails certain rules or principles of sovereign action, it also entails certain limits or 
restraints.  These restraints which the obligation entails, since they are derived from the natural 
laws—which are those principles that Hobbes believes to be requisites for peace—may in turn 
be described as being necessary dictates of rule for the maintenance of a peaceful 
commonwealth.  In other words, a proper interpretation of Hobbes must acknowledge that 
“We needn’t attribute to Hobbes the hysterical view that sovereign authority is so fragile that a 
single limit, a single exception, would shatter it”348. 
Of particular interest to Hobbes, moreover, is the necessity of these restraints on 
sovereign power for the peaceful maintenance of a Christian commonwealth.  The 
peculiarities present in a Christian commonwealth must be taken into account, thought 
Hobbes, and to achieve the peaceful maintenance of a Christian commonwealth, additional 
restraints on sovereign power are required.  Most notably, the sovereign must tolerate all 
purely private religious thought and belief, and the sovereign must refrain from legislating 
                                                
 
348 Herzog, p. 81. 
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religious laws which could potentially force Christians to act in opposition to their belief. 
I began by establishing that Hobbes, in the Leviathan, was indeed primarily interested 
in creating a prescription for a peaceful commonwealth. By noticing what Hobbes stated to be 
the fundamental obstacle to peace, it became clear that both the secular and religious aspects 
of the Leviathan must be taken into account.  Hobbes believed that conflict most frequently 
arose due to the people choosing between obedience to God and obedience to man.   It is, 
therefore, evident that the substantial religious content of Leviathan must not be ignored 
should one wish to further understand how Hobbes sought to create the principles which, 
when enacted, would ensure the existence of a peaceful commonwealth. 
Since Hobbes believed this problem—the choice between obedience to God or man—
to be the fundamental obstacle to peace, much of the Leviathan is devoted to its resolution.  
The problem that arises from this choice, according to Hobbes, is due mainly to the 
relationship between obedience and authority.  Subjects of an authority, he argued, have a duty 
to obey the commands of that authority.  However, if one is unsure of who the ultimate 
authority is, God or man, then one would likewise be torn as to whom one ultimately had a 
duty to obey.   
Accordingly, I demonstrated the way in which Hobbes sought to eliminate this 
conflict, mainly by highlighting his arguments which stripped ecclesiastics of their authority, 
and also his arguments which denied the legitimacy of all but one source of Christian 
revelation.     
The pressing question that these arguments prompt, to which many commentators have 
responded, is whether Hobbes eliminated God as a foundation for political authority, or 
whether Hobbes, despite curtailing the ability of men to obey God instead of their fellow man, 
maintained God as the foundation for political authority.  In other words, in response to the 
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question “obey God or man” did Hobbes, reply “obey man instead of God” or, rather “obey 
God and man”? 
While this question is certainly relevant to whether or not Hobbes was an atheist, 
Hobbes’s ‘true’ answer has little bearing on the political implications of his system.  The 
relevance of this question to the practical application of Hobbes’s system is diminished when 
the assumption which prompts the question is put into its proper context.  Those asking this 
question assume that the natural laws are foundational principles; they argue that if the natural 
laws can be demonstrated to be equated with God’s laws by Hobbes, then it may be concluded 
that Hobbes’s system has a theistic foundation.  Conversely, if the natural laws can be 
demonstrated to function independently of God, then it may be concluded that Hobbes’s 
system only appears to have a theistic foundation.  However, the natural laws are also 
presented by Hobbes as ruling principles, principles that a sovereign must abide by in order to 
achieve the peaceful maintenance of a commonwealth. 
From this perspective, and from a practical standpoint, regardless of whether or not the 
natural laws are God’s laws, the sovereign is obliged to rule in accord with them.  Specifically, 
Hobbes provides two rationales, one secular and one religious, which both obligate the 
sovereign to abide by the natural laws.  Whether or not the natural laws are sincerely intended 
by Hobbes to be equated with God’s laws makes virtually no practical difference to the 
sovereign’s obligation under the natural laws. 
This obligation, it was argued, entailed two major requirements for the sovereign’s 
exercise of authority.  First, the sovereign must rule equitably, and second, the sovereign must 
manage his subjects’ disposition to obey him.  In a Christian commonwealth, I argued, this 
second requirement entails two things.  First, the sovereign of a Christian commonwealth must 
encourage a fear of God amongst his subjects alongside a fear of the sovereign.  Second, the 
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sovereign of a Christian commonwealth is obliged to teach that the basis of his authority 
ultimately rests upon God, which is to teach that God is the author of the natural laws and 
implies a Christian duty of subjects to obey their sovereign. 
The fear of God, and the idea of God as the agent whose command obliges must, 
therefore, be viewed by the sovereign as instrumental; that is, as practically effective bases for 
the exercise and maintenance of authority in a Christian commonwealth.   
This notion of God, and of His relationship to the natural laws, is in stark contrast to 
that proposed by those who assume that the natural laws are mainly foundational principles.  
Where they ask “Does Hobbes eliminate the authority of one of the masters—God or man?” or 
“Does Hobbes make obedience to the two masters consistent?”, it is very plausible that 
Hobbes was more immediately concerned with the management of Christian subjects’ 
perception of whom they are ultimately obliged to obey.  The focus, in other words, of my 
arguments differs from that of the predominant strains of interpretation.  Rather than focus on 
whether or not Hobbes intended God to be the ultimate foundation for his system, I have 
chosen to focus on Hobbes’s belief that the fear of God, and the idea of God as the author of 
the natural laws, is actually required for the peaceful maintenance of a Christian 
commonwealth composed of Christian subjects.  Whether or not God is the author of the 
natural laws is of less importance to Hobbes than the maintenance of a peaceful Christian 
commonwealth, whose subjects, he believed, must perceive that there exists no conflict 
between obedience to God and man.  
In this chapter, the extent of the restraints imposed upon the sovereign was examined.  
First, the sovereign does not possess the authority to coercively affect his subjects’ thoughts or 
beliefs.  He can, and may, attempt to do so through persuasion, but he is powerless to 
coercively change beliefs.  Much more common, I argued, are instances where the sovereign’s 
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authority is limited by restrictions on its exercise spelled out in the natural laws.  The 
sovereign, for instance, must rule equitably, and many restraints on the dealing out of 
punishments are inferred by Hobbes from the natural laws.   
While these restraints are common to all commonwealths, there are particular restraints 
which apply to a Christian commonwealth, which also indicates the extraordinary extent to 
which the exercise of sovereign authority is contingent and limited due to religious concerns.  
The first type of religious tolerance that is apparent in Hobbes’s Leviathan is a tolerance of 
thought and belief.  The sovereign must tolerate thought and belief, Hobbes argues, because 
thought and belief are, by nature, free.  Accordingly, Hobbes argues, they are not amenable to 
change by coercion, and thus the sovereign does not possess the power to change them 
through coercive means.  Since the sovereign cannot, he ought not try. 
The sovereign’s tolerance of thought and belief is also argued to result from the 
liberties of subjects.  This explanation argues that thoughts and beliefs are inalienable rights, 
based on the natural liberty of subjects, which in turn implies that although the sovereign has 
the authority to be intolerant, subjects have an inalienable right to religious freedom which 
must be acknowledged by the sovereign. 
Whatever the rationale, it is discernible in Leviathan that Hobbes intended the 
sovereign to be tolerant of his Christian subjects’ thoughts and beliefs.  Likely more 
contentious, however, is my claim that Hobbes obliged his sovereign to tolerate certain 
expressions of religious belief; that the sovereign must refrain from being intolerant of certain 
religious behaviour. 
I argued that the sovereign has this obligation for two main reasons, both arising out of 
the sovereign’s obligation to the natural law.  First, due to the sovereign’s obligation to 
maintain peace, the sovereign of a Christian commonwealth is required to teach his subjects 
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that God is the author of the natural laws, and that they, in turn, have a Christian duty to obey 
their sovereign.  One of the necessary doctrines for this teaching to be effective is the doctrine 
of Naaman’s freedom: God will not hold a subject accountable for those actions which are in 
obedience to the sovereign.  This doctrine, Hobbes argues, alleviates the conflict between 
obedience to God and man.   
However, were the sovereign to command a subject to act in a way that, in conscience, 
the subject believes to be against God’s will, the sovereign, Hobbes argues, unnecessarily puts 
his authority at risk.  The sovereign’s authority is at risk because were the subject to defy the 
sovereign’s command, the subject publicly renounces the validity of Naaman’s freedom.  
Jeopardising the legitimacy of Naaman’s freedom in a Christian commonwealth must, Hobbes 
argues, be avoided.  To avoid this, moreover, is a relatively simple task; the sovereign should 
not command religious behaviour that would symbolise or indicate belief of potentially 
controversial religious doctrines.  In other words, the sovereign is obliged to avoid 
commanding religious behaviour that would force subjects to choose between obedience to 
God and obedience to their sovereign.  This would most obviously result in an obligation to 
not command public professions of faith. 
The second rationale which Hobbes provides for this restraint on the sovereign’s 
exercise of authority arises from the sovereign’s obligation to rule equitably.  Commanding a 
public profession of faith,  that not all subjects in conscience ascribe to, may result in inequity.   
Some subjects would believe what they were being commanded to profess, while others would 
not believe what they were being commanded to profess.  By enforcing the command, 
therefore, the sovereign would be allowing some subjects their liberty of conscience, while 
denying it to others.  This is, Hobbes argues, inequitable; even though it is a command that 
applies equally to all, in the sense that all must obey it, it is also, according to Hobbes, 
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potentially inequitable in the sense that some subjects are permitted their liberty of conscience 
while others are denied it.   Since Hobbes insists repeatedly that the sovereign must not act 
inequitably, for inequity is a form of iniquity, a restraint on the sovereign may be derived from 
this: the sovereign should not grant to one subject or group of subjects a liberty that the 
sovereign would deny to another.  Thus the sovereign should also not tolerate those who feel 
obliged to their consciences in matters for which the sovereign allows others their liberty of 
conscience.  In other words, be tolerant when to be intolerant would require inequity.  
To command and to enforce certain religious behaviour, therefore, not only risks the 
ability of the sovereign to maintain his authority through the management of his subjects’ 
disposition to obey him, but also constitutes a form of inequitable rule.   Hobbes’s sovereign 
must, accordingly, refrain from legislating religious behaviour that would needlessly threaten 
the peaceful maintenance of the commonwealth.  The sovereign’s restraint, moreover, 
translates into a liberty: where the law is silent, Hobbes states, subjects have liberty.  This 
further translates into a freedom of religious expression—not generally speaking, but rather a 
liberty to express or not to express one’s religious beliefs on particular matters, matters on 
which the sovereign has refrained from legislating behaviour.   
Hobbes does not provide, it must be noted, a general principle of toleration of religious 
expression; rather, Hobbes provides a prudential strategy which the sovereign is obliged to use 
under circumstances in which intolerance of religious expression would threaten peace.  
Specifically, toleration of religious expression for Hobbes is a provisional measure in which 
the sovereign refrains from legislating religious behaviour which would otherwise undermine 
the maintenance of his authority and breach the natural laws.  Again, Hobbes has given every 
reason why a Christian subject should obey his sovereign, yet Hobbes tempers this by advising 
a prudent sovereign not to force obedience in certain instances.   
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For peace to be maintained in a Christian commonwealth, therefore, Hobbes believed 
that a measure of tolerance must be embraced by the sovereign.  Without the sovereign’s 
tolerance of both religious belief, and in some instances, of religious expression, a Christian 
commonwealth cannot be, Hobbes believed, a peaceful one.   The sovereign of a Christian 
commonwealth must maintain a delicate balance between his subjects’ disposition to obey him 
and their fear of God—a balance which Hobbes thought would quickly evaporate should the 
sovereign, through intolerantly enforcing an unnecessary religious law, force his subjects to 
reconsider their duty to obey him.   
 
In Chapters Five to Seven, I turned my attention to the purpose of defence.  An apt 
description of the tension in Hobbes’s system between that which is required for civil peace, 
and that which is required for defense, is, I think, provided by the following lengthy passage 
taken from Michael Oakeshott’s On Human Conduct, discussing the influence war has had on 
the perceived and real character of states in European history.  I include it, despite its length, 
because of its unfortunate obscurity: 
Briefly it may be said that a modern European state at war, whatever the 
strength of its disposition to retain its character as civil association, is 
indisputably turned in the direction of association in terms of a substantive 
purpose.  In war itself, the latent or not so latent ingredient of managerial 
lordship in the office of the government of a modern state comes decisively to 
the surface and is magnified, and what had hitherto been no more than 
contrivances for collecting revenue, for safeguarding the sources of revenue, 
or for maintaining civil order become devices for controlling the use of 
resources and for removing substantive choice from the conduct of subjects.  
In war the status of ‘subject’ recedes before that of agent and role-performer 
in an enterprise, and the word ‘public’ loses its meaning as considerations of 
civility to be subscribed to by cives in pursuing their chosen satisfactions and 
comes to stand for the now compelling corporate purpose of the association.  
And what is plenary in a condition of actual war is merely somewhat 
diminished in the intervals between wars.  War in a modern European state is 
the enemy of civil association; belligerence is alien to civil association.  
Secondly, war and military preparation imposes this character upon a state 
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more or less completely, not in proportion to its destructiveness, but in 
proportion to the magnitude of the claims it makes upon the attention, the 
energies, and the resources of its subjects; and the wars of modern times have 
been progressively more demanding in this respect.  Hostitilites which in the 
fourteenth century destroyed everything that lay in their path but were 
otherwise experienced only in the demands of tax-collectors and left to 
impoverished subjects the management of their own affairs, by the twentieth 
century have become occasions for the almost total mobilazation, 
management, and direction of their attention, their energies and their resources 
in pursuit of a single purpose.  Thirdly, a modern European state which has in 
any significant degree surrendered its character as civil association in favour 
of some non-military idiom of enterprise association and the office of whose 
government has become a notably managerial engagement, or a state in which 
the character of civil association has never decisively emerged, in (in the 
conditions of modern Europe) inherently belliegerent; its already purposeful 
disposition invites that of a state at war.  And finally, what is learned in war is 
remembered when hostilities subside.  The model of a state understood as 
assoication in terms of a substantive purpose and of its apparatus of ruling has 
always been sought and found in the image and organization of a state bent 
upon conquest or of a city besieged the common vocabulary of purposive 
‘rule’ is military.  Thus, although it may be difficult to find any modern 
European state recognizably the counterpart of Sparta in antiquity (that is, a 
state whose reputed purpose is itself war), the condition of almost continuous 
warfare in modern times has familiarized Europe with the spectacle of states 
significantly, if intermittently, transformed into enterprise associations; and 
this has been the chief nourishment of the belief that a state is properly to be 
understood in these terms.349 
My intention in this thesis was to identify the ambivalence between the purpose of civil 
peace, and the purpose of defense, which exists in Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty. This same 
broad ambivalence is captured well in the above passage, which identifies an ambivalence 
between civil and enterprise association. While Oakeshott claimed this ambivalence exists in 
the history of modern European states, I broadly did so within Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty 
itself. I did so not in order to speculate on Hobbes’s influence on the development of the 
modern European state, interesting as that may be.  Rather, I argued that the inherent 
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ambivalence of his theory of sovereignty is the aspect of his thought most relevant and 
consequential for understanding the role of defense in his political thought as a whole.   
 Hobbes’s conception of the role of power—in a non-juridical sense—was, I argued, 
essential to understanding this.  Hobbesian subjects are subject to two types of sovereign 
power: natural power which causes their submission, and instrumental power which requires 
their contribution.  While the sovereign’s exercise of natural power is intended to prevent 
actions on the part of subjects that would otherwise be inimical to civil peace, the sovereign’s 
exercise of instrumental power is intended to be used for the defense of the commonwealth 
and requires the contribution of subjects.  
 Insofar as Hobbes’s description of the practical ability of the sovereign to generate 
instrumental power, I argued against influential interpreters who, while noticing the effect of 
natural power, paid little heed to instrumental power.  The insufficient attention to 
instrumental power leads to a misconception that Hobbes’s moral-psychological theory 
prevents the use of subjects and would, therefore, render his commonwealth effectively unable 
to defend itself.  I argued, however, that Hobbes’s sovereign is described as being able to 
generate instrumental power, and although that ability counteracts the moral-psychology of 
submission, Hobbes’s sovereign so conceived would nevertheless have the ability to 
commandeer subjects’ power and thereby defend the commonwealth.  
 Insofar as the natural/instrumental distinction applies to the authorized exercise of it, I 
argued against notable interpreters who focused exclusively on the limits to its exercise from 
the perspective of subjects, and who did so by either arguing that (i) subjects have a right to 
resist being used by the sovereign for the sake of defence; or (ii) ordinary subjects, with the 
notable exception of soldiers, do not have an obligation during peacetime to contribute to the 
commonwealth’s defence.  I argued instead from the perspective of the sovereign, and 
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concluded that the limits to the authorized exercise of sovereign instrumental power are 
instead a result of the sovereign’s obligation to maintain civil peace.  Hobbes’s sovereign, to 
borrow a nice phrase from Tom Sorell, has a ‘burdensome freedom’: “the burdens of securing 
what Hobbes calls ‘peace’ are great”350. 
 
 
  
                                                
 
350 Tom Sorell, “The burdensome freedom of sovereigns” in Sorell and Foisneau, ed. Leviathan after 350 Years 
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